P0 dup

Commentary

Volume Sixty-three, Number Three, March 1977

RECEIVED

AMERICA AND THE WORLD
The Next Four Years

CONFRONTING THE PROBLEMS
Walter Laqueur

BEYOND DÉTENTE
Robert W. Tucker

DEFENSE RECONSIDERED
Edward N. Luttwak

BAKKE VS. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA	John H. Bunzel
VANADIUM—A MEMOIR	Primo Levi
ABU DAOUD AND THE LAW	Sandra E. Rapoport
Music: GERMAN WARTIME BROADCASTS	Samuel Lipman
Movies: 1976 MINUS ONE	William S. Pechter
Books in Review: Chaim Raphael/Suzanne Weaver/Edward Hirsch/ Maurice Friedberg/Stephen Miller	

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE/$2.00

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IT'S HIGH TIME A 12 YEAR OLD SCOTCH ACQUIRED YOUR TASTE. INSTEAD OF VICE VERSA.

For some people, even the most prestigious 12 year old Scotches have a slightly heavy quality that takes some getting used to. If you're one of these people, you'll find Cutty 12 a lot more to your taste.

It's a smoother 12 year old. More elegant. Perhaps the first 12 year old you can actually enjoy without having to adjust to it.

CUTTY 12.
THE 12 YEAR OLD THAT TASTES EVEN BETTER.

DISTILLED AND BOTTLED IN SCOTLAND. SOLE U.S. IMPORTER. THE BUCKINGHAM CORPORATION, NEW YORK, N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We go further than anyone to please our passengers.



In terms of distance: We go to 89 far-flung cities in 61 countries on 6 continents.

In terms of time: There are parts of the world to which only Pan Am's long-range 747 SP can take you non-stop. (Tokyo from Los Angeles and New York. Auckland from San Francisco. San Francisco from Sydney. And Bahrain from New York.) Thereby cutting hours off your trip.

In terms of comfort and service: We have the world's largest fleet of big, roomy 747s. Many of which have our exclusive upper-deck dining room in first class.

We offer both first class and economy passengers a choice of meals, a choice of movies, and the choice of conversing in a language other than English. (All our flight attendants are bi-lingual.)

We have one of the most sophisticated reservations systems around. And people experienced in helping sophisticated and unsophisticated travelers all over the world.

In overall terms: We're an airline geared to bringing Americans to the rest of the world as easily and comfortably as possible.

And the rest of the world to America.

PAN AM
America's airline to the world.

See your travel agent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

VOLUME 63 NUMBER 3 *MARCH 1977*

Articles	33	America and the World: The Next Four Years
	33	Confronting the Problems *Walter Laqueur*
	42	Beyond Détente *Robert W. Tucker*
	51	Defense Reconsidered *Edward N. Luttwak*
	59	Bakke vs. University of California *John H. Bunzel*
	65	Vanadium—A Memoir *Primo Levi*
Observations	70	Abu Daoud and the Law *Sandra E. Rapoport*
Music	72	German Wartime Broadcasts *Samuel Lipman*
Movies	75	1976 Minus One *William S. Pechter*
Letters	4	from *Paul Hollander, Stephen Reynolds, Sol W. Sanders, Stuart Burdick, Mordecai Shelef, David R. Hunter, Wayne R. Decker, Audrey Topping, Marcel Ophuls, Leo Sauvage, Norma Freedman, Dorothy Rabinowitz, Giuseppe Are, Carnes Lord, Paul Samuelson, Milton Friedman, Mauro Lucentini, Michael Ledeen, Norman Birnbaum, Lionel Abel,* and others
Books in Review	78	On Jews and Judaism in Crisis: Selected Essays, by Gershom Scholem *Chaim Raphael*
	83	Tweed's New York: Another Look, by Leo Hershkowitz *Suzanne Weaver*
	86	Robert Frost: The Later Years, 1938-1963, by Lawrance Thompson and R.H. Winnick *Edward Hirsch*
	90	Dostoevsky: The Seeds of Revolt, 1821-1849, by Joseph Frank *Maurice Friedberg*
	94	Crooked Paths: Reflections on Socialism, Conservatism, and the Welfare State, by Peter Clecak *Stephen Miller*

Editor: Norman Podhoretz

Executive Editor: Neal Kozodoy

Managing Editor: Marion Magid

Associate Editor: Brenda Brown

Contributing Editors: Robert Alter, Milton Himmelfarb, Walter Laqueur

Production Manager: Bruce Lodi

Cover: The Drawing Board, Inc.

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $2.00, $20 a year; 3 years $54; 5 years $80—Add $4.00 per year for all foreign, including Canada and Latin America—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices.

Copyright © 1977 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions—Indexed in *Readers' Guide, Book Review Digest, Public Affairs Information Service, Index to Jewish Periodicals, ABC Pol Sci, Historical Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life*—Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



THE JOS. GARNEAU CO., NEW YORK, N.Y. 1976.

Washington's farewell at Fraunces Tavern may well have included Martell.

1783. General Washington resigns his commission and asks Generals Lafayette and Rochambeau plus his closest officers and friends to Fraunces Tavern in New York. Here he will personally say farewell and thank them for their loyalty.

And what more appropriate way for devoted officers and friends to wish this great patriot well than with a glass of Martell Cognac. For by 1783, Frenchman and American had long agreed, Martell was cognac unequalled.

It still is.

Martell. Taste history.

V.S.P.-V.S.O.P.-CORDON BLEU.
WORLD'S LARGEST-SELLING COGNACS.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statement of Aims

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture. The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Elmer L. Winter, *President*

The Commentary Publication Committee

Edward E. Elson, *Chairman*

Norman Alexander
Donald M. Blinken
Charles D. Breitel
Theodore Ellenoff
Richard C. Ernst
Maurice Glinert
Robert H. Haines
Lewis J. Laventhol
Richard Maass
Bess Myerson
Ned Pines
Frederick P. Rose
David Sher
John Slawson
Harry Steiner
Alan M. Stroock*
Laurence A. Tisch
Ben Touster
Gerard Weinstock

**Honorary Member*

Letters from Readers

China Watchers

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Congratulations to Edward N. Luttwak for his courageous and incisive article, "Seeing China Plain" [December 1976]. For the past three years I have been working on a book comparing the attitudes and perceptions of Western travelers (intellectuals in particular) who visited the Soviet Union in the 1930's, Cuba and North Vietnam in the 1960's, and China in the 1970's. . . . On the basis of my own study . . . , I would like to add a few comments concerning the main puzzle, which is, as Mr. Luttwak puts it: "After the great warning of the Russian Potemkin tours of the 1930's, how could our intellectuals and our journalists—often explicitly mindful of the precedent—fall into the very same trap?"

First, I would say that they have not quite fallen into the same trap; the response to China has been more varied than in the Soviet case. Perhaps this is only a matter of degree, but on the whole . . . the Chinese reports have been *somewhat* more restrained than the euphoric exultation of the pilgrims to the Soviet utopia of the 1930's. It is of course also possible that the praise heaped on the Chinese system strikes us as more justified since we know much less about the China of the last few years than we know of the Soviet Union of the 1930's. . . .

But there is no doubt that the appeals of China and the USSR (and Cuba and North Vietnam) have been almost identical for different generations of visitors despite quite different historical and cultural realities. After reading a sufficient number of such accounts of both periods, it is hard to avoid the impression that the visitors . . . had similar expectations and predispositions; . . . they were acutely aware of the shortcomings of their own societies and anxious to find others which transcended those defects. What is most intriguing in both cases has been the willingness to suspend critical judgment. Fierce social critics in their own societies, . . . these travelers undergo a magical transformation after they depart their own countries. A peculiar decomposition (or suspension) of the critical faculty seems to take place en route from New York, Berkeley, Cambridge, London, or Paris to Peking (or Moscow or Havana or Hanoi at other times). . . . Skeptics become believers, tough-minded social critics turn into enthusiastic affirmers of established authority. . . .

I agree with Mr. Luttwak that the desire to return to the countries in question provides some incentive for both journalists and scholars to curtail their critical impulses. But what about the vast China travel literature that has been produced by people for whom going back is not particularly important professionally (social workers, librarians, physicians, . . . etc.)? . . . I suspect that these uncritical outpourings in the main derive from the almost uniformly favorable expectations about China (as they did in the 1930's about the Soviet Union). For some it is the expectation of a new paradise where total authenticity reigns and the spirit of community enhances the sense of identity; for others it is the appeal of social equality, the elimination of waste, the antithesis of their own decadent, self-doubting society, that carries the day. Still others expect to find a . . . society which has harnessed the . . . problem-solving capacities of the simple peasant. Many of these travelers feel that overcoming backwardness and the new profusion of material benefits justify some limitations on civil liberties. . . . Finally, there is the fact that most visitors who might otherwise be critical do not want to be labeled cold-warriors, hysterical anti-Communists, carping right-wing critics, antediluvian superpatriots, or ethnocentric perpetuators of false stereotypes about China.

Chinese techniques of hospitality enhance but do not create these attitudes, though few of us can respond negatively to being well treated. . . .

Those who fail to "see China plain" are in no way unique. Nor are the components of their attitudes and perceptions, which include, in as-yet-undetermined proportions, idealism, naiveté, gullibility, and opportunism.

PAUL HOLLANDER
Russian Research Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

She says I never give her flowers.

A diamond is forever.

To give you an idea of diamond values, the piece shown is available for about $ [illegible].
Your jeweler can show you other fine diamond jewelry starting at about $ [illegible]. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Passover at the Concord

In the traditional observance and enjoyment of the Festival of Freedom. The Concord proudly presents
Cantor Herman Malamood
assisted by the
Concord International Choir
to officiate at the Services and Sedarim.

Rabbi Stuart Rosenberg
will conduct a Holiday-long program of lectures and seminars on cultural and significant subjects of the day.

Adherence to the dietary laws under the direction of Rabbis Solomon Saphier and Abraham Scheinberg.

Counselor-Supervised Day Camp.
Baby Sitters Available.
Nite Patrol. Teen Activities.
Special Children's Rates.

Spend Passover at the Concord
where the beautiful tradition of the past and
the wonderful promise
of the future are most meaningful.



The Concord Hotel
Kiamesha Lake, NY 12751
NYC Direct Line 212-244-3500
Hotel 914-794-4000

ONE OF THE MOST BEAUTIFUL
RESORTS ANYWHERE SALUTES
THE GLORIOUS CELEBRATION OF
THE HOLIDAY OF LIBERATION.

PASSOVER

CANTOR
IRVING ROGOFF
AND THE
NEVELE SYMPHONIC CHOIR
CONDUCTED BY CLIFFORD NADEL
SERVICES • SEDARIM

NEVELE

ELLENVILLE, NEW YORK 12428
DIRECT WIRE: N.Y. 244-0800
HOTEL TEL.: 914-647-6000

To the Editor of Commentary:

Edward N. Luttwak's "Seeing China Plain" was magnificent. In the midst of what Peter L. Berger rightly calls an "orgy of gullibility," someone at last has said the appropriate thing. I found particularly gratifying Mr. Luttwak's sensitivity to the imperialist character of the People's Republic of China, that self-proclaimed arch enemy of imperialism, and to the cultural oppression that makes Leninist imperialism, Russian or Chinese, so much more vicious than the Western variety.

Perhaps the only point to which I might object is Mr. Luttwak's reference to "submissive Tibetan Buddhists." After more than a decade and a half, the Chinese have finally managed to reduce Lhasa to a safe showcase. The rest of the country is a different story. The Tibetan liberation struggle, best described in Michel Peissel's *The Secret War in Tibet*, has amply proved that the Tibetans are among the world's least "submissive" peoples in the face of an invasion by overwhelmingly superior forces. They are as proud, tough, and uncowed as the Turkic peoples of East Turkestan (so-called "Sinkiang").

The utter irresponsibility of Western intellectuals and journalists is indeed a scandal, as Mr. Luttwak says. What can be done about it? Commentary is willing to publish a forthright article like this one; how many other journals would do such a thing? Somewhere in the past generation or so, the intellectual leadership of the West has fallen into a pathological state so pervasive that chances for recovery are slight. More articles like Mr. Luttwak's . . . are desperately needed.

Stephen Reynolds
Eugene, Oregon

To the Editor of Commentary:

An old Jesuit friend of mine in Hong Kong . . . (an illustrious but unpublicized scholar of Communist China) and I have flirted with an idea for years: why not write a book called *Chinoiserie through the Ages*, subtitled, "From Marco Polo to—," filling in the name of the most recent congressional or American journalist visiting the mainland? Another subtitle could well be "From the Encyclopedists to the Charles River Fraternity." What we are saying is that a peculiar combination of Chinese culture, fascination with the centuries-old skill of the Chinese in handling guests (even under Communist conditions), and the mysterious psychological appeal of China and the Orient for Western man since the time of the Greeks, have overcome the critical faculties of most of these visitors.

It is refreshing that Edward N. Luttwak does not fall into the trap. . . . Yet . . . I wonder if he, too, hasn't failed the test by falling into another trap: the belief that Chinese totalitarianism is a thing apart. Brutal, hideous, inhuman, and reactionary beyond our wildest imaginations, I concur. But during the winter of 1972-73, when I taught at the Chinese University in Hong Kong, I had the unique experience of talking with my students, young Cantonese residents in Hong Kong, who had visited their friends and relatives in Kwantung (Canton) province during the holidays. What they told me was that the whole system of controls did not really work once one was inside Chinese society, at least not over cultural and private opinions. Their relatives listened to the Hong Kong radio and not only could they sing all the then-popular commercials, but they knew a great deal about what was going on outside China and in the North. From my students I discovered also that some of the most cherished clichés of the regime proved not to be true; for example, that the official *kuo yu* (Peking) dialect was actually being learned and had become the *lingua franca* of the young (a claim made for most of the mainland by the super-apologists for the Peking regime as one evidence of its unifying functions). . . . Though Canton has always been a special case historically, nevertheless I don't think such evidence should be dismissed.

I do not believe that Peking has created the People's Liberated Man any more than Moscow created the Soviet Man so vaunted by Russian apologists in the 1930's. For one thing the control system in the major cities and near points of interchange with foreigners, which is apparent to visitors with any kind of perspicacity like Mr. Luttwak, may actually be more superficial than it appears (after all, how much of the vast land did Mr. Luttwak and his friends see even on their extensive tour)? We might also remember that we are only a decade away from claims that the Chinese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The more American energy we can get for American farms,

the better off our country will be.

A large measure of America's greatness depends on the ability to supply her people with the most basic source of human energy: food.

Since 1950, we've increased our productivity per acre of farmland by 60%. That's because we haven't spared the energy to do the job. Today American agriculture uses over a half-million barrels of oil a day for transportation and farm equipment alone. Our farms also use 8.7 million tons of natural gas-based fertilizers annually.

But we've allowed our domestic energy supply to deteriorate. In fact, our dependence on foreign oil has tripled during the last 15 years.

The job before us is critical. We must find new energy here at home.

Amoco and other energy producers have the know-how and the manpower to do the job. But it will take national policies that allow energy producers to be able to make long-range financial commitments. Finding new energy won't be easy, and it won't be quick. We have to be in a position that holds promise for private investment, because more expensive technology and more capital than ever will be needed.

What's at stake is the food to keep America growing.

Our job is you.

AMOCO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist apparatus had somehow avoided the bitter power struggles of the Russians. . . .

In sum, I simply want to say that there may be less about the Chinese scene—except in degree—that is exclusive or unique. And that is after all the great problem: our negotiators and statesmen tend to apply to the Chinese, . . . and to their relationship with us, terms of reference that are faulty because they see the Chinese as unique. . . .

SOL W. SANDERS
Washington, D.C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Within its scope, Edward N. Luttwak's article is a superior job of reporting. His cogent point—that current observers tell what China's establishment wants them to—is somewhat ironic, however, as the same was true of all major-media reporters during Chiang Kai-shek's regime, which was (and is) overwhelmingly responsible for our chronic myopia toward matters Asian that persists to this day. . . .

For longer than half my lifetime . . . Americans have believed . . . that Chiang Kai-shek was the head of a great state. On the contrary, to the end the Kuomintang was an incredibly corrupt spoils system consisting of a gaggle of warlords and their henchmen, who nonetheless had a pipeline to our Eastern establishment through Chiang's in-laws, the Soongs, and Madame Chiang.

The Generalissimo . . . never really had control of the situation or even a grasp of it. . . . So rife with graft and corruption was the Kuomintang that the quarter-million tons of U.S. provisions, shipped halfway around the world and flown over the "hump" at great risk by American fliers (loss rate: thirteen planes per month), seldom reached the troops for whom they were intended. Consequently, many thousands of the latter died needlessly of sickness, starvation, and exposure, great numbers of the survivors ultimately deserting to join Mao's forces in the North. Considering the plight of Chiang's soldiers, who were supposedly enjoying priority by reason of their military importance, the misery of the common people can only be imagined. . . .

I draw this picture . . . to provide a tableau against which to assess the informative and incisive account of today's China given us by Mr. Luttwak. Considering the monstrous botch we have made of what might otherwise have been a golden opportunity to guide an awakening Asia—thanks to the greed and stupidity of vested interests—I regard any dosage of remedial perspective to be in order whenever Asian issues are discussed.

STUART BURDICK
East Palo Alto, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I certainly agree with Edward N. Luttwak that the debunking of the endless stream of mythology spread by gullible Westerners was long overdue. There is no reason to doubt the Chinese skill in constructing their own Potemkin villages to show foreign visitors the "future that works." Nevertheless, some statements about his visit to Sinkiang strike a false note and diminish the credibility of the whole piece.

Having spent several years of my youth in or near real Kazakh . . . yurts on the Soviet side of the Tien-Shan mountains, I know something about these people. The Kazakhs are (or were) mainly herders and speak a Turkic language, but to classify them as Europeans, either in appearance or behavior, is stretching the imagination quite a bit. Their features are more akin to those of Mongolian peoples than to Europeans. Uzbeks speak a similar language, but they more closely resemble the Mediterraneans Mr. Luttwak had in mind. Even the Uzbeks, however, do not consider themselves Europeans, and why should they? As to their gestures, these might simply have been greeting signs, widely used in Asia.

To describe the inhabitants of the region as having "some culture" or as primitive, is reprehensi-

Israel Needs Your Help Now More Than Ever!

Ask for CARMEL

Since 1882
The Most Prized
Imported Wines,
Champagnes and Liquors.

Certified Strictly Kosher by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel

To prove it we've got the GOLD MEDALS from all over the world The Gold Medal is the traditional award for excellence.

Carmel has been the recipient of Gold Medals since 1882.

No wonder CARMEL products are the popular favorites with connoisseurs.

• SWEET WINES • TABLE WINES • DESSERT WINES
• VERMOUTHS • CHAMPAGNES • BRANDY • WISHNIAK
• SLIVOVITZ • VODKA • VARIETAL WINES • REGIONAL WINES

The only wines and liquors produced and bottled in famed Richon Le-Zion, Zichron Jacob, Israel since 1882

Imported by
CARMEL WINE CO., INC.
114 East 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bly condescending. . . . I had the impression that Mr. Luttwak imputes such attitudes to the Chinese in regard to the minorities in their midst. This may be true, but somehow Mr. Luttwak also seems to have difficulty in keeping his own biases in check.

The people of Central Asia do have culture and dignified behavior, perhaps different from Mr. Luttwak's. I too have often witnessed the throwing of not-completely-denuded mutton bones to women. This is a part of the local culture and customs.

MORDECAI SHELEF
Southfield, Michigan

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Edward N. Luttwak's critical examination of totalitarianism in the People's Republic of China appeared completely authentic to me . . . until he began to document his charge that common people on the streets of Chinese cities are forbidden to speak to foreigners and resolutely refuse to do so. . . .

In June 1975 my wife, who speaks Mandarin, and I talked freely and enthusiastically with chance civilians in Peking, Chengchow, Loyang, Sian, and Shihchiachuang. Between six and eight in the morning, after eight at night, or on midday occasions when we passed up the scheduled tour, we were on our own, striking off in directions unknown even to ourselves. This included the unending alleys of Peking described by Mr. Luttwak. The striking, unchanging characteristic of these unplanned wanderings was the friendly, smiling readiness of the Chinese to talk with us and their great interest in the fact that my wife had once lived in Wuhan. The utter contrast of this visit with my experience in the Soviet Union only a few months before, where pedestrian reluctance to talk was precisely what Mr. Luttwak attributes to China, made Chinese openness and lack of fear all the more impressive.

What accounts for this conflict of experience? Was there that much difference between 1975 and 1976? Hardly. Did what Mr. Luttwak was seeking as compared to what my wife and I were seeking influence the response? Did the high-level nature of the [James] Schlesinger party create an atmosphere of self-consciousness and unrest that became a barrier to any kind of effective, relaxed two-way communication? One is tempted to speculate, probably most unfairly. I don't doubt the accuracy of Mr. Luttwak's reporting, but I completely reject his broad generalizations and deductions therefrom.

How sad that he failed to experience the openness and joy, despite the poverty and social restraint, of the ordinary Chinese people. And what else did he miss that has significance for his other findings?

DAVID R. HUNTER
Council on Religion and
International affairs
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . As one of the "uncritical, untaught Americans" who have so spoiled the Chinese with our blissful naiveté, I would like to respond to Edward N. Luttwak's article.

Mr. Luttwak aims . . . to convince us that his perception is both keen and unique, but in the end I doubt the validity of his observations. Mr. Luttwak is suspicious, for example, of having been shown only token goods in the technological area. In my own experience, however, the Chinese themselves were the first to acknowledge a paucity of computers and advanced technology in general. In the interests of balanced development and the employment of appropriate technology, they are in a sense proud of this shortage and would have little motive to deceive.

Again, Mr. Luttwak claims that many Americans have found it "undeniably gratifying" to be asked their opinions on issues of national policy. But even those of us with no access to classified matters have been queried by polite hosts, well-informed about our backgrounds via lengthy visa applications. To believe that such conversations have a serious intelligence motive is nothing more than self-flattery. . . .

Mr. Luttwak's assertion, to take a third example, that "Chinese colonialism is oppressive not merely politically but also culturally" bespeaks either an ignorance of the important cultural role minorities play in Han China or a willingness

Encounter austria

I put myself on Sigmund's couch

Here in the Sigmund Freud Museum at Vienna's Berggasse 19, I dreamed I met the great Doctor himself. What would he say about the mystery I felt in that room?

Elsewhere, in houses on streets I can't name, I heard echoes of Beethoven, Mozart, Schubert, Haydn. I visited the many museums and monuments reflecting the past that brought me here to Austria. I saw the Lipizzaner stallions of the Spanish Riding School, sailed the Danube, walked through the Vienna Woods.

In the mountains near Innsbruck I relived the breathtaking races of the Winter Olympics. I listened to the sound of music in the hills of Salzburg. And I was changed.

It's easy for you, too, to put yourself on Sigmund's couch . . . to encounter Austria.

GC&Cie

I would like to Encounter Austria.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

For your copy of our booklet ENCOUNTER AUSTRIA, and for information on Austrian Airlines, ask your travel agent or send coupon to your nearest Austrian National Tourist Office:
545 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y. 10017
3440 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90010
200 E. Randolph Drive, Suite 5130, Chicago, IL 60601
1007 N. W. 24th Ave., Portland, OR 97210

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to overlook programs which saturate China with minority-group cultural performances, fulfilling goals of both political integration and cultural protection.

Mr. Luttwak further maintains that the linguist in his group had but a single unofficial conversation with a Chinese citizen during the whole journey . . . and that in Peking "even old ladies and young boys knew that it was forbidden to speak with any foreigners." . . . This is quite simply nonsense. Some Chinese are shy, particularly in rural villages where Westerners are a most uncommon sight, but in the major cities one has little trouble speaking with the ordinary citizen. Stores, buses, noodle shops (similar to our all-night diners) provide innumerable opportunities for conversation. . . . I could attach more credence to Mr. Luttwak's report about Sinkiang and Tibet had he not misrepresented the situation in Peking and Shanghai.

Mr. Luttwak does make some valid points. China is not a liberal society, and by any reasonable standard, some poverty still remains. There are areas in the North which make the moon look fertile, and the People's Republic no doubt has its share of idiotic bureaucrats who would attempt cosmetic changes for the benfit of the foreigner. My own hosts were very candid on these issues. . . . I accept Mr. Luttwak's good intentions in cautioning against apologists, especially in the light of America's traditional infatuation with China. . . . But how can Mr. Luttwak's observations justify his cavalier indictment of China *per se*?

WAYNE R. DECKER
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I will cite only those factual errors, among the ludicrously many in Edward N. Luttwak's article, that distorted his description of my report in the New York *Times* on Sinkiang.

Mr. Luttwak says he visited "three multicolored tents" which he describes as the East Wind commune and then complains that I treated "the whole thing as real" and had "obviously not thought it strange that a visit to a commune should not include even a glimpse of housing, animals, or peasants." Mr. Luttwak did not see my article plain any more than he saw China plain. What I find strange is that he could believe that three tents in a meadow could be East Wind or any other commune and that he could assume he was in the same place I was.

I saw none of his pretty tents because I was too busy touring the yurts and log cabins of the Kazakh peasants and observing them herding their thousands of camels, sheep, horses, and cattle on the mountainous grazing land of the 2,400-square-mile commune.

Mr. Luttwak questions my acceptance of a change in the status of the Kazakh women since he noted at a lunch that serving girls caught "scraps of lamb" thrown by his hosts.

Women in Sinkiang are not fully liberated, just as we are not fully equal in all respects in Western countries. However, since I first lived in China (Nationalist) in 1948, I have seen them drop their black veils and achieve political, economic, and social status before the law and increasingly so in custom. I, too, ate many meals with the Kazakh herdsmen and women on the floors of their yurts and we enthusiastically threw the leftover bones to the waiters who were both male and female. It is a practical Kazakh custom to clear the table this way in preparation for the next course—not to feed the starving women. . . .

AUDREY TOPPING
Scarsdale, New York

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK writes:

It is with some diffidence that I thank Messrs. Hollander, Reynolds, Sanders, Burdick, and Shelef for their kind words: as the text should have made fully clear, I am wholly unqualified as a Sinologist, Turcologist, or Tibetanologist, if such beings exist. It is therefore with still greater diffidence that I venture to comment on their observations. I read with profit Paul Hollander's acute analysis, but would tentatively add the suggestion that the "decomposition of the critical faculty" which overtakes so many of our intellectuals on their passages to Russia, China, Cuba, and the rest owes much to their deeper emotions: these intellectuals are after all the lost souls of each generation, who have abandoned the established certitudes of religion and tradition without having acquired at the same time the courage to confront the human condition in solitary individuality; hence their eager readiness to embrace the new dogmatic certitudes they find in totalitarian societies, so long as these are sufficiently exotic to permit self-delusion. And this segment of the intelligentsia will find added virtue in totalitarian states which happen to be intensely hostile to their own, for the acute dissatisfaction with the void in their own spirit is unfailingly projected upon the society which nurtured them, generating a deep though often unacknowledged hostility. (The diplomatic rapprochement of Peking and Washington may thus eventually erode the appeal of China to this segment of the intelligentsia.)

Stephen Reynolds allows me the opportunity to make amends; my description of the Tibetans as "submissive Buddhists" was foolish and ahistorical; but the Tibetans, whose emotions were transparent enough to affect me deeply even on a brief acquaintance, were both profoundly sad and also seemingly resigned, being no doubt sufficiently well-informed of the true scope of our newly reaffirmed attachment to global human liberties.

Sol W. Sanders writes that the efficiency of the Chinese variant of the system of totalitarian control is imperfect; my remarks, however, were more directly concerned with the theoretical structure of the system (and in particular its preclusive nature) rather than with its actual performance in specific places, at specific times. As he correctly points out, my own exposure to its operation amounted to no more than a few random glimpses. These sufficed to reveal the outline of the model, while being wholly inadequate to convey the totality of its transactions. (Incidentally, Mr. Sanders's "old Jesuit friend" in Hong Kong is not so unpublicized as he believes; his writings have enlightened even this casual traveler.)

If Stuart Burdick's main remarks were an oblique reference to my passing comment on Taiwan, he will agree, I trust, that the Chinese state established on that island has achieved a most remarkable success in the economic sphere.

Mordecai Shelef will not permit me to describe the physical appearance of the Kazakhs as Europeans. It is all a matter of perspective: while he once lived in Soviet Central Asia, it was my own good fortune to pass the formative years of childhood in Sicily. And Kazakhs look at least as European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the Passover Seder

Only the prophet Elijah
may drink from this cup.
It's a tradition.
The unleavened bread
is a tradition.
The egg and bitter
herbs are a tradition.

Manischewitz wishes
you a happy Passover.
That's a tradition, too.

Produced and bottled under strict Rabbinical Supervision. Kashruth Certificate available upon request. Manischewitz Wine Co., New York, N.Y. 11232

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Last week I sowed my wild oats. The real fun starts in two weeks, when I try to kill them all."

"Wild oats always make people think of second-rate Victorian novels," says Gulf agricultural chemist Jim Ahle.

"Actually they're big trouble in North and South Dakota. They crowd out the wheat, and cost the farmers there over two hundred million dollars a year.

Single-minded

"A lot of things will kill wild oats. What we wanted was a single-minded herbicide that won't harm any other plants, or the people or animals who eat the grain.

"To solve that problem, we developed a product called Carbyne®. It proved to be one of the most successful wild oat controls ever developed.

"That was several years ago, but we're still running experiments with Carbyne, either new formulations or in combination with other herbicides, so you can control a variety of weeds with one application.

"For each new formulation, we sow thousands of wheat plants and wild oats in seed beds, and in a few weeks spray them with the experimental herbicide. Then we check to make sure the weeds are dead and the grain uncontaminated.

One in 7,000

"For every herbicide that comes onto the market, at least seven thousand have been tested and rejected for one reason or another. Carbyne is a winner, but it's just one of many herbicides and pesticides we're working on here at Gulf.

"The American farmer is the most productive on earth. The challenge, as I see it, is to keep him that way."

"A good wild oat is a dead wild oat."

Gulf

Gulf people: meeting the challenge.

Gulf Oil Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as the Sicilians do. Mr. Shelef defines my two-line ethnography of Turkestan as "reprehensibly condescending." It is true that I do not share the prevailing cultural relativism that prohibits informative distinctions among the cultures of others. But perhaps even Mr. Shelef will agree that literate town dwellers may legitimately be differentiated from pastoral highlanders, or nomadic herders who do not command the use of their own written language and who do not possess an established literature in written form. A purely oral tradition is not to be despised, as we do not despise Homer, but Mr. Shelef would surely concede that the limited capacity of the human memory does inhibit the accumulation of culture.

I cannot account for the profound difference between the experience of David R. Hunter and his consort and that of our party. My own knowledge of Mandarin is not celebrated in Sinological circles, but we did have one totally fluent speaker of Mandarin in our group, Charles Benoit, a man of (almost) irresistible affability. And in his endless attempts at free conversation, Mr. Benoit was not burdened by the attendant retinue of a semi-official visit; he went out on his own for long walks wherever he could, and for hours at a time. Nevertheless Mr. Benoit discovered that he could not converse freely even in his perfect Mandarin.

But Mr. Hunter does give me the opportunity to correct one more omission: while I did not see any "openness and joy" among the Chinese, I was much affected by the human qualities of the Chinese I met, including several of our official escorts. After a few days of travel, they ceased to be exotic in my eyes, and their genuine warmth, high intelligence, and pleasant conduct engendered feelings of friendship that endure with me still. And it was precisely this effortless communion with the humanity of many of the Chinese whom we met that stimulated my resentment against a system of governance that ceaselessly attacked their human dignity by forcing them to repeat absurd slogans a hundred times a day, and by compelling them to simulate indifference to the ordinary social decencies and to the normal emotions of family life.

Wayne R. Decker obviously has a conception of intelligence-collection which is derived from adolescent fiction; nowadays most of the information that competent intelligence departments collect is unclassified, and Mr. Decker no doubt supplied his own share of social, educational, and economic intelligence. There is nothing sinister in this, but the Chinese do need the data, and they get them. Mr. Decker challenges the notion that Chinese rule over the non-Han peoples is oppressive. He writes that I overlook "programs which saturate China with minority-group cultural performances." He must therefore believe that the state-sponsored song-and-dance troupes of the minority peoples adequately embody their national values. He would no doubt accord the same validity to the officially-sponsored Zulu tribal dance groups which are widely advertised in the brochures

See Europe on your way to Tel Aviv.

Israel is a long way off so it makes sense to make a stop on your way to Tel Aviv. And there's no better place to stop than in the heart of Europe—Frankfurt, Germany. You can rest, relax, shop, do a little business or rent a car and do some sightseeing in Europe's most beautiful scenery: the Rhine Valley, the Black Forest, the majestic Alps.

Lufthansa's fast comfortable jets leave from New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles and Anchorage. If you prefer kosher meals, please order them when you make your reservation. Call your travel agent or Lufthansa German Airlines.

Lufthansa German Airlines

680 Fifth Avenue, 52 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019
Telephone: (212) 357-8400

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issued by the South African Tourist Office. But nowadays the Zulus insist that their national values can only be validly expressed by a national independence, and no longer accept the tribal dance troupes as an adequate substitute. Why should the peoples now ruled by Peking differ so very greatly from all the other peoples which were once under colonial rule? It is of course possible that Mr. Decker is a cultural supremacist, a follower of Cromer, or at least Kipling. But if Mr. Decker is *not* a nostalgic colonialist, how can he refuse to concede to the non-Han peoples trapped in the Chinese empire the rights which most former colonial peoples have successfully claimed?

In conclusion, formality compels me to acknowledge the letter of Audrey Topping. I freely confess that I had charitably presumed a casual transit in Kazakh lands on her part. I now read that she has actually observed the Kazakhs at close quarters. Why then did she fail to convey in her articles their profound resentment of Han oppression? Surely she must know that all warlike pastoral people everywhere resent even the most tolerant and remote governance, while in fact Chinese rule in Turkestan is the opposite of both. Did she miss the central phenomenon of Kazakh social life? Would she have written in the same tones of sustained enthusiasm of the joyful lives of the Zulus of Natal? I concede that it is not impossible that the colonial peoples of China actually want to be ruled by Peking, just as any scientific spirit must concede the theoretical possibility that unicorns may yet exist in some remote African dale. But the evidence of all historical experience suggests otherwise. And this is a deduction that all members of our party saw vividly confirmed even in our few and closely controlled contacts with both Tibetans and Kazakhs.

In a perverse sense a fair exchange obtains: while the native intelligentsia is apt to see only evil in totalitarian systems, these systems can usually obtain the unstinting praise of some of our own intellectuals.

"The Memory of Justice"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

One of the few advantages a four-and-a-half-hour film like *The Memory of Justice* has for a general audience, containing as it does forty-five separate interviews, is that, sooner or later, almost any spectator with enough patience is likely to find a spokesman or spokeswoman for his or her point of view.

It should be duly noted that Dorothy Rabinowitz, in her article, "Ophuls: Justice Misremembered" [December 1976], explicitly and almost joyously welcomes Lord Shawcross as her spokesman. Lord Hartley Shawcross was Chief British Prosecutor before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Today, he thinks that the Germans deserved just what they got in Dresden (and he says so in the film). He also expresses the view, vigorously and manfully, that the Americans should have gone "all out" to win the war in Vietnam. I rather like and admire Lord Shawcross for his bluntness and his hon-



"I did it with tax-free Municipal Bonds. If you want to know how much I can save you in taxes with Municipal Bonds, call me at Lebenthal. Or send for our free Bond Information Kit and anything the kit doesn't tell you about Municipals as they apply to your situation, I will. I'm Gerry Bissinger. And I want to be your Hero, too."

Lebenthal & Co., Inc., One State Street Plaza,
New York, N.Y. 10004
(212) 425-6116 or out of state call (800) 221-5822.
Please send me your free Municipal Bond Information Kit.
I would also like to start receiving your bond lists regularly.

Name_____

Address_____ Phone_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

LEBENTHAL 301

We want to be your Heroes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

esty. However, I think that Miss Rabinowitz's review of *The Memory of Justice* should be read in the light of her choice as spokesman in the film.

She disapproves, by contrast, of Telford Taylor, the American prosecutor, because the latter chooses to view the Nuremberg principle in the light of subsequent events, because he is willing to scrutinize his own motivations, his own role in history, because he is willing to question his own country's behavior. This, the critic feels, is waffling! This lacks vigor and simplicity! This teaches us more about penguins than we care to know!

She also disapproves of Daniel Ellsberg's statement that the My Lai massacre is comparable to any "field incident" in World War II. She cites the phrase, putting it, quite properly, in quotation marks, although clearly more for purposes of irony than for direct quotation. But all she succeeds in doing is to demonstrate Daniel Ellsberg's affinity for precise definitions, to the detriment of her own. Mr. Ellsberg, in the interview, is not comparing My Lai to organized mass genocide in Auschwitz, nor to the murderously planned activities of the *Einsatzgruppen* behind the Russian front. He is speaking of *field incidents*. His thought, on this as on many occasions, is both clear and accurately conveyed. Accusations of inaccuracy should, whenever possible, be accurate.

There are other inaccuracies in "Ophuls: Justice Misremembered" which, especially with due regard for the article's title, I find a bit puzzling.

After having accused me of wanton sensationalism, of organizing long fishing expeditions in search of any random bit of drama or levity, Miss Rabinowitz cites as an example my quest, at the beginning of the film, for a former concentration-camp doctor who, after having been found guilty in Nuremberg of perpetrating monstrous crimes on helpless inmates, practiced her medical profession with impunity for many years in a small German village after her release from prison. During our filming in Schleswig-Holstein, I stop two inhabitants of that village on the street, ostensibly to ask for directions to the doctor's house, but in fact, and quite obviously, to get a reaction from them concerning her former activities. Both interviewees admit some vague recollections of the case, and remember "having read something or other about it in the papers." In doing so, they openly display their total lack of interest, and their complete moral indifference. One of them, shrugging his shoulders, adds spontaneously: "Around here, she was considered a good doctor. . . ."

Now here is the way . . . Dorothy Rabinowitz describes the scene:

> One man, having told the little he knows, senses the noose of *small talk* [emphasis mine] tightening. Impatient with Ophuls's *gregariousness* [emphasis mine], he walks away, indicating, not without some justice on his side, that a person need not indefinitely be detained by conversations to which he has nothing whatever to contribute.

So here we have the curious case of a Jewish film critic sharing her distaste for a film interview, and the methods of the interviewer, with the German citizen being interviewed, and offering her sympathy for the latter's (a German citizen's) impatience with the whole subject of concentration-camp doctors. In this, she will be glad to know, she fully agrees with my censors on German television, who also thought I was victimizing those poor men.

Her feeling of the scene's pointlessness is shared by her eminent colleague, Pauline Kael, who also disapproves of the so-called "sauna sequence." But Pauline Kael is foxy. Her critique, as usual, is so impressionistically authoritarian that she makes herself almost invulnerable. The question, marginal but difficult to avoid, occurs to me: whose feminine sensitivities and womanly intuition are influencing whose? Kael-Rabinowitz, or Rabinowitz-Kael?

"*Toward the end* [emphasis mine] of *The Memory of Justice*," writes Dorothy Rabinowitz in the opening sentence of her review,

> there occurs one of those moments, small in themselves, that invite disproportionately large reflections on the whole enterprise. . . . The scene takes place in a sauna in Germany. . . .

She then proceeds to describe the vulgarity and uselessness of the scene in great detail, ascribing thought connections to me, between nudity in the sauna bath and nudity in the shower rooms of the extermination camps, which I am fairly well placed, I believe, to deny ever having made. One-and-a-half columns later, she concludes:

> *By this time* [emphasis mine] it does not occur to the viewer to ask by what inexorable logic we find ourselves in a German sauna. . . . The random hunt for the provocative, evident . . . *in the foregoing four-and-a-half hours,* has by now earned a kind of acceptance [emphasis mine].

It seems somewhat callous of me to intrude on the critic's creative reveries with a crude question of fact. But, unless the projectionist mixed up the reels, Miss Rabinowitz must have seen this particular sequence, like everybody else who saw it, in the first hour of the film, where it is part of a whole chapter on "Nuremberg and the Germans," and where the conversations, once again, tend to demonstrate, quite clearly, the way many ordinary citizens in Germany attempt to deal or not to deal with the past. The conversation clearly and spontaneously underlines the fact that middle-class, middle-aged Germans of my own and Günter Grass's generation who were in their early or late teens at the end of the war (remember the "Werewolves"?), who now sweat off their extra pounds in sauna baths and frequently voted for Willy Brandt, were not told by their parents or teachers about the Nuremberg trials, and that, to the best of their knowledge, next to nothing is being taught about Nazi crimes in German schools today.

Idle chatter, do you think? A random hunt for local color? Sexist exploitation of the human body? Perhaps all of it, or perhaps none of it. Let the public be the judge. But whatever logic or lack of it presided over the editing of my film, the fact remains that the sequence is shown at the beginning, not at the end, where, indeed, far more fundamental issues are being raised. . . .

I can only assume one of two things:

1. The critic's memory and/or her attention span are so seriously limited as to disqualify her for the work she presumes to undertake.

2. She has deliberately chosen to disregard contradiction by that small portion of the film's potential audience who have already seen it, in order to concentrate her best efforts on the task of discouraging from possible attendance the much larger portion which has not.

Personally, I'm inclined to favor the second hypothesis. Jewish readers of COMMENTARY, should they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Next time you need a prescription drug, who should select it?

You'd be surprised how many people want to get into the act.

And their motives aren't bad.

Some pharmacy groups contend that when pharmacists fill your prescription, they should be permitted to substitute their choice of the drug product for the brand specified by your doctor.

Certain consumer activist groups claim that such substitution would save you money.

And some legislators, at both state and federal levels, regularly propose laws to permit pharmacists to interchange brands without the doctor's approval.

The member companies of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association applaud the motives but have serious doubts about the validity of the claims.

We think the money saving argument is fallacious. Some states have had pro-substitution laws for years. Yet, when you look for evidence that consumers have saved money, it doesn't exist.

And there's more than money at stake.

There's the important question of whether all brands of a drug are the same.

The fact is that two versions of the same drug, formulated by different companies, using different inert materials and manufacturing procedures, and different quality control measures, can have different effects on patients.

Current drug standards, and their enforcement, don't adequately ensure the equivalency of differing drug formulations. The Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress has said as much. So have many scientific experts in drug therapy.

Which leads us to conclude that your doctor is in the best position to select your prescription drugs. Only he has the knowledge of your health history and present condition as well as of the medicines that can help you. Your pharmacist and your doctor, working together, can select the best and most economical therapy. The collaboration goes on every day, and it requires no change in the law to continue and grow.



That's why we think that, while the advice of the pharmacist is an important factor in your doctor's prescribing, the final selection of the specific medication should remain in your doctor's hands.

We hope you agree.

The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association

If you'd like to comment, we'd like to hear from you. Write us at Dept. COM-3 1155 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disregard Miss Rabinowitz's advice, might discover that *The Memory of Justice* very clearly demonstrates that its author believes that the cause of justice was well served in Nuremberg, that the scope and the monstrosity of Nazi crimes are unique in the annals of recorded history, that no equation is made between genocide in Auschwitz and war crimes in Vietnam, and that most Germans have swept the "corpse into the cellar." Such discoveries must be prevented at all costs, because the film also, quite deliberately, offends some of Miss Rabinowitz's prejudices, because, quite in contrast to my earlier film, *The Sorrow and the Pity*, where I obtained the Jewish Seal of Good Housekeeping, the new film strikes too close to home. And you and I, Miss Rabinowitz, know exactly where and when that is, don't we? Well, all I want you to know is that I did it *on purpose* [emphasis mine!].

MARCEL OPHULS

Wallis, Switzerland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

It really was a relief to read Dorothy Rabinowitz's article, which defied "the torrent of critical enthusiasm" with which *The Memory of Justice* has been received in the U.S. This letter is not meant to take anything away from Miss Rabinowitz's arguments against Marcel Ophuls, but rather to add a few points which she left out. Though, as she says, *The Sorrow and the Pity* is a better film than *The Memory of Justice,* the first does not rely more on history than the second, and it does not impose on it less "ideology," that is, less bias or distortion.

Some of the distortions in *The Sorrow and the Pity* are easy to palm off on Americans—and also on a large segment of the French people—who don't know the intricacies of the wartime French Resistance. Thus in the film Marcel Ophuls may have given the impression that he was dealing impartially and objectively with both the non-Communists and Communists in the Resistance by interviewing a representative of each tendency. But the non-Communist spokesman presented by Ophuls was a carefully selected "villain": a narrow-minded army colonel whom I had never heard of before, with an ugly, sinister face and unbelievably reactionary views which were uncommon in the Resistance, even among the groups which had come from the royalist or other extreme Right nationalist ranks. To represent the Communist side, however, there was Jacques Duclos, the chubby and jovial "elder statesman" of the French Communists.

How did Ophuls manage to avoid bringing forward, to represent the non-Communists, a man like Henri Frenay, also a former army officer, but with a clear and clean mind? Frenay started one of the very first Resistance movements, *Combat,* and was recognized after the war as one of the most important leaders of the Resistance.

Paradoxically, the choice of Jacques Duclos for the Communists was perhaps even more revealing not only of Ophuls's bias but of his submissiveness. Charles Tillon would have been a more typical representative of the Communist Resistance. Once the Communists started resisting (that is, *after* Germany attacked the USSR), Tillon organized and led the FTP (*Francs-Tireurs et Partisans*), the most effective fighting force in occupied France. But Tillon later ran into trouble with the party line. In 1952, he was removed from all his high party posts . . ., and his name disappeared until 1970, when the Communist press announced that he was officially expelled from the party. So the Communists certainly wouldn't have liked it at all to see Charles Tillon brought back as the former national commander of the FTP. And Marcel Ophuls did not bring him back. . . .

As for *The Memory of Justice,* I shall limit myself to one remark. Ophuls has shown the many former Nazis who live unmolested—and sometimes respected—in West Germany. Fine. But what about the many Nazis who occupied—and often still occupy—very high positions in the administration of East Germany, particularly in the army and police? Of course Ophuls could not have looked for them freely in East Germany as he did in West Germany, but he could at least have drawn attention to them. . . .

I may have overlooked something in this four-and-a-half-hour-long documentary, but I can remember perhaps only one or two minutes which were unpleasant for the Russians: the mention of Katyn during the Nuremberg trial. But I wonder how many people were aware of this reference. . . .

LEO SAUVAGE

New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . I think it is not hindsight which makes me see *The Sorrow and the Pity* somewhat differently from the way Dorothy Rabinowitz does. True, the fact that victims appeared in it—as they do not in *The Memory of Justice*—and that the viewer is able to contrast them with the collaborators, makes a difference to some of us. . . . [But] the net effect of *The Sorrow and the Pity,* especially if one remembers the distaste with which Ophuls appears to regard the treatment of the Frenchwoman accused of collaboration, . . . is to cancel out all distinctions. No one, the film seems to be saying, was responsible for his or her actions; everyone acted according to the situation his life had placed him in, or at least most people did. . . .

In *The Memory of Justice* Ophuls presents us with a very big pot into which he has thrown a lot of material, making us think that the pot may contain something interesting. . . . But what the pot really holds are many distortions. Ophuls's false emphases are as much distortions of history as were Hannah Arendt's emphases in *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* and as baleful in their contributions to the rewriting of history. . . .

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that *Night and Fog* and *The 81st Blow,* films that tell us far more about what happened than either *The Sorrow and the Pity* or *The Memory of Justice,* have been missed by most people, while Ophuls's work is taken as . . . the last word on the subject.

NORMA FREEDMAN

New York City

DOROTHY RABINOWITZ writes:

It is a useful rule of thumb never to reply point by point to correspondence which issues from passion. The task is usually endless, the results invariably profitless to writer and reader alike. That said, let me proceed on a modest scale to put aside the rule; that is, to answer those points in Marcel Ophuls's letter that are answerable, as distinguished from those merely lying about on the page.

With regard to the wandering interview, to which I objected, and to Mr. Ophuls's charge that I aligned myself with his German censors: I plead guilty (even if the subject is a German citizen and I am a Jewish film critic) to believing that aimless questions do not fall into the prov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ice-Proof Scotch

What is the ideal proof for a Scotch whisky? That depends on the way the whisky is consumed and the palate of the individual. Scotch drinkers are finding that Famous Grouse, the only 90-Proof Scotch, is the ideal proof and blend for consuming "on the rocks." It's America's first Ice-Proof Scotch.

by Allen Mac Kenzie

Perhaps the most elusive quality of any Scotch whisky is the ability to retain freshness as it dilutes with ice. While no Scotch can be totally "ice-proof," it can be demonstrated that a 90-Proof Scotch will sustain its freshness substantially longer than Scotches bottled at 80, 86, or 86.8 Proof.

Our motive in presenting this demonstration is quite simple: our brand of Scotch Whisky, *Famous Grouse*, is the only Scotch now available in this country at 90 Proof. If you are an "on-the-rocks" Scotch drinker, we presume you are a seeker of long-lasting freshness and will take the time to consider our argument.

A Comparison of Proofs

To demonstrate the merits of a slightly higher proof, we performed a simple experiment: a jigger of Scotch (about 1.7 ounces) was chilled with 6 one-inch cubes, and the changes in proof were noted.

As you might expect, the proof falls rapidly during the first few minutes of cooling, but more slowly after the whisky is chilled. The diagram shows how long it takes Scotches of three different proofs to reach 45 proof when poured over ice. If proof is considered to be a measure of freshness, 90-Proof *Famous Grouse* has a 3½ minute advantage over 86.8-Proof Scotch after 18 minutes on the rocks. (Because it takes 3½ minutes longer to reach 45 proof.) Its advantage over 80-Proof Scotch is 8½ minutes.

In Praise of Character

Proof, of course, is not the only influence on the flavor of a blended Scotch. The proportion of malt to grain whiskies, origins of the malts, aging methods—these are also important factors determining the relative richness of Scotch flavor.

The makers of *Famous Grouse*—Matthew Gloag & Son of Perth, Scotland—have been producing Scotch in the same family for six generations. And they have performed their most noble feat in the rich blend they created for *Famous Grouse* Scotch. Its flavor—so remarkable at the outset—holds firmly to its character during prolonged contact with ice.

Graphs and calculations can carry you only so far in the search for a perfect Scotch

on the rocks. The ultimate experiment requires that you pour a portion of *Famous Grouse* over ice and submit the decision to your palate. In the words of the great bard, Robert Burns:

"From scenes like these,
Old Scotland's grandeur springs."



TIME IT TAKES THREE DIFFERENT SCOTCHES TO DILUTE TO 45 PROOF WHEN POURED OVER ICE (IN MINUTES.)

SPECIAL OFFER: Conduct your own Famous Grouse experiments. For a set of four 11-ounce "on-the-rocks" glasses (conveniently calibrated and bearing the Famous Grouse trademark), send $5.00 to: Famous Grouse Offer, Box 929—C—3 Wall Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10005. To comment on this advertisement or suggest future experiments, write to Mr. Allen Mac Kenzie at the same address.

90 PROOF BLENDED SCOTCH WHISKY BOTTLED IN SCOTLAND IMPORTED BY AUSTIN, NICHOLS & CO., LAWRENCEBURG, KY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ince of a moral right. Mr. Ophuls has, in this latest film of his, done more than his share to elevate the status of the non sequitur—whether by conviction or necessity, it is difficult to say—and so it does not come as a surprise, entirely, that he should provide so feeling a defense of a scene notably lacking in either logic or consequence. Not surprising either is Mr. Ophuls's ugly argument that a Jewish critic has here shared her sympathy with a German citizen—a point that is of a piece with the general impulses behind his film, i.e., the straining after coarse parallels, the predilection for cheap irony.

As to influencing or being influenced by Pauline Kael, I can only observe that it is not only possible for two critics to come to the same conclusion but that, in a scene so distinguished for its pointlessness and vulgarity as the sauna sequence, the same conclusion is a virtual certainty. I do confess to misplacing that sauna scene, as Mr. Ophuls charges at some length. He protests that the sequence takes place in the first hour of the film, while at the end more "fundamental" issues are raised. But had the issues Mr. Ophuls raises at the end actually transcended the fatuities of the earlier scene in the sauna, it would have been easier to tell the beginning of the film from the end. As for Mr. Ophuls's defense of Daniel Ellsberg, it seems to me that to speak of field incidents in World War II *without* reference to the *Einsatzgruppen* is to be guilty of obscene omission—the more so if one is aiming, as Ellsberg is, to establish that there was nothing unique in the behavior of the Germans, that My Lai and the Vietnam war itself were equal to the depredations of Nazism.

To turn to matters less clear, Mr. Ophuls suggests at the end of his letter that for me the film strikes "too close to home"—a location, he gives to understand, that he and I alone know. To this I can only reply that Mr. Ophuls here is in possession of a vision keener than it is given the rest of us to attain, and seems determined to avoid sharing it. The identity of whatever "it" is he has done "on purpose" must similarly remain shrouded in mystery.

Quite separate from Mr. Ophuls's personal intentions, however, is the matter of the pernicious effect of a film which attempts, consciously or otherwise, to alter the significance of certain facts of history. No one has put it better than Harold Rosenberg in a recent, scathing review of *The Memory of Justice*, in which he comments on the film's focus on the "humanness" of the Nazi war criminals: "I regard commiseration for the Nazis as human beings as intellectually degrading and morally degenerate," Rosenberg writes. Precisely. To the generation of viewers who have grown up since the Nazi crimes were perpetrated, he further states, "*Memory* presents a dilution of the significance of this vast organized death system by fitting pictures of corpses being dragged to pits into a rhythm of night-club performers, lush landscapes, chatter in sauna baths, and gentlemen reminiscing reflectively at their fireplaces."

If I had any intentions in writing my review, they were not to direct readers away from the film but rather to invite those who see it to feel free, despite the torrents of critical acclaim showered on it, to dislike *The Memory of Justice* and repudiate the parallels it draws, parallels that are both an affront to honest minds and an insult to the memory of the millions whose lives were obliterated under National Socialism as a matter of cold, deliberate policy.

The most civilized hotel in New York. Maybe the world.

The Regency Hotel

Park Avenue at 61st Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. (212) 759-4100

Communism, Italian-Style

To the Editor of Commentary:

The two excellent articles published in November 1976 under the title, "Italian Communism at Home and Abroad" ["The New Class," by Mauro Lucentini; "The Soviet Connection," by Michael Ledeen] are quite different from what the international press has been reporting about the Italian situation in the past year and a half. . . .

Messrs. Lucentini and Ledeen have brought to light the hidden intentions and ingrained political attitudes which lie behind the reassuring statements that leaders of the Italian Communist party (PCI) have been making to foreign journalists. Instead of merely reprinting these statements, the for-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eign press should be deluging readers with analyses of the real transfer of power and the transformation of the regime that is actually going on in Italy today—a qualitative change that is turning Italian social and political structures into something very different from the Western model. As a result of this qualitative change, whole areas of Italian society today can no longer be reliably assimilated into any plan for cooperation or union with the West. These are the strategy and tactics of conquest from the periphery toward the center—an industrial-society version of Vietnam.

Where I disagree with Mr. Lucentini is about the nonviolent character both of this conquest and of the regime that it will lead to. It is through violence—by breaking the heads of dissenters—that the schools and universities have been conquered; it is through violence (sabotage, physical assault, kidnapping of management personnel, and systematic intimidation) that the unions have maintained their rigidity and brought the Italian economy to the brink of catastrophe; it is through violence that representatives of the law on all levels have been intimidated (judges have been murdered, etc.); it is through violence that attempts are being made to prevent the free flow of information from abroad (TV transmitting stations have been destroyed) and to destroy freedom of information domestically (the presence of Communist cells, under the guise of union representatives, in the editorial offices of most newspapers). Even as I write this, an Italian court is being prevented, by violent means, from bringing to trial a group of terrorists who have been indicted for serious crimes. It is true that these acts of violence have for the most part been perpetrated by extremist groups to the Left of the PCI, but it is also true that the PCI has always made strenuous efforts to keep these groups from being prosecuted. It has done so because the activities of such terrorist groups have been very useful to the PCI in pointing up the confusion and impotence of the Italian ruling class, and in opening new breaches in the fabric of society through which the PCI has been able to advance.

At this point, however, the most important question—not only for Italians but for all of the West—is whether the situation is still reversible. It is necessary for public opinion in the free nations to be informed that if the government of Italy continues to remain in the hands of this particular Christian Democratic party, with its present leaders, the situation will soon be reversible no longer. It is this ruling class, with its corruption and weakness, its lack of ideas, of programs, of culture, and of courage, and undermined by its own ambivalence, that has handed over entire areas of Italian society to the PCI without even putting up a fight. These are the people who have given birth to and nurtured the New Class described by Mr. Lucentini. It is they who have lacked the necessary energy to keep the country bound to the West—when he was Foreign Minister, Aldo Moro resorted to Communist advisers on the Middle East question, for example. What are we to make of it when Prime Minister Andreotti reassures *Business Week* about the NATO loyalties of the Italian Communists? Can he be unaware of the duplicity so well documented by Mr. Ledeen? . . . But in any case, it is not he or people like him who are able to provide leadership to the 65 per cent of the Italian people who do not want the Communists in power. It is not people like these who can rally the still vast energies of the Italian people to restore law and order and reconstruct the economy. People like these—and the Christian Democratic party is largely in their hands—can only pave the way for the conquest of power by the Communists. If the friends we have in America want to help prevent this from happening, they must help us to get rid of them.

GIUSEPPE ARE

University of Pisa
Pisa, Italy

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mauro Lucentini and Michael Ledeen come as a welcome relief to those accustomed to the selective reporting and reassuringly bland analysis that have become the norm in American coverage of Italian affairs. Mr. Lucentini's account of the extraordinary success the Italian Communist party has already had in making itself an indispensable part of the Italian political establishment sheds new light on the meaning of the "historic compromise" between Communists and Christian Democrats which the former represent as their preferred solution to the political crisis.

PIECES SHOWN ACTUAL SIZE
Twelve Tribes of Israel
STERLING SILVER WITH CHAIN $15
14 KARAT GOLD $75
Mezuzah
STERLING SILVER WITH CHAIN $13
14 KARAT GOLD $75
18 INCH 14 KARAT GOLD CHAIN $20
ZALMAN DESIGNERS
DEPT. C., P.O. BOX 26741
ELKINS PARK, PA. 19117
PLEASE ADD 1.50 FOR INS. & POSTAGE.
PA. RESIDENTS ADD SALES TAX.

Calder

Six original plate-signed lithographs created by Alexander Calder. These six lithographs were conceived from "Flying Colors," a mural painted on a DC 8-62 jet.

Each of these lithographs will be authenticated with the embossed cachet of "The Flying Colors Collection."© Pulled on 100% rag Arches paper and printed in Paris on the traditional flat bed presses which have been used for over 100 years in this method of printing.

The dimensions are 22" x 28" and are delivered framed for $65 each plus shipping charges of $3.95. The frame chosen is an award-winning welded, one-piece aluminum frame.



Sunburst

Send for free color catalog sheet.

The Flying Colors Collection
221 Park Ave. So., New York, N.Y. 10003

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It would be worth pursuing the implications of this analysis with regard to the much-advertised commitment of the PCI to pluralism and democratic processes. That the PCI's tolerance for political parties to the Left of the Christian Democrats (particularly those least connected with the political establishment) is less than exemplary is suggested by a series of incidents—wholly unreported in the American press—that occurred in the period preceding the June elections. The small Radical party had decided to turn an old Communist trick to advantage by having its supporters appear outside courthouses with their electoral lists almost two weeks before the filing date in order to insure that their party would be placed at the top of the ballot. What happened in Verona was evidently not atypical: PCI goons were brought in from another town to insult, terrorize, and finally beat up their Radical comrades, with the approval and at the apparent direction of local Communist officials. At Ancona, Radicals were beaten and dragged away to shouts of "Viva Stalin!" What is perhaps more disturbing is that legal charges brought by the Radicals in connection with these incidents were summarily dismissed by the highest court in Italy. The PCI has enjoyed similar impunity for the Fascist-style "punitive expeditions" reportedly mounted by some of the faithful against officials of the far Left Democratic Party of Proletarian Unity.

While the parallels between the PCI and the Fascist movement of the 1920's multiply (as Mr. Lucentini indicates, a variety of less violent methods has been no less effective than those just described), the Christian Democrats appear to be too interested in protecting acquired positions and their precarious dominance in the current government to respond effectively to the challenge of the Left. Increasingly, the "historic compromise" has the aspect of a favor to be granted not by the Christian Democrats but to them.

CARNES LORD

Washington, D. C.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

In a static world, the Lucentini-Ledeen view of Italian politics would not be entirely without merit. RAI-TV is certainly nepotistic, overstaffed, and fairly stupid. But it almost always has been, and long before Mauro Lucentini's "New Class" (representing a third of Italian voters) began asking for its share of the jobs formerly monopolized by the patronage of the Christian Democrats (which now represent a third of Italian voters). As for Marxism in education, Mr. Lucentini's eloquence would be more effective if it had been supported by statistics and analysis. When he says that "Communist activists have been installed as teachers at all levels, and many textbooks even in the elementary grades read like Marxist treatises," he is hardly making a statement of degree or significance. Nor is it surprising that the world of publishing and journalism is affected by a Left whose growth has been in direct proportion to the inability of the bourgeois leadership to cope. For the situation, to judge by the criteria of techno-capitalism, is unmanageable. Italy's tropism toward decline and fall is a few years ahead of the rest of Western Europe's, . . . and perhaps three decades ahead of the United States. . . .

That the Left is trying to find places in the key sectors of industry, communications, and education in the Italian corporate state structure can mean either one more in the long list of corrupt bureaucracies which have governed Italy, or it can mean an administrative cadre which, given power and public approval, will honor its Marxist commitment. To support the first hypothesis, there is Italian history almost back to Romulus and Remus. To support the second, there is the discipline, sobriety, and commitment of the Italian Communist and Socialist parties, their conservatism and integrity almost guaranteed, first by bourgeois Italian social tradition, and second by the presence of well-organized and aggressive far-Left and far-Right criticism. Mr. Lucentini believes that under Communist tutelage "the corrupt, nepotistic aristocracy that has been formed in Italy would settle down to its final and undisturbed reward." This is a static view of society as a perpetual pawn of palace revolutions. But Marxists who believe that change is the law of life hope to be able to influence consensus politics long enough to effectuate their long-term rescue plan for a collapsing Italy.

Michael Ledeen wishes to disprove the idea of national, semi-autonomous Communism. That the PCI raises funds through business connections with the USSR seems no more or less significant than that Lenin used Armand Hammer or that Willy Brandt had American support for the chancellorship which initiated his *Ostpolitik*. . . .

If, as Mr. Ledeen says, "the PCI simply does not see anything wrong with Soviet imperialism," why did it condemn so strongly the Soviet intrusions into both Hungary and Czechoslovakia? As for Angola, along with San Thomé, it had long been one of the most brutally exploited areas of the Third World. Back around 1906, the three great English Quaker chocolate families, Cadbury, Rowntree, and Fry, horrified by the excesses in these two fiefdoms of British and Portuguese money and power, boycotted Angola's cocoa exports in an attempt to force a semblance of societal decency. The boycott failed. If Fidel Castro's troops have succeeded, are Italian Communists wrong in calling them "freedom fighters"? Or are all incursions of one state into another equivalent forms of "imperialism"? . . .

That political rhetoric must now suit itself to the century of the common man should not blind us to political realities. In terms of Italy, it is better to look at the facts of life than at *l'Unità*, which is, after all, only a PCI house-organ. These facts are: the Italian mentality and tradition; the bankruptcy of the neo-Keynesian, marginal utilitarian model for Italy; the independent Italian political stance, always keeping its options open (and, hence, displeased with the rigidity of the NATO obligation); and the frightful insecurity of the global military, political, and economic context in which Italy is trying to survive.

Somebody once said, "Italians are all born old." Old people want, above all, to stay alive. If "a major security problem for NATO" would be "a Communist government in Italy," perhaps a major security problem for the USSR would be what must, in fact, become a democratic-socialist government in Italy, a national compromise serving national needs and committed to a national independence beholden to neither Western nor Eastern militarism. To world-power determinists, Eastern or Western, the concept may seem illusory. To Italians, however, illusion is the stuff of history.

ROBERT WULIGER

Oakland, California

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"THERE IS NOTHING THAT CAN BE SUBSTITUTED FOR SEEING ISRAEL FOR YOURSELF."

—Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel

"I don't believe that there is a better way to express your feelings than to actually go to Israel....There is something special about the Holy Land....Those who go, come back entirely different. They see something that no words can describe."

So spoke Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, at the beginning of this Solidarity Pilgrimage Year. Yet, what Rabin said is an echo of what every person has felt who has ever visited Israel. You know this.

If you don't you'll learn it at Pesach, when, sitting at the Seder in Israel, every symbol of this festival of freedom will take on richness that almost aches.

You'll know the feeling when you join the crowd and dance through the streets on Purim or Independence Day.

You'll feel it on Shavuot, as the First Fruits are paraded through the kibbutz with so much bursting pride. And at the Western Wall, where the ancient chanting through the night seems to make centuries melt away.

You'll know what "no words can describe" when you walk through the streets of Israel at Sukkot, and find yourself surrounded by beautiful Sukkot booths in every yard and on every balcony.

You'll feel it at Chanukah, at the candle lighting ceremony atop Mount Zion.

But you don't need a celebration to share these experiences. Because every day of Solidarity Year is a celebration of your partnership with Israel.

And once you go and feel these things for the first time, as many times as you return will never be enough.

ISRAEL

Contact your travel agent or
The Israel Government Tourist Office,
488 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The statistics on government employment in Italy cited by Mauro Lucentini are indeed extraordinary. In the United States, approximately 19 per cent of employed persons work for the government. I don't know the relative relationship of population to employed persons in the United States and Italy, but probably it is roughly the same. Thus if "the public payroll [of Italy] is, in proportion to its population, ten times as large as that of the United States," Italy would have 190 per cent of employed persons working for the government. This is particularly remarkable when you remember that "more than half of the total Italian labor force is already retired on official pension plans," and there is a "vast army of the unemployed." It would appear that "Italy indeed has become the first major Western country to produce a New Class," but the New Class is a very peculiar one. It is the class of those who are retired and drawing a pension, holding two government jobs, and, at the same time, paying enough taxes to support themselves.

In fact I find myself rather in sympathy with the general conclusion drawn by Messrs. Lucentini and Ledeen. What I am criticizing, however, is what we might call the a-numerical approach of many literary scholars. Anyone who thinks about the numbers at all immediately realizes that they are absurd. The same points could be made with the correct numbers or by using literary terms which imply a large bureaucracy without using numerical values which are obviously wrong.

GORDON TULLOCK
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg, Virginia

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I found Mauro Lucentini's article on Communism in Italy very interesting. I was astonished to learn that so many people in Italy receive an income quite divorced from providing a productive economic function. If such facts are true, this is certainly a finding of considerable importance.

PAUL SAMUELSON
Department of Economics
MIT
Cambridge, Massachusetts

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Mauro Lucentini's persuasive description of the development of the New Class in Italy has direct relevance to the U.S. A recent example was the defeat in Michigan last fall of a ballot proposal for a constitutional amendment setting a limit to expenditures by the state government. The proposal was defeated, primarily through a last-minute propaganda blitz—highly deceptive and misleading in content—financed by the Michigan Education Association behind the veil of the League of Women Voters—a typical coalition of New Class interests with a group pervaded by precisely the kind of "cultural left-wing conformism" to which Mr. Lucentini calls attention.

A somewhat older example was described at length by Daniel P. Moynihan in his book analyzing the defeat of the Family Assistance Plan, primarily by the welfare bureaucracy.

We have not yet reached Italy's state, and I trust that we never shall; but with government spending already amounting to 40 per cent of the national income, it behooves those of us who are concerned with strengthening and maintaining a free society to look to our defenses.

MILTON FRIEDMAN
Department of Economics
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

MAURO LUCENTINI writes:

Since, in Italy, it is so difficult to distinguish between people who work and people who don't but nevertheless get money from the government in a variety of ways, I deliberately spoke of people "on the public payroll"—not only of government employees—when making the comparison that Gordon Tullock finds absurd. Mr. Tullock also says that in the United States approximately 19 per cent of employed persons work for the government, but this figure is too high since it includes occasional government contractors and the armed services which are not pertinent in this context; moreover, it is derived from a Census Bureau estimate which, for

Add "tam" to your travel.
Ask for Borenstein's Ⓤ Glatt Kosher meals.

More hard-to-please travellers prefer our distinctive cuisine than any other brand. Because we've got "tam." That's why we've been El Al's exclusive American caterer since its inception.

Now we offer our unique and varied menus to any traveller on any airline.

Delicious, satisfying Glatt Kosher meals are yours for the asking. Just specify Borenstein's whenever you book your flight.

Gourmet or dietary (for instance, low sodium) meals are available on request.

Since 1945
Ⓤ Borenstein Caterers, Inc.
179-29 150th Road, Jamaica, N.Y. 11434
(212) 656-3600
C

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PASSOVER

...when only the best is good enough

Festive dinners for family and guests, occasions when only the best will do, are times for Empire Kosher Poultry. To be sure to satisfy, let the center of attraction be a Roaster, Pullet, Duckling, Turkey, or any of dozens of fine quality products and specialties from Empire Kosher Poultry . . . to eat in good faith . . . to eat in good health.

At Better Quality Kosher Butcher Shops, Food Stores and Dellys, Coast-to-Coast

KOSHER FOR PASSOVER

KOSHER
Empire
POULTRY

The Most Trusted Name in Kosher Poultry

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the purpose of determining the number of employed persons, does not take into account the whole of the labor force. Mr. Tullock should therefore scale down his figure for U.S. government employees by about half. If he then also considers the fact that the relationship of employed persons to population in the two countries is not "roughly the same," he will find that my comparison stands up very well.

Both Mr. Tullock and Robert Wuliger reproach me for being "anumerical," but the few statistics I cited in my article were the best approximation I could produce for a country where statistics are unreliable or chaotic. A mission of the International Monetary Fund that visited Italy to investigate a possible loan was unable to get an estimate of Italy's indebtedness abroad and one of its members was heard to remark that "we got better figures in Gabon than here." The Communist leader, Giorgio Amendola, when asked recently how many people are jobless in Italy, replied: "And who knows?" So it would be very difficult to satisfy Mr. Tullock's and Mr. Wuliger's wish for exactitude insofar as even the main outlines of Italian life are concerned, let alone to quantify an assertion like ". . . many textbooks . . . read like Marxist treatises."

But the unreliability of official Italian statistics is, in itself, beside the point. Any numerical approach would be misleading precisely because the New Class regime that has been created in Italy is based on such a complicated set of false labels and inverted truths. How do you arrive at a numerical judgment of Italian politics in a country where Communists masquerade as democrats and democrats (Christian and others) are often more to the Left than Communists? How do you arrive at numerical conclusions in a social situation where people getting state pensions through political patronage hold two or three jobs simultaneously, also obtained through political patronage—as Mr. Tullock very correctly divines? Mr. Tullock finds the statistics in my article "extraordinary." But I will provide him with fresh ones that are even more so. In the province of Avellino (400,000 inhabitants) one out of three adults gets a disability pension, yet, judging from medical reports, people seem to be just as healthy there as elsewhere. In another area, the province of Chieti, forty people getting pensions for blindness were found to have drivers' licenses. In the large city of Potensa, the number one source of income, according to INPS, the Italian welfare agency, was found to be state pensions.

More meaningful than an attempt to get at exact statistics and numerical comparisons between two radically different situations like the Italian and American ones are calculations like the one recently arrived at by independent Italian economists that the money spent by the Italian government on maintaining failed portions of the nationalized industrial system is two or three times larger than would be necessary if the government simply paid a salary to the involved people and closed down the plants. Or the fact that Alfasud, the new giant automobile plant installed with government funds in the South, is kept open even while one million lire are lost on each car it produces. (Actually, the portion of the nationalized economy that is not in the red is minuscule, and government industry is losing money "on everything from steel to panettoni," as one observer has remarked.)

The distortion and camouflaging of the Italian economy have been proceeding on a wholesale scale, not only because the New Class has by now a vested interest in obscuring the truth, but, perhaps more significantly, because people excluded from the New Class are finding deception necessary for survival. In order to get work, vast numbers of people have renounced the "official" status of workers, and given up all the fringe benefits guaranteed by the welfare state, in collusion with employers who otherwise would be unable to operate. These secret workers do not figure either in the ranks of the employed or in those of the unemployed (officially defined as "those actively looking for work" through labor offices). Moonlighting, multiple and false enrollments, altered employment records, parallel sets of budgets—"official" for fiscal use and "real" for internal use—have become the order of the day. Economists in Italy are now talking of two separate economies—an official one, recognized by the government, the unions, and the law, and a "black" or "underground" one, for which nobody possesses any records, but which nevertheless appears to have great impact on and great relevance to Italian life.

This dual reality is the result both of the destructive forces put into motion by "socialization" and of the ingenuity shown by Italians in escaping them. This takes me back to the Italian character and its importance in understanding Communism, Italian-style. I do not quite understand whether Mr. Wuliger is accusing me of being "static" (of missing "the locomotive of history," as Communist newspapers would put it) or of being too dynamic (since he says that I lament things that are as they "almost always [have] been"), but I certainly agree with him when he says that a plausible guess about what's going to happen in Italy can be based on Italian character as evinced from "Italian history going almost back to Romulus and Remus." Italians, throughout this long history, have always been masters of opportunism, change, and survival. They have acquired a marvelous knack of not taking things too seriously, which has been both good and bad. This is also the reason I do not share Giuseppe Are's fear that, in case of a Communist takeover, we would witness a great wave of violence in Italy. I do not deny that the Communists are exploiting episodic violence strategically, by preventing the repression of the activities of extremist groups, or even using it directly, as pointed out in Carnes Lord's letter. But I do not see in the Italian character the premise for any bloodbath on a Stalinist scale, and again I would refer to the comparison with Fascism and its relative blandness. Which is certainly small comfort, I admit, in viewing the approaching "historic compromise."

MICHAEL LEDEEN writes:

Both Giuseppe Are and Carnes Lord make an important point, one which Robert Wuliger would do well to ponder. The point is that, unless we choose to believe the propaganda of the PCI, its behavior is so much like that of the Communist parties of Eastern Europe just prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain, that the differences appear relatively minor. Among the most striking similarities, the recourse to violence—particularly against left-wing critics—is one of the most alarming.

Mr. Lord, like several other careful observers of contemporary Italy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

© 1977 Allied Chemical Corporation

You don't have to be a nuclear physicist to understand an electric bill.



The numbers next to the $ sign are a lot higher today than a couple of years ago. And we can expect even bigger bills as prices increase for oil, coal, natural gas—the main sources for the energy we use.

That's why the world is turning to nuclear power as a practical alternative. Nuclear power can cut our future electricity costs and reduce dependence on those few countries that control oil production and prices. Thousands of American communities now enjoy power, light and heat from nuclear energy. By 1985, there will be at least 300 nuclear power plants in the U.S. and overseas.

Nuclear power is produced by reactors that run on uranium. After 3 or 4 years the fuel rods in a reactor are spent and taken out. They can be stored away. But they contain plutonium, as well as unburned uranium, and discarding them means losing forever a potential source of energy. However, there is a way to reprocess this material, to generate at least 50% additional electricity instead of simply throwing away this valuable resource.

Right now, there's only one facility in the entire U.S.—at Barnwell, South Carolina, built by our company in partnership with General Atomic—that is able to evaluate the benefits of reprocessing. At full operation, Barnwell will reprocess spent nuclear fuel from 50-60 reactors every year. This reusable fuel can provide the energy equivalent of almost 70 million tons of coal or nearly 300 million barrels of crude oil a year. That's a lot of energy that would be wasted without reprocessing.

Reprocessing provides another plus. By significantly reducing the amount of highly radioactive nuclear waste, the need for storage locations is lessened—an environmental as well as economic benefit.

But Barnwell is idle. It can't get started until the government clarifies its position on nuclear fuel recycling.

Barnwell can establish that effective safeguards can be maintained over the plutonium contained in spent fuel. In doing so, it will go a long way toward providing an answer to the problem of international nuclear arms proliferation.

Recent surveys show that a majority of Americans favor more nuclear power plants. Barnwell is the key to proving that reprocessing can help make nuclear power the choice of the future—an economical, safe and environmentally acceptable answer to America's need for electricity.

It doesn't take a degree in nuclear physics to make that choice. Barnwell and the American people are waiting.

Allied Chemical

For copies of this ad and information about how nuclear fuel reprocessing can help solve our energy problems, write to: Energy, Dept. 3- Allied Chemical Corporation, P.O. Box 2245R, Morristown, N. J. 07960

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How to shop for bonds

Free booklet answers most of the questions you might have about bonds.

38 plainly written pages on tax-free municipals. Government guaranteed issues. Corporates. And more.

Tells how bonds could make your money work harder. Plus 19 helpful charts and diagrams, 8 detailed case histories, glossary.



"The Bond Book"

Write:
Merrill Lynch Service Center,
P.O. Box 700, Nevada, Iowa 50201
NCY0300BON

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State_____Zip_____

Business Phone_____

Home Phone_____

Merrill Lynch customers, please give name and office address of Account Executive:

Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.

© Copyright 1976 Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc.
Member, Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)

(including Walter Laqueur, who made the same point in his article, "'Eurocommunism' and Its Friends," COMMENTARY, August 1976), sees parallels between the PCI and the Fascist movement of the 1920's. I must say that I find these comparisons forced. While neither party has any love for democracy, the Fascist notions of the state, of human nature, and of nationalism are very far removed indeed from those of the Italian Communists. I think we miss the point if we insist on making such comparisons; the most useful paradigm is that of the Czech Communist party before the defenestration of Masaryk.

Finally, we have Robert Wuliger, smacking his lips over the imminent fall of capitalism (or is it the fall of the West?). Mr. Wuliger believes that the PCI strongly condemned the Soviet "intrusion" into Hungary in 1956, which it did not. Indeed, its failure to do so cost it many of the finest minds and spirits in Italy, ranging from the historians Renzo De Felice and Pietro Melograni to the editor of *l'Unità*, Renato Mieli, and the former ambassador to Poland, Eugenio Reale. Furthermore, Mr. Wuliger has a bad habit of putting words in my mouth. I pointed out that the PCI condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, but stressed that conflicts between the PCI and the Soviet Union were limited to relations among socialist countries and/or parties. Conflicts do not exist over broader question of foreign policy. Mr. Wuliger may believe, if he likes, that financial ties between the PCI and the Soviet Union do not compromise the possibility that the Italian Communists really want to become independent of Moscow; but most intelligent people will notice that such ties provide the Soviets with considerable leverage over the PCI. If the Russians were upset with Berlinguer, they could simply turn off the spigot (as they have done on several occasions in the past, with quick results).

The PCI's foreign policy is not that of a Western democratic party. But this is not important to Mr. Wuliger, who prefers to think that the PCI's opposition to a firm NATO commitment stems from a traditional Italian desire to keep its options open (why, then, has the PCI changed 180° on the question?), and that "the neo-Keynesian, marginal utilitarian model" is bankrupt (why, then, does the PCI accept the model?). But Mr. Wuliger's most incredible fantasy is that the PCI wants a "national compromise . . . beholden to neither Western nor Eastern militarism." This, too, is supposed to be part of Italian tradition. What does Mr. Wuliger do with the tradition which, throughout this century, has tied Italy to the West, and which the PCI is attempting to destroy? And if the PCI wants a real compromise, what is it doing supporting Soviet-financed mercenary armies in Angola?

"Tsaylemkop," Contd.

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Reuven Frank's letter [January], far from impugning my own (and the COMMENTARY editors') command of Yiddish, is actually a splendid illustration of my assertion [Letters from Readers, October 1976] that "one is not born a Litvak but rather, as a result of deficient upbringing, stoops to that condition."

Mr. Frank's distinguished father apparently tried to shield his child from admittedly unpleasant regional prejudice, for the truth of the matter is that *tsaylemkop*, an epithet commonly hurled at Litvaks by their Galitzianer neighbors, has nothing to do with the Litvak's mispronunciation of Yiddish. (*That* is quite another matter.) In retrospect, one wishes Reuven Frank had been taught instead the virtue of consulting reference books.

Nahum Stutchkoff's classic thesaurus, *Der oytser fun der yidisher shprakh*, a work edited by Max Weinreich, the great Yiddish philologist, and published in 1950 by YIVO, that august citadel of academic Litvaks, groups *tsaylemkop* under three rubrics. The first (No. 363) is entitled "lies, falsehoods, swindles." The second (No. 339) is "tsaylemkop [i.e., 'cross-head'], *shmadkop, meshumedkop* [both mean 'apostasy-head']." The third (No. 613) is called "lack of faith, heresy, apostasy." That was my sense of the usage, which is also confirmed by a Yiddish saying cited on p. 165 of the volume, "two Jews and a Litvak are riding [in a cart]." Not all connotations of *tsaylemkop* are negative: there is also an entry for it in rubric No. 339, "wisdom."

All of which adds up to a composite stereotype of the Litvak *tsaylemkop*. He is seen as a skeptic, not overly honest, and not very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To England we owe
the Magna Carta,
the steam engine,
the plays of Shakespeare,
the melody of "My Country,
'Tis of Thee,"
the Law of Gravity,
and sundry other blessings.

LICENSED TO LINZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pious, but also as a man of impressive erudition. Clearly, then, Reuven Frank, although of Litvak parentage, cannot himself be called a Litvak. A neo-Litvak, perhaps, but not a true Litvak.

MAURICE FRIEDBERG
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

Interpretation

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

The September 1976 issue contained a symposium, *What Is a Liberal—Who Is a Conservative?*, to which I had the honor of contributing. I read most of the other contributions, but not all of them. My attention has now been called to the piece of Lionel Abel which contains a certain number of references to myself. These combine infelicity, nay vulgarity, of expression, insult, and untruth in approximately equal measure. I find particularly astonishing an assertion by Mr. Abel that I had expressed regret that the American Communist party is not as powerful as the Italian one. Mr. Abel refers to an essay by myself in the *Massachusetts Review*. The *Massachusetts Review* is a distinguished quarterly, but its circulation is only one-twentieth that of COMMENTARY. Mr. Abel may have noticed my essay in its Autumn 1975 issue, "Where is the U.S.A. Going?" That essay, however, contains no reference whatsoever to the American Communist party. Mr. Abel's inability to adhere to the norms of civilized discourse is particularly regrettable at the end of a career which was not without occasional moments of distinction.

NORMAN BIRNBAUM
Amherst College
Amherst, Massachusetts

LIONEL ABEL writes:

In his argument against me, Norman Birnbaum has chosen, like the maid in Genet's play, to go straight for the insults. All the same, I shall do my utmost to answer him equably. Here is the background.

Mr. Birnbaum says: "I find particularly astonishing an assertion by Mr. Abel that I had expressed regret that the American Communist party is not as powerful as the Italian one." And he goes on to say that the essay of his to which I referred ". . . contains no reference whatsoever to the American Communist party." Now just how literal-minded am I expected to be?

Here is what I said of his article: "We are now a backward country, he tells us in the *Massachusetts Review*. Why are we a backward country? Because the Communist party of the United States is not beating at the gates of political power, as it is in Italy, where, should it be admitted, it would have to turn to the backward United States of America for aid." There should have been a question mark and not a period at the end of this sentence, but even as punctuated, it seems to me that anyone with any skill in reading can see at once that this is not an attempt to paraphrase what Mr. Birnbaum said, but to state the *sense* of what he said and reduce that to an absurdity in a single sentence. And Mr. Birnbaum would hardly be so obliging as to do that for us himself. But what did Mr. Birnbaum actually write in the *Massachusetts Review* article which justifies me in stating as I did the sense of what he wrote? Here is Mr. Birnbaum: "It is surprising for an American to hear many of his countrymen refer to the United States as an 'advanced' society. . . ." Later in his text he goes on: ". . . the American imperial synthesis . . . has broken down. The defeat in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, the Portuguese revolution, *the electoral progression of the Communists and Socialists in Italy* [emphasis mine] . . . the risk that even German Social Democrats might show some independence, entail serious dangers for an American strategy which combined military and political economic integration."

I take it from these remarks that Mr. Birnbaum looks favorably on our defeat in Southeast Asia, the Portuguese revolution, and the increased electoral strength of the Communist party in Italy. His reference to "electoral progression" in Italy is somewhat more absurd today than it was in the fall of 1975 when his article appeared. After all, we have not seen electoral progression by the Socialists in Italy; they have been practically eliminated from politics. It is only the Communists who have progressed electorally. I take it, too, that Mr. Birnbaum regards Communist advances in Italy as signs of that country's democratic and national depth, as contrasted with our own failure to develop—these are his words—". . . a culture at once national, democratic, and profound. . . ."

One last clarification: when Mr. Birnbaum found American society backward as compared with Western Europe, did he have any particular country of Western Europe in mind? He could not have been thinking of West Germany, for he has accused the Social Democratic government there of being so dependent on the United States (in West Germany, as in the United States, the Communist party is practically nonexistent). Was he thinking of England? But he could hardly point with pride to England, where leftism has been so spectacular a failure. Did he mean France? Now in France the government is headed by a conservative and the recent elections showed increased strength for the Socialists and a waning of the Communist vote. However, Mr. Birnbaum did not choose to speak of electoral progression or any hope for it in France. He chose to refer instead to electoral progression in Italy, where the Communists have become so strong and the Socialists are almost nil. I am sure he differentiates his politics from that of the Communists, and has more criticisms of them than he has said. I am quite ready to admit, too, that my remarks about his article were interpretations or readings of his meaning, but I deny that they were unfair, discourteous, or beside the point.

Correction

Our Letters from Readers section in the January issue carried a letter from Joan Peters (p. 25) replying to correspondence on her article, "An Exchange of Populations" (August 1976). The signature on Miss Peters's letter was omitted by error.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This year Rent-a-Train in Europe

2 weeks unlimited First Class train travel, 13 countries, $170.

Renting a car in Europe can be expensive, and driving on strange roads isn't always relaxing. Compare that with Eurailpass "Rent-a Train" (You're not really renting a train, of course, just getting a pass that gives you all the train travel you like).

You ride fast, clean, punctual trains that run often and whisk you to the heart of cities. While you sit back and relax Europe unfolds from your window. You dine and sleep on board. You can ride Europe's deluxe trains without paying extra for them. Your Pass even covers certain ferry, steamer, and motor-coach trips. You can get to know Europeans; they prefer going by rail, too.

And travel is carefree. With a Eurailpass you can improvise your trip, take locals to out-of-the-way places. There's never any problem about tickets. Just a flick of your Pass and you're on your way.

No wonder more and more Americans are switching from rent-a-car to "Rent-a-Train."

See your Travel Agent for a Eurailpass, it's not for sale abroad. A three-week Pass costs $210. One month $260. Two months $350. Three-months $420. Students under 26 get a Student-Railpass for two-months unlimited Second Class rail travel, $230.

Eurailpass, Box Q
Staten Island, N.Y. 10305

Please send me free information on Europe's biggest travel bargain, Eurailpass and Student-Railpass.

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

My Travel Agent is_____

132B-405

AUSTRIA
BELGIUM DENMARK
FRANCE
GERMANY HOLLAND
ITALY LUXEMBOURG
NORWAY PORTUGAL
SPAIN SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND

EURAILPASS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Behind the buttons, there's a "brain."

Electronic intelligence has come to the phone system.

It's part of our new electronic switching machines, working round-the-clock to give you better phone service.

And it's another innovation in telecommunications from Bell Labs and Western Electric.

Intelligent Systems.

Conventional electromechanical switching couldn't have kept up with the enormous increase in telephone calling. Only electronic switching can do that. So we've developed a family of electronic machines that are handling calls in rural, suburban and metropolitan areas.

And our new long-distance electronic system handles 550,000 calls an hour—four times as many as before.

So your Bell telephone company can continue to respond to your needs better and, at the same time, keep your costs reasonable.

Since electronic switching machines run on instructions that can be easily changed, their operations and services can be changed without rewiring or adding equipment.

This flexibility makes many new services practical. Like having your calls forwarded to another number or being signalled the instant a busy line becomes free. The instructions are just programmed into the system's memory.

Electronic switching systems can do more because they're much faster than electromechanical systems. So even though they're handling many more calls, electronic systems have time left over for other tasks.

They continuously check themselves for trouble, diagnose any they find, signal for help, and route calls around a trouble spot.

But trouble is rare with electronic switching.

Today's systems are working round-the-clock with less than 12 minutes "downtime" a year on the average. That makes them 99.9998% reliable.

Our Biggest Job Ever.

The development of electronic switching was the biggest project ever undertaken by Bell Labs and Western Electric in our efforts to keep your phone bill down.

It required an enormous investment in research and development.

Building it took even more work and money.

But now there are 1000 electronic switching offices serving communities of every size as well as handling long distance calls. And a new office is being installed about every working day.

The System Works.

It took the Bell System to develop electronic switching.

Because only the Bell System has Bell Laboratories and Western Electric working together to make your telephone system the most reliable and least expensive in the world.

Which is to say, we had the brawn to put a "brain" behind your phone.

One of a series of messages to keep you informed of how telecommunications technology is changing our world—and the part Bell Labs, Western Electric and your Bell Telephone Company are playing in it.

Western Electric/Bell Laboratories

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America and the World: The Next Four Years

Confronting the Problems

Walter Laqueur

"CRITICAL" is one of those adjectives whose value has been severely depreciated by overuse, yet in speaking of the importance of future developments in American foreign policy no other word will do. For a long time now the United States has been so preoccupied with internal problems that foreign policy has seemed an unwelcome intrusion. The world, however, has not been able to wait patiently for the United States to sort out its domestic difficulties. In the past few years there has been a marked deterioration in the position of both America and its allies —politically, militarily, and economically—and new problems have by now emerged on top of the old familiar ones which still remain unresolved. Thus the Carter administration has come into office at—precisely—a critical moment, and the question arises as to how well it is equipped to cope. Although in certain areas it has made what appear to be bold moves, it remains to be seen how much of this is rhetoric and how much is real, and whether what is real is of value. The truth is that the setbacks suffered in recent years have caused the margin for experiment to shrink considerably, and the apprenticeship of the new administration is therefore likely to be either very short or very costly; one hopes it will not be both.

To start with the most obvious case, the Middle East: although the idea that a comprehensive peace settlement is possible there in the near future belongs to the realm of fantasy, all the signs indicate that the push for just such a settlement is to be given high priority, simply because everyone says the time for it has come. This, indeed, is one of the few issues on which Moscow and London, liberals and conservatives, oil companies and Arabs and Trotskyites agree. I have already argued at length in these pages that a resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states, itself an unlikely prospect, would in any case not necessarily bring peace to the Middle East, which contains plenty of other volatile elements in addition to the Arab-Israeli confrontation.* If, moreover, some of the planners have their way, and a new Palestinian state is established on the West Bank, the situation is liable to deteriorate even further. It is said that unless there is some movement toward defusing the Arab-Israeli conflict there may well be a new war two or three years hence. This is quite possible, but the establishment of what is sure to be a non-viable and therefore irredentist state in Palestine would lead to a new war with even greater certainty. There remains the hope that a fresh impetus may coax the two sides out of the present impasse and that this may eventually result in Palestinian autonomy within a wider framework, such as a federation with Jordan. But a Geneva-type conference aiming at a comprehensive settlement is the approach perhaps least conducive to progress toward this end. The most one can reasonably aim for at this juncture is a beginning in a process that will take many years to unfold. Any attempt to force a lasting, comprehensive settlement here and now is bound to end in breakdown.

Moreover, to concentrate on that comprehensive, lasting, but elusive peace settlement—something the Carter administration shows every sign of intending to do—is to ignore another urgent Middle Eastern problem which has far more serious implications: the price of OPEC oil. The large-scale indebtedness that has resulted from the price of OPEC oil is an infinitely more acute danger to world prosperity and stability, and thus to world peace, than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Were it not for oil, indeed, the Arab-Israeli conflict would be just another of the irritants disturbing world peace. What magnifies the danger in Western eyes is the fear that a new Arab-Israeli war may lead to another oil embargo and thus to the

WALTER LAQUEUR, who contributed "Third World Fantasies" to last month's issue, is currently teaching history at Harvard. He is also chairman of the Research Council of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington and a contributing editor of COMMENTARY. Mr. Laqueur's many books include *The Rebirth of Europe, The Middle East and World Politics,* and, most recently, *Guerrilla.*

* See my article, "Is Peace Possible in the Middle East?," March 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic ruin of the importing nations. Yet quite irrespective of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the economies of many countries are in grave trouble already because they cannot afford oil at the current price levels. And despite the optimistic talk one hears in certain circles, financial collapse on a global scale remains a very real threat. The riots in Egypt earlier this year are just a first indication of the coming storms in the countries most affected.

Saudi Arabia was praised last December for its statesmanlike restraint in deciding to increase the price of oil by only 5 per cent instead of 15 per cent. But since the United States, West Germany, and Japan are already financing the oil imports of the insolvent countries—OPEC's contribution being insignificant—and since there is little prospect that these debts will be paid back, it is difficult to see what the general jubilation was all about. Although there is no easy way to solve the problem, there are many ways to reduce the pressure (and the price), ranging from conservation measures and the development of alternative sources of energy to eliminating the oil companies as intermediaries and creating conditions in which the cartel might break up. It is precisely in this direction that American initiatives at home and leadership abroad will be needed to avert disaster.

RELATIONS with the Soviet Union remain one of the central issues facing the new administration. President Carter has been urged by ex-ambassadors (from George Kennan to Charles Yost) and business interests (from Coca Cola to El Paso Oil) to put an end to the "neglect" of relations with Russia. What in their view is needed, as a recent statement by the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations puts it, is "a resolute abandonment of the stale slogans and reflexes of the cold war, a recognition that this is a new era, with different problems and possibilities, and a determination not to be governed by the compulsions of military competition." There is little to quarrel with in sentiments of this kind, but how they are to be translated into the terms of arms control, of economic cooperation, and of political management is another matter.

The general feeling among experts is that the race to control strategic arms is being lost.* Of course the only sure way to "win" this race is to break down national boundaries—something no country is at present willing to do. Another, less far-reaching, and probably not entirely foolproof way is massive and unhampered on-site inspection, but this has been emphatically rejected by the Soviet Union. All other suggestions, however ingenious, become irrelevant with the progress of technology. There is no known procedure, except perhaps on-site inspection, to verify whether a cruise missile, for example, has a range of 600 or 3,000 kilometers. Nor is verification always useful even where it can be carried out.

As to the present state of the arms race: in the SALT-1 negotiations, American policy-makers accepted unequal ceilings for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's)—1,054 for the U.S., 1,618 for the Soviet Union. The assumption in Washington was that the Russians could not be expected to negotiate from a position of inferiority, but once they had drawn even with the U.S., they would no longer be interested in building new missiles and effective arms-limitation talks could at last be held. (It was on this ground that the New York *Times* recently welcomed the successful Soviet testing of a submarine-launched ballistic missile.) Unfortunately the impeccable logic of this analysis has been lost on the Soviet Union, which has continued to forge ahead; the terms "parity," "sufficiency," and "destabilization" do not exist in Soviet strategic doctrine. In retrospect, it seems almost certain that the arms race could at least have been slowed down if the United States had made it crystal clear that every ICBM deployed by the Russians over and above 1,000 would be matched. But such a course of action was considered hawkish or unnecessary—"[What], in the name of God, is strategic superiority? . . . What do you do with it?" asked Secretary of State Kissinger. As a result, present-day ceilings are far higher than they need have been.

While extolling the virtues of fruitful cooperation among nations and attacking the reactionary circles in the imperialist countries for spending too much on defense, the Soviet leaders have produced new weapons systems in almost every field, built a big fleet, deployed new generations of ballistic missiles, and, generally speaking, spent between two and three times more per capita on defense than the U.S.†

In spite of various efforts to ignore or belittle this Russian push forward (the *Times* continues to insist that the Russians have only been "running hard to overtake an American lead"), the contradiction between Soviet words and deeds has begun to register. Attention has been focused on it by groups like the Committee on the Present Danger

* The phrase occurs in Paul Doty, Albert Carnesale, and Michael Nacht, "The Race to Control Nuclear Arms," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976.

† Soviet spokesmen have vehemently denied all reports of a military build-up. Thus, most recently, Mikhail Lvov in *Novoye Vremya* 3, 1977: "The share of military spending in the Soviet budget is decreasing year by year. So is the amount in absolute terms." The problem with statements of this kind is that Mikhail Lvov has not the faintest idea what the Soviet military budget is, because even trustworthy party workers are not burdened with sensitive information of this kind. To reinforce his claim, Lvov quotes Brezhnev's speech at the last plenary meeting of the Communist party Central Committee. Unfortunately, Brezhnev was more cautious in his remarks than is his commentator. He simply said: "The amount spent by the Soviet Union on defense is exactly as much as is needed to insure the security of the Soviet Union and the joint defense by the fraternal countries of the gains of socialism. . . ."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the task force of outside experts ("Team B") called in to review the CIA estimate of Soviet military capability. Reports of the Soviet build-up have even been described as "ominous," or at the very least "impressive," in circles which would have brushed such information aside not very long ago. The section on defense in this year's Brookings Institution study, *Setting National Priorities*, for instance, warns that the American decline in real defense spending must not be continued.

The constant and rapid growth of Soviet power over and above what could be explained away even by the most charitable observers as needed for the defense of Russia has also caused disenchantment among some arms controllers who used to believe that once a low level of deterrence is assured there is no longer any connection between military strength and political influence. This illusion—and several others as well—also figured in the debate in the 1930's over German rearmament, as can be seen from the recently published fifth volume of Martin Gilbert's excellent biography of Churchill. Looking back on the years when he was warning his countrymen—without great effect—against German rearmament, Churchill said in 1938: "Four years ago, when I asked that the airforce should be doubled and redoubled . . . Lord Samuel thought my judgment so defective that he likened me to a Malay running amok. It would have been well for him and his persecuted race if my advice had been taken. They would not be where they are now and we should not be where we are now." The task of playing Cassandra was a thankless one; there was not a day when Churchill was not accused of being a warmonger, a reckless man, utterly devoid of judgment, wanting to plunge his country into a holocaust, and this at a time (to quote the stock phrases used against him) when there was a real chance that Europe could free itself from the nightmare haunting it, and from an expenditure on arms that was beggaring it.

In retrospect, one can discern four distinct stages in public reaction to Churchill's constant warnings. In stage one (1933-34), it was claimed that the reports about German rearmament were grossly exaggerated or altogether untrue. In stage two (1935), it was admitted that Germany was investing vast resources in rearmament, but not that Germany was catching up with Britain. Some said that Germany was big but inefficient, others claimed that it was not as big as it looked, and others used both arguments at the same time. In stage three (1936-37), it was conceded that Germany had reached parity or had even overtaken Britain but it was also contended that such superiority was meaningless in military terms, that the specific geopolitical situation of Germany had to be taken into account (the need to "defend" itself against potential enemies in the West as well as in the East), and that there was no reason to assume that Germany wanted war. Eventually, the full extent of German superiority could no longer be denied, but it was precisely because the Germans were so much stronger that the counsels of appeasement prevailed in stage four. Survival, it was then said, had to be the overriding consideration, Britain would never be ready to fight in view of its vulnerable position, a "moribund people such as ours is not equipped to deal with a totalitarian state" (Lord Rothermere). Hence Chamberlain's policy of trying gradually to remove "hostility between nations until they felt they could disregard their weapons."

All this will sound eerily familiar to anyone who has followed the debate in America in recent years over Soviet military capabilities and intentions. The historical context changes, but the psychology of appeasement remains fairly constant. Nor is this psychology the monopoly of any one section of the political spectrum. The idea, for example, that determination in foreign policy and defense is part of right-wing ideology is historically mistaken; in the 1930's the leading appeasers in Britain and France were on the Right (though they were helped along by elements on the Left as well). Today appeasement is stronger on the Left, but again there is considerable support from the other side (i.e., right-wing isolationism). Appeasement, in any case, has a momentum and a logic of its own, and once it has proceeded beyond a certain stage, it no longer matters whether the original inspiration came from the Left or the Right. There is the famous case of Marcel Deat, a leading French socialist, who persuaded himself that it was not worthwhile dying for Danzig and then became a leading collaborationist of the Nazis.

There is, of course, one basic difference between the 1930's and the situation today—which is that nuclear weapons have made a major war far less likely. The aggressors in the 1930's could hope for a quick and easy victory, but this is no longer so today (provided, of course, the West does not invite aggression by neglecting its defenses, both strategic and conventional). Hitler wanted war; the Soviet leaders do not. But precisely because the military issues are no longer that straightforward, confusion tends to be even more widespread than in the 1930's. Not only have the arguments and illusions of the 1930's returned in full force, but they have been compounded by others suitable to the nuclear age. Thus we hear it said that the Soviets are slow learners who have not as yet mastered the essentials of strategy in the nuclear age and are merely squandering money and resources on arms that cannot possibly give them a military or political advantage. Others in a more familiar spirit point to Russia's geopolitical situation and its feeling of insecurity because it has to defend itself on two fronts. Still others stress tradi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion and culture—the Russians have always been great believers in quantity.

It is useful to keep the historical parallels in mind at this moment when the pressure to sign another SALT treaty is becoming so strong. That pressure is coming from Washington as well as from Moscow. On the Soviet side, the policy has all along been to weaken the American position slowly and to avoid sudden shocks. Soviet leaders know from bitter experience that the U.S., once threatened or challenged, is still capable of gigantic efforts, such as happened after the launching of Sputnik-1 and on several other occasions. Hence the urgency with which Brezhnev—mindful of the growing realism in the U.S. over the Soviet build-up—now insists on the completion of the SALT talks. On the American side, some say that even a meaningless treaty is better than no treaty, or that this is the last chance before the moderate Brezhnev is succeeded by younger leaders believing in a winnable war. The logic is curious: after all, if such leaders should materialize, they would obviously not feel bound by agreements entered into by their predecessors. Those who warn that the race to control strategic arms is being lost admit that their own cures are "complex, messy, and unbearably difficult." But arrangements that are messy and unbearably difficult are usually also ineffective. In the short run there is no alternative to effective arms control but the threat to match every effort undertaken by the other side.

It was just such a threat, arising out of belated American dissatisfaction with SALT-1, that has now opened the prospect for a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads. But it would be wrong to hail this as a great breakthrough. For, again, it cannot be stressed too strongly that the "national technical means of verification," as they are called in SALT—i.e., satellite surveillance—are not altogether effective even with regard to old-style ICBM's let alone in determining whether or not qualitative improvements are being made in already existing weapons systems. They cannot detect dormant warheads on the surface of the earth, especially if these are located in an environment in which there is a great deal of electromagnetic radiation. They cannot look into caves or mines or under camouflaged structures in which missiles can be hidden. There is in fact an endless number of possible ways of concealing offensive missiles so long as they are not deployed in a conventional manner—that is, in large concrete silos with uncamouflaged steel lids. Thus a truly meaningful agreement would be feasible only by reverting to the old, seemingly impossible idea of on-site inspection.

Yet even if a marked reduction in strategic arms were achieved, it would still be necessary for the West to match the general Soviet military build-up. Even in a state of equality of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would retain overall superiority because of its stronger non-nuclear forces. Indeed, it was the mistaken Western notion of a "cheap" (i.e., strategic nuclear) defense which contributed to the arms race in the first place. What would be most desirable is a *general,* mutually balanced reduction of forces, but here again a really effective verification system would be needed.

OTHER aspects of détente offer only a somewhat more encouraging picture. Soviet-American trade, for instance, has considerably increased over the last five years, but the scope of these exchanges is quite limited. Although the volume of trade went up again in 1975, this was mainly owing to grain sales; U.S. purchases of Soviet goods actually decreased in 1976. Brezhnev has complained about American restrictive measures, saying that were it not for these, American businessmen could do $10-billion worth of business in the Soviet Union over the next five years. It has even been said that trade on this scale would provide work for three million Americans. These figures are a little suspect, however, as even the most superficial analysis will show. The Russians will in the future have to finance their trade by exporting a greater volume of machinery and equipment—something that will hardly create new jobs in the United States. In addition, overall Soviet foreign-trade targets for 1975-80 are quite low, and imply a growth rate less than half of that for 1971-75. The enormous deals allegedly made by the restrictionless Germans and Japanese, and missed out on by the Americans, are for the most part mythical. Germany is historically Russia's most important Western trade partner, but even so, Russia figures only in twelfth or thirteenth place among Germany's customers—just as it did five, ten, and twenty years ago. In 1976 Germany's trade with Russia actually fell from 3.2 per cent to 2.7 per cent, and there may be further decline this year. Nor have there been any spectacular deals with Japan.

In 1975 and again in 1976 the USSR sustained a big hard-currency trade deficit with the West (about $6 billion each year). Soviet purchases in the West have been made possible only by large extensions of credit on the part of Western governments and banks, and the total indebtedness of the Soviet bloc now amounts to nearly $40 billion. The international bankers are not worried—they cannot afford to be, for the climate of confidence has to be maintained at almost any price, with unpaid debts rolled over, renegotiated, or stretched out—but they have become far more cautious with regard to further loans. The credit rating of some East European countries has also taken a plunge: Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria can no longer receive cheap loans (Polish debts to the West are now close to $10 billion).

The prospects of American trade with the Soviet Union are summarized in a detailed 800-page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

study by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress (October 1976): "Although the USSR remains an excellent credit risk in the eyes of Western bankers, heavy Soviet borrowing in 1975 may have constrained Moscow's ability to borrow as heavily in the Eurocurrency market this year. At a minimum it appears that the USSR will have to pay higher interest rates and management fees. . . ." The honeymoon, in short, is over, and it was not a wild orgy to begin with. According to *Tass*, the Soviet news agency, the enemies of détente wish to use foreign trade debts to restrain trade with the Soviet bloc. Such complaints must be a source of confusion to Soviet newspaper readers who are told daily that the Eastern-bloc economies go from strength to strength while Western economies are on the edge of the abyss.

Then there is the question of technology transfer. It is now generally accepted that Western firms have been selling technology too cheaply; even Samuel Pisar, the leading advocate of East-West trade, has written that he feels saddened by the tendency of some American businessmen to go after any profitable deal without regard to the national interest. It may well be that, as some Western economists maintain, the overall impact of American technology on the Soviet economy has not been as extensive as it has been thought to be, partly because it is limited to a few industries, and also because the Soviet system is not elastic enough to derive the maximum benefit from new technologies. But this cannot be laid at the door of Soviet-Western relations.

Which brings us to the politics of détente. The great expectations prevailing in 1971-2 have on the whole given way to a more realistic assessment. But there are still certain misconceptions with regard to what Soviet leaders have in mind when they talk about peaceful coexistence *and* the "need to continue the ideological struggle." If this merely referred to speeches and articles about the incurable ills of Western societies and the superiority of the Soviet system, Western leaders would be entitled to ignore such ritual professions of faith as matters of little consequence. What has been insufficiently understood after all these years is the simple fact that "ideological struggle" has nothing to do with philosophy but a great deal to do with a political offensive which may on occasion, as in Angola, be reinforced by military intervention. This struggle will go on in many parts of the globe, the Helsinki conference notwithstanding. Within the immediate sphere of Soviet influence, Rumania has more or less caved in under pressure, and the Yugoslavs are once again uneasy about their future. Over the last year tensions have increased between the two Germanies—traditionally an accurate barometer of the state of détente.

It would be wrong, however, to accuse the Soviet Union of not having lived up to its promises; the Russian leaders have never promised to "freeze" the global balance of power, nor have they ever said that they would not make the most of Western weaknesses and indecision. The problem is not whether the Soviet leaders have been lying (as President Carter wanted to know in his early briefings); the problem is that Western leaders have not made a sufficient effort to understand the psychology and political thinking of the leaders in the Kremlin, let alone to act accordingly.

This applies to the use that has been made of the issue of human rights as well as to every other aspect of détente. Thus, the Carter administration came into office making strong statements of support for dissidents in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (including Andrei Sakharov), but it has stopped well short of threatening to impose any serious consequences on the Russians for violations of the human-rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement. The fact is, however, that in the Soviet Union and East Germany, in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, those advocating human rights are treated more harshly now than at any time in the past decade. Statements of concern on the part of Western governments may alleviate hardship in individual cases, but unless they are made an inextricable part of a larger policy they are most unlikely to affect the general drift of events.

THE Soviet deployment of new weapons systems and the appearance of a strong new Soviet fleet are ominous signs, but they are not the cause of the recent Western retreat. For the latter one must look to such factors as the economic depression of the early 1970's, the divisive trends in the Western alliance, and the radicalization of some Third World countries. But it is the internal American crisis—the loss of self-confidence and the political paralysis entailed by this loss—which has been the most important factor. If there are now some signs of a recovery of spirit, a great deal of ground has still to be covered as a precondition for coping with international problems that have been neglected for too long.

More than anything else, this applies to the economic situation. The social and political consequences of the recession of 1974-75 are still felt, and there is the danger of a new downturn in 1978-79. The recovery of the world economy has been hesitant and uneven; the British and Italian economies are still in the doldrums and for France, according to all forecasts, 1977 will be a bad year. Inflation has gone down, but not sufficiently, and unemployment in the West is only 20 per-cent lower than at the height of the recession. Protectionist pressures are still strong (since most nations depend on export earnings more than ever before) and these pressures threaten world trade. Above all, there is the great monetary disorder, caused largely by the growth of the market in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

petrodollars and the general indebtedness. There is far too much liquidity, with international bankers offering loans to all who want them and to many who do not. The accumulated debt of the poorer nations now amounts to some $170-200 billion. Perhaps half of this sum has been lent by private banks, with Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea among the main debtors. To this must be added the growing deficits of Britain, Italy, and some of the minor European countries. The pressure for "rescheduling" is growing in many parts of the globe. If, as is likely, growth in 1977 is slower than in 1976, some major nations may ask for a debt moratorium and this could lead to the collapse of leading banks and to a new recession.

Coming summit meetings will be devoted to economic problems, with various rescue operations high on the agenda. The possible political consequencies are, of course, the most worrisome aspect. While conditions vary from country to country, a policy of austerity will be unavoidable and this, according to past experience, will involve decisions that are not at all easy to make in democratic societies. There is the danger of growing political polarization; whether the swing will be to the Right or to the Left depends on local conditions, and where democratic institutions are not deeply rooted or no longer function effectively, they may be replaced by authoritarian structures.

Still, the stabilization of the international currency system, however difficult, may not be beyond human ingenuity, and there is at least a chance that the ailing economies of Western Europe will eventually recover. Infinitely more difficult will be the task of improving relations between the industrialized countries of the Third World. For it is precisely in the underdeveloped countries that the position of the West has deteriorated most over the last decade.

IT HAS been said that a change in these relations can be expected only if the West accepts the new economic world order proposed by the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, or at the very least if new and more beneficial agreements on the terms of trade can be concluded. Such agreements should indeed be explored, but there is no room for illusions with regard to the political consequences. The experience of the Soviet Union should be pondered in this context. If the position of the Soviet bloc has grown stronger in the Third World, it is not because the Communists have provided more aid than the West—they have provided much less—or because they have offered better trading terms or modern technology. On the contrary, they have flatly refused to accept responsibility for the economic plight of the poor countries. What is perhaps even more important, they have all along limited their trade with the producers of raw materials. The Soviet Union is perhaps not greatly admired in the Third World, but it is respected and sometimes feared, much in contrast to the West, and the reason is that the growth of its military strength has not passed unnoticed. Third World leaders will not engage in campaigns of vilification against the Communist bloc because they fear that they cannot do so with impunity. There is no such fear with regard to the West.

Western relations with the underdeveloved countries are exceedingly complex because political, economic, and humanitarian considerations not only do not coincide but frequently clash. Politically, relations with the Third World could improve if the causes of tension were faced up to: this, however, might well mean a reduction in imports from these countries, which would remove the ground for complaints about exploitation and "neo-imperialism." Although costly in economic terms, such a move would be politically far more effective than any changes likely to be made in the terms of trade. There is in any case no objective standard of a "fair price" for raw materials; an increase of 100 per cent in the price of oil can be as easily justified as an increase of 10 per cent.

This is not to say that the terms of trade should not be renegotiated; they will have to be. But the process promises to be a long drawn-out one that may well create new tensions in place of the old. Some of the exporting nations believe not in interdependence but in a strategy of minimum cooperation and maximum confrontation; since almost all of them are dictatorships whose very legitimacy is based on an aggressive stance, the more radical members in a cartel are likely to prevail more often than not over the more moderate ones. On humanitarian grounds a good case can be made for a massive, ongoing Red Cross-type effort for the very poorest countries. But this again would do little to satisfy the demands of the raw-material-producing nations, and the motives behind such a strategy would almost certainly be misrepresented, with America being seen to accept the historical responsibility for the plight of the very poor.

In the struggle for influence in the Third World the West faces handicaps that cannot presently be overcome. There is envy because Western societies with all their difficulties are infinitely richer than those of the Third World, and there is also a greater instinctive affinity between Third World autocrats and Eastern bloc dictators. The picture, nevertheless, is not all bleak. The anti-Western group in the UN, UNCTAD, and elsewhere consists of an alliance between the relatively rich producers of oil and some other strategic materials and the poor countries of Asia and Africa. This *ad hoc* alliance is largely based on the expectation that OPEC will obtain for the least developed nations massive financial support from the West and Japan, and also to a certain extent on racial or ideological solidarity. But as time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passes and the oil producers grow richer, and as it emerges that their contribution to the welfare of the least developed nations is negligible, this alliance will falter and break—provided, of course, the West does not allow OPEC to claim credit for Western aid to the poor nations.

In a paradoxical way, the present weakness of the West in the Third World may even be a potential source of strength. As Soviet military muscles are flexed through intervention-by-proxy, Angola-style, some Third World countries may begin to feel threatened. There are Russian "parties" in almost all Third World countries but there is no "American party." Consequently (as even the Indian example has recently shown), the incumbents, especially if their country is located near the Soviet border, are bound to fear the Communists more than the multinational corporations—the latter can easily be nationalized or expelled, but the former are dangerous rivals for power. The Third World has never been a monolithic bloc, and as Soviet influence grows and the differences between the haves and have-nots increase, there may be startling political realignments favoring the West but quite irrespective of Western initiatives.

THERE has been no mention of the specific problems of Central and South America, which are the problems neither of the Third World nor of the industrialized countries. It is certain, however, that they will preoccupy the United States in the years to come more than ever before. And finally there is Europe with its multiple economic and political crises, and its stalled movement toward greater unity. Of the governments of the European community only the one in Luxemburg can confidently assume that it will last the year. The French government is in grave trouble and the German coalition may fall apart; the fact that the opposition in each country is also in disarray cannot be of much comfort. Sweden, Norway, and Austria are relatively stable, to be sure, and in Portugal the worst has so far not happened; there is even a chance that Spain—despite the recent turmoil—will transform itself into a democracy of sorts without too much violence. But given the overall precariousness of the European situation, these rays of hope are not sufficient by themselves to inspire confidence.

Most European countries may indeed overcome their present political and economic difficulties; the problem is that one or two of them may not, and this would have incalculable consequences for the future of democratic institutions and of the Atlantic alliance. Ever since World War II, Western Europe has been dealing with the Soviet bloc from a position of weakness; if this had not been the case, there would have been no need for an American nuclear umbrella and the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe. The eclipse of even one major European country would at the very least deepen the imbalance on the continent, and the consequences could well be more far-reaching still.

In this connection one should view with skepticism Cyrus Vance's pronouncement that the participation of Communists in West European governments would upset Soviet relations with Eastern Europe more than it would upset the Western alliance. This idea seems to be based on the indisputable historical fact that the wider Communism spreads, the less unity there is in the Communist camp. To take the reasoning one step further, if Communism were to prevail in the United States, the result might well be unfortunate for the Soviet Union, for a Communist America would almost inevitably clash with Russia in the same way that China and other Communist countries have done, and would in many ways be a stronger and more dangerous rival than the present United States, hampered as it is by bourgeois inhibitions concerning the use of political and military power. But such a perspective is hardly reassuring if the aim is world peace, nor does it hold much comfort for the future of freedom and other such values. Eurocommunism does indeed pose problems for the Soviet Union, but the problems it poses for the West are likely to be much the more intractable.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union, or the Communist bloc as a whole, will not have real troubles of its own in the coming years. Inside the Soviet Union, succession may not proceed as smoothly as expected, and in a longer-term perspective the question of the nationalities, with the higher birth rate of the non-Russians, has potentially explosive aspects. A lasting reconciliation between the Soviet Union and China seems only a remote possibility. The Soviet position in Eastern Europe is far from "crumbling," as some oversanguine observers have announced, but the Russians certainly will have to pay close attention to sources of friction in that part of their empire. This is partly due to the desire of these countries to attain a greater measure of independence, and partly to economic pressures. For Eastern Europe too has gone through a revolution of material expectations, and at the same time has been severely hit by the recession. Still, modern-style dictatorships find it relatively easy to cope with crisis in the short run. The Soviet bloc may be handicapped or even partly paralyzed by internal convulsions in the years to come, but it would be unwise to bank on this.

NEW administrations always promise both to be different and to improve on the performance of their predecessors. If President Carter's own experience has not been in the field of foreign policy, the new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, has a reputation as an excellent international negotiator; the new Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, has specialized in arms sys-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tems on the one hand and in arms control on the other; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the adviser on national security, has been hailed by the press as a brilliant conceptualizer.

The new administration will also have the benefit of advice from that segment of the foreign-policy establishment which was in opposition under the Republicans. Recent years have seen an outpouring of books, articles, and summaries of conferences held by this segment of the establishment, all offering alternative choices and strategies for American foreign policy. As some of the main authors of these alternative choices will now be in the seats of power, and as others may exercise indirect influence, it will be instructive to see which of their blueprints will be followed by the new administration.

Fewer, no doubt, than some hope and others fear, for it is one of the laws of foreign policy-making that the number of available options and the room for freedom of choice are usually even more limited than in domestic affairs. The conduct of foreign policy largely depends on the attitudes and behavior of the other players, not to mention the contingencies that may arise at any moment. In the seclusion of a university or the offices of a foundation, abstract new world orders and systems can be produced almost at will; the view from the seventh floor of the State Department (or the first floor of the Pentagon) is more restricted. Thus President Carter's new foreign-policy-makers may avoid some of the errors that were committed in the past, but they cannot pick and choose the problems with which they are going to deal.

Since Brzezinski has for many years been a leading student of world affairs, his writings over the last decade or two will be scrutinized as closely as those of Henry Kissinger once were (even though it is still not certain that his ideas will prevail in White House councils). An investigation of this kind will reveal a searching, imaginative mind but also a certain pattern of overconfidence. This refers, for instance, to his belief, voiced in the 1960's, that in view of recent technological developments the position of the United States was bound to become stronger in the world, that socioeconomic reforms in the Soviet Union would lead to political reform there, and that the 1970's would witness the spread to the Soviet Union of the sorts of convulsions that Spain, Yugoslavia, Mexico, and Poland began to undergo in the late 1960's. The same pattern of imaginative overconfidence can be seen in Brzezinski's predictions concerning the far-reaching political and social effects of the new "technetronic" age, a term coined by him.

To recall such misjudments is partly unfair, if only because Brzezinski was dealing with the shape of things to come, and it is infinitely more difficult to be right about the future than about the past. Furthermore, it is to Brzezinski's credit that at a time when transnational systems of interdependence were being offered at a dime a dozen, he drew attention to the danger of international anarchy. Brzezinski saw correctly that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, a greater capacity for involvement in the world's trouble spots would stimulate a greater temptation to *become* involved. He also saw that the fact that the conflict between the two superpowers has become more complex in recent years does not necessarily make it any the less dangerous. Above all, if somewhat belatedly, he saw that (technetronics aside) America now finds itself facing a hostile world, at a time when its power remains central as never before to global stability and progress.* Even in his more adventurous moments, Brzezinski has never forgotten that power is still a factor of some importance in world affairs; the clash between this perception of his and dreams of an "emerging global consciousness" worked out by some of his colleagues is no doubt what has led to his reputation in some circles as a hawk.

BUT what are the policies likely to be proposed by the new national-security adviser? In his most recent essay, Brzezinski has suggested that the U.S. should not support white supremacy in South Africa, should not be indifferent to the desire for greater social justice and national dignity in Central America, and should not take a cynical view of those countries of Eastern Europe that seek to enlarge their national independence. These are unexceptionable ideas, though honesty (rather than cynicism) should oblige one to admit that America will be able to offer nothing more substantial than sympathy to countries like Poland and Rumania.

In the same essay Brzezinski urges that the U.S. become cooperatively engaged with the "rising global egalitarian passions." Since most countries are ruled by dictators, a confrontation between freedom and despotism is to be avoided in favor of an attempt to accommodate the pressures for reform of existing international arrangements, in the hope that this will lessen radical passions. This view of the world scene, however, is only partly valid. "Egalitarianism" is just one of the motive forces underlying anti-Americanism, and frequently not the most important one. The inequities of the world, especially the unequal distribution of resources, cannot be seriously affected so long as nation-states, anxiously preserving their sovereignty, continue to exist. Expressions of sympathy by American leaders and trebling (or quadrupling) the amount of help to poor nations will perhaps do no harm (though even that is by no means certain), but their political effect cannot be expected to be great, either in the short run or in the long run.

*"America in a Hostile World," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SPECULATION about the shape American foreign policy is likely to take under the new administration is admittedly risky. An inevitable learning process must occur as statesmen and advisers adjust to the world as it is (rather than as they would wish it to be), and qualities hitherto latent may surface in unexpected ways. So far, however, from the President down, a certain alarming confusion has seemed to prevail, along with the rote continuation of old policies in new rhetoric. Early pronouncements show no sign that the administration has registered the extent to which the American position in the world has deteriorated, or the problems that this entails. Instead, there has been much sermonizing about the need for openness in the policy-making process and about the role of morality in the conduct of foreign relations. But how to combine the wish for détente, for example, with an insistence on human rights—unless one is ready to make some clear connection between progress on the one front and progress on the other, something President Carter has eschewed? Already a double standard is appearing: one for the Soviet Union and its allies, another, harsher one for the Chiles and Rhodesias of this world. In the field of nuclear disarmament, to take another example, everyone in the new administration has gone enthusiastically on record in favor of "progress," but what is the value of agreements hastily concluded mainly for the sake of "movement" if such agreements will weaken the United States and its allies without making the world a safer place than at present?

Rhetorical emphases aside, it would seem that the sum total of the new departures in foreign policy by the Carter administration can be expected to be modest. Which brings us back to where we began—to the great question of the qualities needed to face a surfeit of critical problems in a largely hostile world. Moderation, friendly gestures, negotiations in a reasonable and constructive spirit are always useful; in some instances a case can even be made for gimmicks. Still, however useful these qualities are when the going is good, at a time of danger they do not suffice. Nor can the answer be found in revolutionary new ideas or hitherto undiscovered conceptual breakthroughs. Every self-respecting political scientist has a concept for a new world order; some, for variety's sake, have offered several. What is required at a time of danger is not one new concept or several new concepts but leadership—strong leadership.

Leadership does not mean hegemony or "indiscriminate interventionism"; there is something farcical in the current invocation of these perils in view of the weakness of the American position. Leadership means clarity of vision and the vigor needed in a struggle for survival. America still is the senior partner in the Western alliance. If it does not supply the proper kind of leadership, the chances of the other partners cannot be rated high, nor, in the long run, can the prospects for world peace and for the continued existence of democratic institutions even in the United States itself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America and the World: The Next Four Years

Beyond Détente

Robert W. Tucker

I

Do we live in a new world? To a growing number the question will appear little more than rhetorical. The view that we are witnessing what amounts to a transformation of sorts in world politics is no longer the possession of a select group. It is now broadly subscribed to by the foreign-policy elites. It is entertained by a number of persons who occupy key foreign-policy positions within the new administration. At least, it *was* entertained prior to their assumption of power. Whether it will be held to now that there are more heady and serious things to do than writing articles in *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy* remains to be seen.

The principal features of the new world we have presumably entered are by this time reasonably familiar. It is a matter of common agreement that the international system today is far more complex than it has ever been, if only because of the startling increase in the number of actors and of issues. At the same time, this proliferation of actors and issues has been attended by an equally startling increase in relationships of mutual dependence that, once entered into, can normally be broken only at exorbitant cost. These relationships are but rarely susceptible to the arbitrament of force. Though interdependencies may and do breed conflicts of interest, the threat or use of force to resolve these conflicts is likely to prove more injurious to the user than non-forcible means (even if the latter should frequently prove quite limited in their effectiveness). Thus the principal sanctions of the past no longer respond to the "logic" of the new world. Instead, novel methods of conflict resolution are called for that will respond to a system in which the actors are not only many but of diverse character and the relationships they form are far more compromising of the state's independence of action than were the relationships characterizing world politics of only a generation ago.

This emergent international system is not only found to be far more complex than the system it is displacing, it is also seen as far less hierarchical. Indeed, the decline of hierarchy appears as both consequence and cause of increased complexity. It is the consequence in that the emergence of new actors and new issues no longer permits the concentration of power the previous system permitted. Then, too, mutual dependencies that increasingly limit the freedom of action even of great states must also result in the steady diffusion of power. It is the cause in that the insistent and growing demands for greater equality advanced by the new states presumably presage a system in which conflicts will be increasingly resolved through complex bargaining rather than through great-power fiat.

To be sure, the emergent system is still seen as one that remains hierarchical. Even so, hierarchy no longer is found to have the salience and solidity it once had. In consequence, the great powers may no longer be expected to play their traditionally preponderant roles and to enjoy their once customary advantages. In place of a rough and precarious equality of the strong, the only equality international society has ever known, a new equality is arising, largely as a result of the decline in utility of traditional instruments of power—above all, of military power.

Given this view of the new world we are entering, or have already entered, the growing emphasis on North-South rather than East-West relationships becomes at once understandable. It is relationships between developed and developing countries that *appear* to fit this view. By contrast, relations with the major Communist powers can scarcely be accommodated to it. Whereas North-South relations evoke a present and future need of "world-order" politics, East-West relations remain as an unpleasant reminder of "balance-of-power" politics. For those committed to the new world this must of course pose difficulties. Still, such dif-

Robert W. Tucker, who writes frequently in these pages on issues of foreign policy, is professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins. Mr. Tucker's new book, *The Inequality of Nations*, is about to be published by Basic Books.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ficulties can be reduced by considering East-West relationships as little more than the residue of a world that is increasingly at odds with the forces now dominant in global politics.

II

WHAT ARE we to say of this new world? A harsh and brief answer is that it appears so far divorced from contemporary realities that one is inclined to conclude that it is very largely the product of desire. Certainly there is very little to point to in today's world that bears out this vision. On the contrary, the signs insistently point in the opposite direction. They do so even if one accepts the emphasis placed on North-South rather than East-West relationships. For the conflicts that increasingly mark the relationships between developed and developing countries are conflicts over wealth and power—and status—and these are exactly the conflicts in which states have traditionally engaged. Given the stakes involved, there is little reason to expect that they will be moderate. There is even less reason to expect moderation, if one adds to these perennial stakes of state rivalries the ideological differences arising between many of the developing countries and the industrial democracies of the North. If these conflicts nevertheless prove moderate, it will only be because those challenging the present distribution of wealth and power do not have sufficient means to mount an effective challenge.

For once we take away the major oil-producing states of the developing world, what does Southern power amount to? Clearly, it amounts to *something*. What is by now a very large literature dealing with the growing importance of the developing world in its own right cannot be wholly misplaced. But this is not at issue here. Instead, it is the significance of the new states relative to the significance of the Soviet Union.*

There is no real comparison here and no amount of ingenuity can alter this judgment. Again, the major oil-producing states of the developing world apart, the importance of the new states cannot be divorced for the most part from this nation's continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union (and, in much lesser degree today, with China). In the new world, as in the old, it is the rivalry of the great powers that affords such significance in global politics as most of the developing countries enjoy. The North-South relationship therefore remains a function of the East-West relationship.

If illustration is needed of this, Southern Africa provides a case in point. What has given a sense of urgency and new importance to American policy in this region? Certainly, it is not the intrinsic significance of Southern Africa. If this were the reason we should have expected an American government to have directed its attention to the task of averting a race war long before the time it did in fact do so. The potential for such conflict has long been apparent. The relative indifference shown until recently by the United States to this prospect has scarcely improved our relations with black Africa. Yet until the Angolan war and the successful intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in that conflict, these considerations were insufficient to effect a change in American policy. And if in the wake of Angola the heightened potential for race war has brought about a change in American policy, it is not primarily because of the tragedy in human terms such conflict would entail. Instead, it is the prospect that a widening "war of liberation" from white rule would allow the Soviet Union to extend and consolidate its influence in a region where heretofore this influence has been very modest.

III

WHAT prevents the above considerations from being seen as altogether commonplace is not an estimate of the role and importance today of the new states that must ultimately provoke skepticism even on the part of the credulous, but a belief in the declining utility of military power. If for whatever reasons this belief is strong enough, the significance of East-West relationships is bound to assume modest proportions in comparison with the significance it once assumed. Moreover, to the degree a belief in the declining utility of military power is attended by the conviction of a corresponding rise in the utility of economic power, the tendency to reduce the importance once given the Soviet-American relationship is further strengthened. For the critical importance that was generally attached to this relationship in an earlier period consisted precisely in seeing it above all as a "balance-of-power" relationship, that is, as one determined by relative military power. With but a brief exception in the late 1950's, the economic power *per se* of the Soviet Union was never regarded as critical to this relationship since American (and, even more, Western) economic preponderance was taken, to all intents and purposes, as irreversible. It is still so taken, though now in a period when economic power *per se* is increasingly assigned the role once given to military power. The emergent balance of power, as it were, is increasingly seen above all as an economic balance, and in the scales of this bal-

* In the scale of American interests, it may be argued that of paramount importance are our relationships with the other industrial democracies of the North. The argument is unexceptionable not only because of the intrinsic significance of these countries for American interests, but because our relationship with them remains, as in the past, central to our relationship with the Soviet Union.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ance the Soviet Union continues to be far outweighed by the West.*

This is, at least, the most respectable argument for reducing the importance once given to East-West relationships. If valid, it does not really matter how militarily powerful the Soviet Union becomes. At any rate, within a very broad margin for error in calculating the balance of military power, it does not really matter. This being so, it also follows that it does not really matter that the Soviet Union has shown such persistence and determination in the build-up of both its strategic and conventional military forces. If the utility of military power has declined to the extent many now insist that it has, and if this decline holds out no reasonable prospect of being reversed, there is no need to speculate on why Soviet leadership continues its impressive military build-up. Ingenuous—and disingenuous—arguments that seek to account for this otherwise curious behavior are superfluous.

Nevertheless, arguments are made. One such argument is that the Soviet arms build-up is indicative of mindless behavior on the part of Soviet leadership. The Russians, this argument runs, have yet to comprehend the nature of the contemporary world. If they did, they would see that most of their arms are without meaningful purpose and that this is certainly true for the massive increase in strategic forces and conventional naval forces they are presently undertaking. This same view, applied to strategic forces, is implicit in the well-known response of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to criticism that his policy on strategic-arms-limitations agreements ran the risk of conceding strategic superiority to the Soviet Union. "[What], in the name of God, is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"

These are questions, however, that are more properly addressed to those who seek strategic superiority today. One purpose might be to persuade America's major allies that the once vaunted power of their protector can no longer be relied upon to protect them in a future crisis and that, accordingly, they ought to draw the necessary political consequences. If this purpose seems trivial and insubstantial to some, it may nevertheless appear quite important to others. So, too, the rapid development of naval forces with an expanding interventionary capability may seem trivial and unimportant to some. In the region of the Red Sea, however, this same capability may one day be used to impede—or plausibly threaten to impede—the flow of oil to Europe. Indeed, the mere capability to impede the flow of oil may be converted to political leverage.

Finally, there is a very simple response to the argument of a mindless Soviet leadership yet unable to comprehend the nature of the new world. Even if the argument were accepted, can it give us much assurance about the price that may have to be paid one day in order that the Russians better understand this new world? If it does not give much assurance, as it obviously does not, is this not a weighty reason for taking mindlessness quite seriously and endeavoring to insure that one traditional message this great power—as any great power—can be counted upon to understand is adequately conveyed?

An older, and more familiar, argument that provides an apparently comforting explanation of the Soviet military build-up emphasizes the defensive orientation of Soviet leadership, inherited from their imperial predecessor. In this view, a profound need for reassurance about the adequacy of their defenses is exacerbated by the need to be on guard both in the West and in the East. The response may well be conceded as excessive, yet the excess is regarded as understandable. This argument might perhaps explain the maintenance of very large ground forces. It does not satisfactorily account for the effort presently being made at the strategic level. Even less, perhaps, does it provide a plausible explanation for the impressive effort in developing Soviet naval power. These are not the instruments—and certainly not in their magnitude—of a leadership whose major preoccupation is defensive. They are the instruments of a leadership with global ambitions, however cautiously and tentatively it may initially move in the pursuit of those ambitions.

Yet it does not matter a great deal if the argument is conceded that in their military build-up the Soviets have acted primarily out of defensive considerations. The history of great powers that have become determinedly expansionist is, after all, in large measure a history of states that initially acted primarily out of defensive considerations. A host of critics of Vietnam, and of the larger policy alleged to have led inevitably to Vietnam, have found the roots of this war in the security and military bureaucracies that largely originated in the course of a conflict (World War II) fought out of defensive considerations and of a postwar period in which the same considerations remained paramount. It was these bureaucracies, and the larger military-industrial complex they

* Does not this emphasis on a "new" balance of power contradict the view, as applied to North-South relationships, that a new equality is arising as a result of a steady diffusion of power and a decline in utility of the traditional instruments of power? In some measure, it does do so. At the same time, the decline in the utility of military power as it bears on North-South relationships is found by many to result in the increased significance of economic power. The importance nevertheless attached to the developing states is due to exaggerated estimates of their economic power—estimates which of course focus very largely on the determination of these states to use their power as well as on the vulnerabilities of the industrialized states to this use.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spawned, that presumably nourished the need to pursue expansionist goals. Whatever the historical merit of this argument, the reluctance to apply it today to a state that has few, if any, of the constraints on the behavior of governing elites this country possesses is, to say the least, curious.*

In the absence of such constraints, it obviously will not do to view with equanimity the growing military power of the Soviet Union by finding the assurance of moderate behavior in what is presumed to be the deeply conservative character of Soviet leaders. For the same forces that have impelled other regimes to expansion when possessed of enormous military establishments, and particularly those regimes that have otherwise been incompetent domestically, may also impel Soviet leadership to expansion, whatever its previous attachment to the status quo. This is, of course, an understatement that itself borders on the absurd since it assumes that Soviet leadership and polity are altogether normal, whereas the contrary is the case. It assumes that the hostility the Soviet government entertains toward other, radically different, governments is no more and no less than the norm in state relations. And it assumes that the legitimacy of the Soviet regime poses no problems and creates no compulsions for its leadership that other governing elites do not face. Even if we were to grant these plainly unwarranted and absurd assumptions, however, the residual problem posed by the Soviet arms build-up would remain.

We are often reminded that there is after all an impressive record of Soviet behavior with respect to the use of military power, a record that is marked almost throughout by caution and circumspection. The record does indeed show that this and preceding Soviet leaderships have been cautious and circumspect in the use of military power. At the same time, this record cannot be considered apart from the military power that has been arrayed in potential opposition to whatever aspirations Soviet leadership, past or present, may have entertained. Unless we are to fall back on some assumption about the inherently defensive and conservative disposition of those who rule over the Soviet Union, a disposition independent of time and circumstance, we can only conclude that the caution heretofore shown by Soviet leadership in using their military power has been largely a function of American military power and the credibility of that power.

Here again, no more and no less need be assumed of the Soviet Union than is assumed of any rising and ambitious power. Indeed, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the case for viewing the Soviet arms build-up with the utmost seriousness need not rest in the first instance on the distinctive characteristics of the Soviet regime. Those characteristics surely must add, and considerably so, to the apprehensions with which an arms build-up of the character and magnitude we are witnessing today should in any event be viewed. But if the significance of this development cannot be divorced from the fact that it is presided over by a ruling elite that remains deeply at odds with its own people and profoundly estranged from the outside world, at the very least a more conventional power calculus compels us to consider its eventual consequences.

These consequences need not be equated with the overt use of armed force and, in all probability, ought not to be so equated. This does not diminish the gravity of the consequences thereby raised, unless it is simply assumed that military power not used overtly is useless. But that assumption, however broadly it is entertained today in the West, cannot bear serious examination. The prospect of the overt use of Soviet military power is not the principal issue raised by the current build-up. The point of this power is precisely that it *not* be used overtly, but that it serve as a base for launching a political offensive. Even to put the matter this way may be to state in too stark and dramatic a form the process by which Soviet influence is most likely to expand. The political shadows cast by growing military power may well go largely unheralded, at least for a considerable period. We may expect that elementary considerations of prudence would dictate that the expansion of Soviet influence be carried out as quietly and unobtrusively as possible. In this manner the illusion may persist that the utility of military power has markedly declined and that, indeed, it no longer dominates the relations of the great states.

IV

In sum, unless we assume that the nature of state relations has essentially changed, we have no alternative but to conclude that our relationship with the Soviet Union constitutes today, as it has constituted since the close of World War II, the central problem for American foreign policy. Moreover, unless we assume that the character of world politics has undergone sudden and qualitative transformation both in its

* It is, of course, applied, but for the most part in a manner that borders on the captious. Thus the Soviet Union is held to have its own military-industrial complex that constrains a political leadership in a manner not too dissimilar from our own experience. The Soviet arms build-up is frequently attributed to the military (and its allies) and to the need to appease the military, particularly when the political leadership moves toward any reconciliation with the West. Thus it has been argued that the present build-up in arms is the price that Brezhnev had to pay for détente. At the same time, there is little concern manifested over the prospect that this same military bureaucracy might succeed in employing its arms on behalf of an expansionist foreign policy. To the contrary, the explanation that the Soviet arms build-up is a consequence of a military-industrial complex is taken more often as a source of comfort than as a source of alarm.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stakes and in its means, we have no alternative but to consider the impressive and persistent growth of Soviet military power as critical to any assessment of the overall relationship between the two states. Attempts to explain this growth in a manner that gives it no more than peripheral significance do not carry plausibility. What we will eventually have to respond to, in some manner, is a dramatically rising military power that has all of the conventional reasons for asserting itself and for expanding as circumstances permit. To the conventional reasons for expansion must be added those reasons that stem from the distinctive character of the Soviet regime. In this respect, there is little evidence that Soviet hostility to and fear of the West have substantially diminished, and very few among those regarded as knowledgeable in Soviet affairs have argued that they have.

Given these considerations, the general alternatives open to the United States seem clear enough. It may withdraw before Soviet power, however gradually, whether in the hope that this power will somehow be automatically contained or in the hope that Soviet ambitions will prove to be moderate. Since the latter hope appears on closer examination as little more than a variation of the former, it is in the forces seen as automatically containing the Soviet Union that expectations are focused. These expectations are reflected in current illusions concerning the declining utility of military power. They are also reflected in the continuing faith placed in a world that is found to be ever more pluralistic and, in consequence, ever more resistant to great-power expansion. A decade ago, the pluralist thesis formed the mainstay of the prevailing liberal critique of Vietnam, and of the larger policy that presumably had eventuated in Vietnam. Today, it is applied not only to the Third World but, in the assessments that are commonly made of Eurocommunism, to the First World as well.

But if the expectations placed in the automatic containment of Soviet military power are groundless, the only alternative to a policy of withdrawal is one of countering this power with military power. At least, this is the only real alternative so long as we wish to continue to play a role in world politics that bears any real continuity with the role we have played since World War II. Now as in the past, power will have to be balanced with power and the precondition for "world-order" politics will continue to be "balance-of-power" politics.

IN A word, we are back to a policy of containment. Indeed, we have never left containment. Nor could we do so in the absence of new or reemergent centers of power capable of providing for their own security. These centers of potential power have failed to materialize and show no prospect of materializing in the foreseeable future. The policy known as détente, and which emerged full blown in 1972, did not assume the contrary. It is quite true that the rhetoric of the Nixon-Ford administrations encouraged the belief that containment, if not already dead, led no more than a very truncated existence. The 1972 presidential report to Congress stated: "Our alliances are no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet Union and China behind an American shield. They are, instead, addressed to the creation with those powers of a stable world peace." But this and similar statements need not be taken at face value and cannot be so taken unless it is assumed that the Nixon-Kissinger version of détente signalled the intention of simply abandoning the competition with the Soviet Union that had dominated world politics since the 1940's. There is no warrant for making this assumption, though many did and continue to make it. Still, détente was not an alternative to containment *per se*. Instead, it was conceived as a different and easier version of containment, one that would prove supportable in the light of the national mood that had emerged —or that was thought to have emerged—from Vietnam. Détente, 1972, was still a form of containment, but it was to be containment without tears and without the term that had once been widely accepted but was now carefully avoided.

The growing criticism of détente, 1972, expresses the realization that the economic incentives held out to the Soviet Union have not brought the anticipated results, while the opportunities supposedly afforded by Soviet-Chinese rivalry either were not properly exploited or, more likely, were never there to exploit in the first place. An emphasis on the importance of economic inducements in moderating Russian behavior was, if taken seriously, a variation on the view that internal constraints—the need for greater economic growth and the satisfaction of consumer demands —would turn Soviet leadership away from an expansionist foreign policy and lead it to accept largely American- or Western-inspired "rules of the game." But internal constraints had never had these results in the past, and there was no plausible reason for believing that they would in a period when the stability of the regime—whatever its incompetence in dealing with the domestic economy—appeared as assured as it had ever been.

Nor was it ever quite clear why, according to the principal architects of détente, so much emphasis had to be placed on economic inducements in altering Soviet behavior. For the rough parity in power that had come to prevail between the nuclear superpowers presumably meant that, in Henry Kissinger's words, "the constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent" was either very unrealistic or very dangerous or both. If the theory of marginal advantage was true, however, it made the economic incentives held out to the Soviet Union largely superfluous. At best,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these incentives could only serve to reward the more moderate behavior that was in any case in the Soviet Union's interest for other, more fundamental, reasons.

Nor does it seem plausible to assume, as some critics of the implementation of détente have assumed, that a more effectively exploited triangular relationship might have done what economic incentives did not do. Even had the opening to Peking been more imaginatively and assiduously pursued, whatever this might have meant in practice, it is doubtful the result would have had an appreciable effect on the development of détente. The Chinese criticism of American policy has not been, in the main, a criticism of what this nation has done or failed to do in Asia. Instead, it has been a criticism of what America has failed to do in confronting the Soviet Union throughout the world. In this confrontation, it is not clear that Peking, even if closer to Washington than it is today, would make any more substantial contribution to the American effort other than the contribution it already makes by virtue of China's hostile position toward the Soviet Union. There are, it seems hardly necessary to add, substantial difficulties for both Washington and Peking in pursuing a more intimate relationship. But even if these difficulties are set aside, there is reason to doubt that a more intimate relationship would have had —and may still have—a substantially greater effect in constraining the Soviet Union.

These considerations necessarily point to the conclusion that there are no reliable soft-options for effectively containing the spread of Soviet power and influence. It may be argued, though very few have done so, that it is no longer in America's interests to contain this power and influence, that the risks run and the costs entailed by the attempt to do so have become too great. This is at least a clear position, whatever else one may think about it. At any rate, it is a clear position so long as the risks run and the costs entailed by abandoning a policy of containment are not obscured by the promise of effective, and largely self-operating, substitutes for this policy.

The evident failure of détente to have realized its initial promise has given considerable impetus to the search for such substitutes. The vision of a new world in which international politics are progressively assimilated to domestic politics, in which the issue of power as it has been traditionally manifested in state relations is progressively spirited away, and in which ideological issues either tend to disappear, or, if considered, are divorced from considerations of power, is largely the product of this search for an alternative to containment. A policy is desired, whether it is one of preserving the substance of the nation's position and interests in the world, though without paying the price preservation is likely to entail, or of abandoning position and interests, though without paying the price abandonment is likely to entail. In either case, it becomes necessary to "find" a world suited to policy. For those who wish to preserve, it is useful—even necessary—to find a moderate world, that is, a world in which the great powers either do not have inordinate ambitions or can no longer realize such ambitions because of the constraints "the system" places on the use of power. For those who wish to withdraw, the same vision of an essentially moderate world must be evoked. For both, it is necessary to explain away the growth of Soviet military power with the general proposition that this power can no longer be effectively employed to serve the purpose of an expansionist foreign policy.

Since this proposition cannot survive critical examination, there is no alternative to a policy—*some* policy—of containment. Moreover, it is important that the term containment itself be rehabilitated, lest the belief—or rather the illusion—is further encouraged that we have somehow gone beyond the realities it addresses. "Metaphysicians, like savages," Bertrand Russell once remarked, "are apt to imagine a magical connection between words and things." It is difficult to credit the charge that the principal metaphysicians of détente imagined a magical connection between words and things. But they did encourage others to imagine such a connection. They still do by their persistent refusal to use the term containment.

V

Although there is no escape from containment, as long as this nation wishes to sustain anything resembling the role and influence it has sustained since World War II, there is a choice in the scope—and, to some extent, the means—of containment in the circumstances of the late 1970's.

It is often forgotten today that the history of American foreign policy since World War II has been in large measure a history of the meaning to be given to containment. The critical debates over foreign policy in the postwar period have nearly all been debates over containment. During his last year in office Henry Kissinger was fond of declaring that: "The problem of our age is how to manage the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower." In fact, this has been our problem for almost three decades. That it should elicit controversy today can scarcely prove surprising, given the controversy that has attended managing—that is, containing—Soviet power since the late 1940's.

It is necessary to remind ourselves of the varied and often complex history of containment, if only as an antidote to the view today that containment did, after all, have a rather set meaning from its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inception, a meaning that was given its clearest illustration by the intervention in Vietnam. If Vietnam cannot simply be seen as the perversion of containment, it also cannot be seen as the essential meaning of containment. It is, of course, the widespread penchant for equating containment with Vietnam—and, beyond Vietnam, with all of the excesses bred by the cold war—that accounts for the care with which even those who know better meticulously avoid use of the term. In its origin, however, containment expressed for the most part a balance-of-power policy. It was a conventional conception of security that provided the principal motive for early containment policy, not only in Europe but in Asia as well. To this extent, containment rested on the assumption that a Europe —and, even more, a Eurasia—controlled by a hostile power would not only threaten the nation's physical security, but would hold out the prospect of a world in which America's political and economic frontiers would have to become largely coterminous with its territorial frontiers. In such a world, it was argued, America would find it difficult, if not impossible, to remain itself, since a hostile world from which this nation was shut out would inevitably affect the integrity of domestic institutions and the quality of domestic life. The issues of physical security and economic well-being apart, it was to prevent this prospect from materializing that the nation abandoned its interwar isolationism and intervened in World War II. It was in order to prevent a similar prospect that, in the years following the war, it adopted a policy of containment.

At the same time, it is the case that containment also expressed from the outset an interest that went beyond a conventional notion of security. Indeed, this was in some measure implicit in the very insistence upon defining the nation's security in terms of an external environment whose characteristics extended far beyond the conventional requirements of a balance of power. Thus from the very start, containment carried with it an underlying ambiguity, since from the very start a narrower concept of security coexisted with a much broader concept and one that might readily be put to expansionist ends. The Truman Doctrine formed the most striking expression of this underlying ambiguity. By interpreting security as a function not only of a balance of power between states but of the internal order maintained by states, and not only by some states but by practically all states, the Truman Doctrine equated America's security with interests that evidently went well beyond conventional security requirements. More than this, in its definition of American security the Truman Doctrine went well beyond even the conception that equated security with preserving an international environment compatible with the integrity of the nation's institutions and the quality of its domestic life. For it proclaimed, in effect, an interest in maintaining a stable world order—presided over by American power—that would insure the triumph of liberal-capitalist values and institutions.

It was this larger interest proclaimed by the Truman Doctrine that, in substantial measure, accounts for Vietnam. In part, of course, Vietnam must be explained as a legacy of the classic cold war (and particularly the Asian legacy). An intense hegemonial conflict generated a momentum of its own. It encouraged, even impelled, excess in thought and in action. It often distorted the issue of security to a point where an emphasis on security seemed almost inversely disproportionate to the security interests at stake. Moreover, by a dialectic as old as history, it led to expansion. To contain the expansion of others, or what was perceived as such, it became necessary to expand ourselves. Still, the expansion to which containment led must also be found in the larger interest this policy expressed from its inception. It was this larger interest that ultimately prompted forcible opposition to the expansion of Communism wherever this expansion occurred and quite apart from the plausibility of equating it with the expansion of Soviet (or Chinese) power.

IN THE aftermath of Vietnam, it is not only the larger interest expressed by containment that has been renounced by many, but containment itself. One reason for this is the conviction that it was the larger interest that constituted the "true" expression of containment, in the sense of reflecting the deeper motivation and interest of American policy. But there is surely no more reason to find the true meaning of containment in this larger purpose than there is to find it in the more limited purposes that marked its origins. Indeed, there is a certain perversity in the argument that discredits containment by equating it with this larger interest, an equation that Vietnam is then found to establish beyond question. Even if it is granted that *a* Vietnam was always implicit in the policy of containment, much else was also explicit in this policy. Why should the quintessential character of containment be found in Vietnam rather than in Western Europe or Japan? If there is no plausible reason for doing so, and it is difficult to imagine what that reason might be, there is no plausible reason for arguing that containment has been discredited. What may be argued is that containment was discredited at the margin, not at the center, where it has enjoyed a success that finds few historical parallels.

Nor is this all. The success containment enjoyed at the center—in Western Europe and Japan—need not, and should not, be seen simply in terms of a power calculus. Containment in Europe was not undertaken simply for reasons of security, narrowly construed, and no one contended so at the time. Considerations of political and cultural af-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

finity were evidently very important. In the case of Japan, these considerations were just as evidently lacking, although the intent to establish such affinities in the future with a democratic Japan was clear. Here, as in Western Europe, the purpose of containment was not only to prevent centers of industrial power from falling under Russian control, but to insure that these centers—however independent of the Soviet Union—would constitute democratic societies. In an earlier period, circumstances partially obscured this broader dimension of containment and the dilemmas it might one day impose. Yet from the very outset containment at the center was directed not only to maintaining a favorable power balance, but to preventing the emergence of Communist governments, whatever the effects such emergence might or might not have on the balance of power.

WE THUS come back to the larger interest of containment and the issues this interest must raise. Is this interest—or purpose—to be condemned, and if not quite condemned, then at least abandoned? Few will say so. At any rate, few will say so unambiguously. Still, the unmistakable impression is conveyed that what was once acknowledged on nearly all sides as the larger purpose and justification of containment is today largely abandoned.

Its abandonment may be seen in the admonition that world politics are becoming increasingly egalitarian rather than libertarian, and that American insistence upon the primacy of libertarian values only serves to confirm the suspicion that as a nation we are opposed to demands for greater equality. Its abandonment may also be seen in the familiar charge that American policy in the developing world has long made a mockery of what was once proclaimed as the larger interest of containment (though, curiously enough, this charge is nearly always juxtaposed with the demand that we "begin" to give moral content to American policy, a demand almost invariably translated to mean that we cease our support for, or tolerance of, dictatorships of the Right and bring pressure to bear against them). More subtly, though perhaps more significantly, its abandonment may be seen in the tolerant, even benevolent, attitude shown toward Eurocommunism, an attitude ostensibly justified by the assumption that Western Communist parties in power will behave as Communist parties in power have never before behaved (that is, by observing democratic processes in roughly the same manner as did their bourgeois predecessors).

Given this assumption, of course, no problem arises, since Communist parties will then be Communist in name only. Skeptics of Eurocommunism are not so obtuse as to fail to recognize this or, for that matter, to see the need these "Communist" parties in power would have of NATO, given the likely Soviet reaction to them. To urge tolerance here and the maintenance of NATO is to push at a door that is already open. It is another matter, however, if Western Communist parties in power were to behave as Communist parties in power have always behaved—certainly, a more likely prospect. In that event, as Henry Kissinger has rightly pointed out, the alliance would be deprived of the essential inner meaning that has always informed it (as would the policy of containment that gave rise to NATO). A Western Europe increasingly controlled by Communist parties might leave the balance of power unchanged. But it might also isolate America in an altogether unprecedented way.

There is no reason today to abandon the larger purpose of containment. If that purpose was valid three decades ago, it remains no less valid today. To abandon it, under whatever guise, at the center where it has clearly been successful would be deplorable. It is at the periphery, in the developing countries, that this larger purpose, though ultimately valid, has been in practice betrayed, whether by dint of the "necessities" imposed by containing Communism or, more profoundly, because of the circumstances in which this purpose has been pursued. These circumstances—above all, the simple juxtaposition of the strong and the weak—have regularly led to the temptation to impose our will. For this reason alone, they have almost invariably led to the corruption of purpose. It is quite true that a poor record in dealing with developing countries is not distinctive to this nation. Even so, it is sufficient to observe that we have not dealt well with these countries and that—as the history of our relations with the Caribbean countries amply attests—they have evoked something near the worst in us. Where containment has failed is here, at the periphery. Certainly, this is where the larger purpose of containment has failed. It is also where the narrower purpose, with few notable exceptions, can be and should be limited.

VI

THOSE WHO have defended the détente of recent years have often argued that there is no alternative to *this* détente save a return to the old containment policy of the classic cold war. Yet the latter policy is an illusory alternative, it is contended, if for no other reason than that the United States no longer enjoys the military superiority over the Soviet Union it once did. There is no gainsaying the point that this nation no longer possesses the margin of advantage it once possessed. The post-World War II order rested essentially on the conditions that the United States (together with its major allies) would retain a clear military preponderance over the major Communist powers, that Western access to the raw mtaerials—above all, energy—of the de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

veloping world could be assured on terms compatible with substantial economic growth of the industrial democracies, that once decolonization had run its course the new states could and would be integrated into this order, and, of course, that America would remain able and willing to preside over this order. None of these conditions obtains today. Of the four, the first and the last were the most important. Yet the first has passed and, in all probability, irrevocably so, while the last evokes continuing and serious doubt throughout much of the world.

It is in these changed conditions that a policy of containment will have to be pursued. Given these conditions, it is apparent that containment in the future will have to be characterized by more modest objectives than in the past. For the growth of Soviet military power will not permit entertaining all of the objectives of the past, and this quite apart from the desirability of doing so. We cannot reasonably expect the Soviet leadership to refrain from making use of its newly acquired power. Sooner or later, the attempt will surely be made to put this power to more effective political purpose, to expand Soviet influence—and, in some instances, Soviet control—through intimidation of the weak and deterrence of the strong. If we sought to deny them everywhere, we would very likely be in for a very bad time. At that, the outcome of our efforts would remain uncertain.

At the present juncture, however, the prospects of our undertaking such efforts are so small that they may be safely neglected. The external constraints apart, domestic support would prove difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Although there are many indications that the nation is emerging from the more extreme effects on foreign policy of Vietnam and Watergate, there are no indications that these experiences have been, or will soon be, erased from the national memory. A domestic consensus on foreign policy of a kind even roughly comparable to the consensus of the pre-Vietnam period does not appear to be a meaningful possibility. Nor does the new administration appear in the least inclined in such a direction. This being so, the prospect of a return to the old containment policy of the classic cold war may be dismissed. At least, it may be dismissed short of an overt threat to the physical security of this nation or of its major allies.

The substantial issue today and in the immediate period ahead is not whether to return to the containment policy of the 1950's and early 1960's, but whether to sustain a political-military position sufficient for even a markedly more modest version of containment. The determination of this issue will not resolve many of the questions that attended the implementation of containment in the past. Even for a more modest version of containment, these questions will once again be raised and they will once again provide the occasion for serious differences. But these differences ought not to be confused with the position that, in the new world, containment may be undertaken quite painlessly or, for that matter, need not be undertaken at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

America and the World: The Next Four Years

Defense Reconsidered

Edward N. Luttwak

THE great revelation of the 1976 elections, both primary and general, both congressional and presidential, was that the majority opinion on the worth of military power, and on the present adequacy of American forces, was no longer marked by the discouraged inattention of the late years of Vietnam and Watergate. The substance of the great change in the popular outlook was manifested in the campaigning stance of the winning candidates: those who could not offer themselves as promoters of American military power (even if only in the guise of efficiency experts) found it wise to say as little as possible upon the subject.

In his campaign the new President did of course speak of budgetary cuts, but he spoke of a strong defense also, and made it very clear that the cuts would be quite small, the consequence of efficiency rather than of force reductions. In any case, one could hardly recognize the lineaments of a unilateral disarmer in the former naval person from Georgia. Now that the new administration has taken office, its final intentions in this respect are somewhat cloudier. But the national debate over the proper form of American power, and the importance of the military element within it, has if anything become sharper. (It is, one supposes, inevitable that just as the terms of the defense debate last fall were set by the hurried slogans of a political campaign, so the policy debate today is defined equally simplistically in terms of the personalities of the President's appointees.)

As for the dimensions of the change in public attitudes, these were charted quite precisely by the opinion surveys. According to the most authoritative compilation,* in 1976 it was the public consensus that the United States remained slightly superior to the Soviet Union in overall national power, but a majority of the public also believed that the United States was losing ground rapidly and that the Soviet Union would become the superior power within the next decade.

Having made the prediction, a majority of those questioned evidently did not like its result: 52 per cent of the sample agreed with the proposition that *the United States should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even going to the very brink of war if necessary.* It would be interesting to know how much greater the percentage might have been had the question embodied the more reasoned assumption that a restoration of American supremacy would deter conflict rather than provoke it. But the extreme terms of the question make the result all the more significant: in 1974 only 42 per cent of the sample had agreed with the same proposition, and the 1972 figure was 39 per cent. In fact, it was only in the pre-1968 period that the 50 per-cent mark had been exceeded.

Opinion on the proper level of military expenditure has evolved in similar fashion: 28 per cent of the 1976 sample declared themselves in favor of an increased military expenditure. This proportion hardly denotes an overwhelming enthusiasm, and yet the sober (and far from hawkish) compilers of the survey were moved to write that *"the nationwide extent of increased approval for military and defense spending that we found in 1976 is little short of phenomenal."* For the real meaning of the 28 per cent only becomes apparent in the context of the trend in the balance of opinion: the proportion of respondents who favored cuts in the defense budget has declined from 37 per cent in 1972 and 33 per cent in 1974 to 20 per cent in 1976; while those satisfied with the present level of the defense budget increased from 40 per cent in 1972 and 1974 to 43 per cent in 1976; and those who would not pronounce themselves declined from 9 per cent in 1972 and 6 per cent in 1974 to 5 per cent in 1976. The candidates who were competing for office in 1976 did not need to be skilled trend analysts to interpret correctly the meaning

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, whose widely-discussed article, "Seeing China Plain," appeared in our December 1976 issue, is associate director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research at Johns Hopkins. Mr. Luttwak's books include *A Dictionary of Modern War, The Israeli Army* (with Dan Horowitz), and, most recently, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Johns Hopkins University Press).

* Walter Slocombe, Lloyd A. Free, Donald R. Lesh, and William Watts, *The Pursuit of National Security: Defense and the Military Balance* (Potomac Associates), pp. 28-39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the numbers. By a common instinct they converted the 28 per cent who favored increased military expenditures into a net majority, for they could see how many of the 43 per cent in the middle actually belonged with them.

The depth and consistency of this change in mass opinion were evident in the response to questions which tested the public's willingness to sanction the actual *use* of military power. In 1974 and 1975 only 48 per cent of the sample would approve of the use of American troops to defend "major European allies" attacked by the Soviet Union; by 1976 the proportion had increased to 56 per cent. In the case of Japan, a similar evolution has been observed: in 1974 only 37 per cent of those questioned were willing to approve the use of American forces to defend Japan in the event of war, while the 1976 figure was 45 per cent, with another 18 per cent undecided and a distinct minority of 37 per cent against. The new concern with the adequacy of American military strength is thus directly connected in the public mind with the actual needs of Western defense, and cannot be dismissed as the manifestation of a pointless national machismo, as some would have us believe.

The major theme of the great attack on the military which opened with the 1969 ABM debate was that social programs deserved a greater share of public money, and the call for a "realignment of national priorities" continued to be heard even while the Pentagon's budget declined year by year to a quarter of the federal total. It is therefore particularly interesting that at a time of waning support for all social programs, it turns out that majority opinion favors increases in only two items of government expenditure: the defense budget as a whole, and an item described in the polls as "maintaining U.S. military bases throughout the world."*

It was the new attitude of the public which insured a fair hearing for both sides in the controversy over the national defense. For years the quality media had largely conveyed the views of those who saw only one strategic threat, the threat emanating from our own "military-industrial complex." In 1976 we could hear once again the other side also, the voices of those made anxious by the dynamic growth of Soviet military power. A debate which had long been necessary thus became possible. It remains, however, most difficult to resolve. It is not the requisite information which is lacking. Facts are available in great quantity, with only the most abstruse details still guarded by security controls; indeed much of the debate features rival selections from the vast totality of the facts.

IN THE strategic-nuclear dimension of military power—the dimension of the long-range weapons of nuclear deterrence or nuclear war—we are offered seemingly precise comparisions of the intercontinental weapons deployed on both sides: 1,054 land-based ballistic missiles for the United States versus 1,450 for the Soviet Union; 656 ballistic missiles on board American nuclear submarines versus 880 on Soviet submarines; and 382 American strategic bombers versus 210 for the Soviet Union. In the overall totals, the Soviet advantage is significant: 2,540 vehicles versus 2,092 for the United States. But on one side of the debate it is argued that this advantage is entirely meaningless, since the *quality* of the American weapons is much higher. In particular, the advanced multiple-warhead design of American missiles means that they can launch many more separate nuclear strikes. At the last count, 8,500 American bombs and warheads were deployed versus 4,000 for the Soviet Union. Moreover, American ballistic warheads are more accurate, while the superior quality of American bombers further widens the margin.

True, says the other side, there are indeed more American ballistic warheads, but they are also much smaller because American ballistic missiles are themselves so much smaller than the Russian.† Almost 70 per cent of warheads on American missiles have an explosive yield of less than fifty kilotons (i.e., 1,000 tons of TNT equivalent), and only a further 7 per cent have a yield of more than one megaton (one million tons of TNT equivalent). Soviet ballistic missiles are by contrast much larger, and their warheads have far higher yields. In fact, 70 per cent are in the megaton class, and a further 10 per cent have superheavy warheads, with yields in excess of twenty megatons. The superior quality of American bombers is conceded also, but it is pointed out that the *net* difference in real bomber capabilities is much smaller, for American bombers would suffer heavy losses to Soviet air defenses, while the United States is virtually undefended against bomber attack. The Soviet Union deploys some 2,500 fighter-interceptors and 10,000 anti-aircraft missiles to defend its airspace, but no strategic SAM's remain in service to defend the continental United States, while the number of manned inter-

* Edwin L. Dale, Jr., Donald R. Lesh, Lloyd A. Free, *Priorities in an Uncertain Economy: Inflation, Recession, and Government Spending* (Potomac Associates), p. 23.

† The most meaningful measure of the magnitude of ballistic missiles is their delivery capacity ("throw-weight") over stated ranges. While all but 54 of the land-based ballistic missiles in the American arsenal (Minuteman-2's and -3's) have "throw-weights" of roughly 2,500 pounds each, the Soviet Union has some 290 missiles with "throw-weights" of 10-15,000 pounds, and the "throw-weights" of the three new ICBM's now being deployed—the SS-17 and SS-19 "mediums" and the SS-18 "heavy"—are respectively 4,000, 6,000, and 15,000 pounds. (See my *Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and Political Utility*, Washington Papers No. 38 [Sage], p. 25.) The "throw-weight," however, only measures the *potential* of missile forces; actual capabilities depend on current warhead yield-to-weight ratios, and, of course, accuracies (as well as technical and operational reliability).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ceptors has declined to a mere 341, not enough to provide a realistic air defense.

Such exchanges do not by any means settle the debate. In answer to the argument that Soviet ballistic missiles have far greater delivery capacities and can therefore launch bigger warheads, it is stressed that accuracy counts for much more than yield: to destroy small and protected targets (such as the ballistic-missile housings themselves) a one-megaton warhead with American levels of accuracy can be as effective as a Soviet warhead with twenty times its yield.* To this the other side may reply that the American advantage in accuracy cannot offset the Soviet advantage in the size of the missiles and the yields of their warheads, since accuracy is always an uncertain and delicate ability, while yield is assured.

And so the debate goes on, with neither side quite able to dispose of the other's case. But as soon as the comparison proceeds beyond a mere listing of numbers, and the *evolution* of the actual weapon inventories is compared, those who take the more anxious view of Soviet strategic power have the better of the argument. A massive and broadly-based strategic build-up has been under way in the Soviet Union since the mid-1960's, and it still continues with some urgency and a surprising abundance of means across the full spectrum of strategic weaponry.

In the case of the land-based missiles, for example, the United States has only one new type of weapon, the Minuteman-3, and that is now out of production; research and development in this field are also limited to a single new type, the MX. On the Soviet side, by contrast, no fewer than four different new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles are in production: two different medium-sized weapons fitted with separately targeted multiple warheads (SS-17 and SS-19), one smaller missile comparable to the Minuteman and seemingly meant for land-mobile deployments (SS-16), and one weapon which is very large indeed, the SS-18, whose "throw-weight" is about six times as large as that of the Minuteman-3.

Of all the crosses that SALT enthusiasts and doves in general have to bear, none is heavier than this heavy Russian missile. The SS-18 is simply too large to be an ordinary deterrent weapon meant for attacks on cities, and it is altogether too costly to be explained away as a mere experiment in variety. In fact, the development of the SS-18 can only be explained in rational terms by those who take the more somber view of Russian intentions. While the SS-17 and SS-19 are both more efficient as deterrent weapons aimed primarily at American cities, the SS-18, which can carry up to eight separate megaton-range warheads, is much more effective for attacks against heavily protected missile housings and command centers. The nuclear peace cannot be the sturdy child of reciprocal terror if one side can disarm the other at the outset of a nuclear war, and the SS-18 has all the traits of a weapon designed to do just that to the American land-based missile force.

The inference is much reinforced by the sheer scale and urgency of the Soviet effort. The American strategic nuclear force of 1,054 land-based intercontinental missiles consists of 54 large but old Titan-2's, in place ever since 1962; 450 small Minuteman-2's built since 1965; and 550 slightly larger Minuteman-3's first deployed in 1970. The number of American ballistic missiles has not increased since 1967, though the quality of the force has been upgraded. The Soviet Union overcame its disadvantage in the gross numbers by 1969 when it attained numerical equality with the American force. A one-for-one modernization effort by the Russians was still to be expected, but that is not what happened. Instead, the number of Soviet missiles increased to pass the 1,400 level by 1970. At the same time, the massive upgrade program involving the development of the SS-16's, SS-17's, SS-19's, and the heavy SS-18's, was also under way.

It was natural that the Soviet Union would want to emulate the American development of separately targeted multiple warheads (MIRV) and no sinister intent need be imputed to this Russian effort. But like the proverbial innkeeper who raises his prices, *and* serves in smaller glasses, *and* dilutes the wine, the Russians have added both numbers and MIRV, and they are producing the heavy SS-18 on top of all that.

Much the same pattern is observable in the evolution of the ballistic missile forces on board nuclear submarines. Again, the United States had both numerical and qualitative superiority during the 1960's, while the Soviet development of the technology lagged behind the spectacularly successful effort which produced the Polaris missiles deployed on board highly reliable nuclear submarines. Again, the United States, as an exercise in unilateral arms control, subjected itself to a numerical limit of 656 missiles on board 41 submarines, which had already been attained by 1967. Since then, the size of the force has not increased, though the Poseidon missile (with MIRV) was introduced in 1971. It was not until 1968 that the Soviet Union managed to complete the development of a submarine-missile combination comparable to the Polaris, the SS-N-6 missile on board Y-class submarines. But then they were mass-produced so rapidly that by 1972 the number of submarine missiles deployed or under construction exceeded American levels.

* Missile accuracy is measured by the CEP (Circular Error Probable), this being the radius from the aiming point within which half the warheads launched are expected to fall; CEP is therefore the expected median *in*accuracy. The effectiveness of a warhead against its target is a function of target hardness (measured in the pounds-per-square-inch of peak overpressure which would initiate disintegration), the energy yield, and median inaccuracy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Totally unconstrained by the SALT-1 agreement of 1972, which merely ratified Soviet plans, the Russian missile submarine force has continued to grow. In 1973 there appeared a new D-class submarine fitted with SS-N-8 missiles much larger than the American Poseidon, and by 1976 yet another new submarine type appeared, the D-2, with sixteen tubes for the SS-N-8, which has a much greater range and "throw-weight" than the only submarine-launched ballistic missile now being produced in the United States, the Poseidon.

Until the SS-N-8 appeared, the United States had both greater range and a much more effective warhead package in its complement of Poseidons on board thirty-one of the forty-one submarines in the force. With the introduction of the SS-N-8, the Soviet Union gained a major advantage in range (4,000 *vs.* 2,500 nautical miles), but it could not realize the potential of the large "throw-weight" of its new missiles since they had single warheads and not MIRV's. In late 1976, however, the SS-N-8 was tested with MIRV warheads. The United States is now developing a missile in the SS-N-8 class, the advanced Trident C-4; but by the time these weapons will be operational on the Ohio-class submarines, there will probably be yet another Soviet sea-based missile at least as effective as the Trident.

WHEN the SALT-1 agreements were signed in Moscow and criticized in Washington, Henry Kissinger justified the net superiorities conceded to the Russians (1,618 land-based ballistic missiles for the Soviet Union against 1,054 for the United States; 740 submarine-launched missiles for the Soviet Union against 656 for the United States) on the grounds that the United States had a greatly superior force of long-range bombers. And indeed, the 405 heavy B-52 bombers and 66 light F-111 bombers which the Strategic Air Command had in 1972 were a far more powerful force than the 140 old long-range bombers in Soviet service. Of course there was the corresponding difference in air defenses (American bombers flying into the Soviet Union would suffer losses, while the Russians would have a free ride), but it was certainly true that the bombers and the bombers alone could balance the strategic equation.

Hence the importance of preserving the American advantage in this particular sector of strategic power—and hence the development of the B-1 bomber over which so much ink has been spilled and against which so much opposition has been mounted. The B-1 is a replacement for the old B-52's which were designed in the 1950's and which, although repeatedly modernized with new weapons and new electronics, are outdated in basic structure. (The B-52 force has already declined to 316 operational aircraft.) Very advanced and highly effective, the B-1 is also expensive, with a unit cost now estimated at somewhere around $90 million, or roughly twice the cost of an ordinary wide-body passenger jet, *sans* its advanced features and *sans* all the combat electronics.

Where the B-1 is concerned, as in so many other areas, while we have been debating the Russians have been building, in this case the Backfire bomber.* Much larger than a non-strategic bomber has any need to be, not quite large enough to be a full-size intercontinental bomber with all the trimmings, the Backfire is certainly advanced and certainly capable of reaching most American targets, if only because we have no effective air defense.

In the SALT negotiations of 1975-76 the Russians have steadfastly claimed that the Backfire should not be counted against the total weapon ceiling which a new agreement is to impose; and much of the argument between the State Department and the Pentagon over the SALT negotiations has revolved around the precise military role of the Backfire. The entire controversy is far removed from the realities of military power, and a typical product of the artificiality that the SALT process has engendered. Even if our official weapons theologians finally agree that the Backfire is not "strategic," this will not cause it to disappear. Even if we could be certain that this weapon is not aimed at the continental United States, this can only mean that it would be aimed at Europe and China, and our overall strategic position would be affected just as much. It hardly seems worthwhile to go to great lengths to find the legal formula that will solve the negotiating problem in SALT if the only consequence is to give the Soviet Union a free license to deploy Backfires against those whose security we cannot divide from our own. In the meantime, the Soviet Union has already built about 70 Backfires.

But the conflict between substance and form in the pursuit of arms control is much sharper still in the case of the cruise missile. This new class of weapons embodies a variety of advanced technologies in the deceptively familiar guise of pilotless aircraft. Thanks to highly efficient engines, they can have sufficient range to serve as strategic weapons while still being quite small and rather cheap (a cruise missile no larger than a torpedo tube will have a range in excess of 2,000 miles); thanks to miniature electronics and new techniques of guidance, cruise missiles are highly accurate, and so can execute many strategic missions with much smaller nuclear warheads than those fitted on the less accurate ballistic missiles.

Their small size and compact form also make it possible to deploy cruise missiles in any number of ways: they could be launched from bombers or converted transport aircraft, from ships or submarines, or even from the backs of trucks. For strategic stability this is very important, since a deterrent

* "Backfire" is the NATO code name; the Soviet designation of this aircraft is thought to be TU-26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

force of weapons so small, mobile, and dispersed could not possibly be destroyed in a surprise strike. If both sides deployed cruise missiles instead of the much larger and more vulnerable ballistic missiles, it would therefore be quite easy to achieve a stable balance of mutual deterrence. And a force of cruise missiles would also be inherently cheaper than a comparable array of ballistic missiles. In other words, the introduction of cruise missiles would much advance the substantive objectives of arms control, stability, and economy.*

One would therefore have thought that the arms-control enthusiasts would have welcomed the new technology; but not at all. The fraternity has been almost unanimous in its opposition. For it turns out that the very quality which makes cruise missiles so fully compatible with the *substance* of arms control—their ability to avoid detection at the launch point—also happens to make it impossible to keep track of them for the purposes of an arms-control treaty. Apparently most of the arms-control professionals attach greater importance to the procedural side of things, the long negotiations and the ceremonial signing of treaties, than to improvements in the substance of the strategic relationship. (Only this, by the way, could explain their continuing enthusiasm for the 1972 SALT-1 accords, which have brought higher force levels, greater expenditures, and new instabilities in their wake.)

The future of American strategic cruise missiles remains in doubt, but surely not that of their Russian counterparts. If an agreement prohibiting these weapons were to be signed, it would inevitably have to rest on little more than faith, since satellite observation would not do and even on-site inspection would be useless. At present, the United States still enjoys a lead of several years in the requisite technologies, but it is certain that the Russians are now making an all-out effort to develop the new-style cruise missile also; and the Soviet Union already has many launchers for (tactical) cruise missiles on board both ships and submarines. While we conduct our own leisurely debate, they will no doubt go ahead and build.

Finally, of all the components of the strategic balance, none is more controversial than civil defense. The U.S. has essentially abandoned the ambition of providing realistic protection for its population in the event of nuclear war. The Russians plainly have not. A nationwide program is now under way in the Soviet Union featuring evacuation procedures, industrial dispersal, emergency supply and temporary shelter provisions, the whole being directed by a special corps of civil-defense forces. The scale of the effort is undoubtedly very great, and its importance is demonstrated by the seniority and prestige of the people in charge. What remains in doubt is the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense in the conditions of a nuclear war with the United States. Clearly what the Russians have done so far in this area would not suffice to negate the effects of an all-out American strategic strike against Soviet cities and industrial areas. But is it realistic to evaluate Soviet civil defense by this standard? As against the 1,054 land-based missiles, 656 sea-based missiles, and 382 bombers of the intact American inventory of forces, Soviet civil-defense preparations would indeed be grossly inadequate. But suppose a Soviet first strike against the American strategic arsenal; then the number of surviving, operational, and reliable weapons would be a fraction of the initial inventory, and the Russians may well believe that they can indeed provide real protection for their population against a depleted American second strike. In any case, it would clearly be grossly imprudent to dismiss Soviet civil defense as a chimera, not to be taken into account in our evaluation of the strategic balance.

All strategic weapons are nuclear, but not all nuclear weapons are strategic. Both the United States and the Soviet Union deploy many thousands of tactical nuclear weapons† in the shape of aircraft bombs, tactical missiles and rockets, artillery shells and mines. It is not at all clear what part such weapons might have in a European war. Ever since 1967 it has been official NATO doctrine that even a full-scale war in Europe would be waged without using nuclear weapons for as long as possible. Soviet doctrines and plans once called for the immediate use of nuclear weapons, but this may have changed of late. Regardless of what the official doctrines might be, the weapons are there and they are apt to be used, if only because the sudden outbreak of conflict after thirty-odd years of peace is likely to cause cataclysmic panic and massive confusion in which the tactical nuclear weapons alone might serve to avert defeat. No meaningful comparison is possible between the tactical nuclear forces deployed on each side, for the significance of the weapons depends on the pattern of their use on *both* sides, and that is a mystery which we may all hope will never be revealed.

In between the tactical nuclear weapons and the intercontinental-range strategic weapons, the Soviet Union deploys an intermediate class of nuclear weapons to which there is no American counterpart. These include roughly 500 medium bombers of various types** (to which the Backfires may be added) as well as 600 ballistic missiles with ranges from 1,000 to 3,000 miles and more.

* And the minimization of damage in the event of a nuclear war; high accuracy would allow the use of low-yield warheads against many targets. This could greatly reduce the collateral damage of a limited nuclear exchange.

† With ranges of up to several hundred miles. The term defines weapons meant for theater deployments against military targets, even though these weapons could also be highly destructive if used against civilian populations.

** TU-16's and TU-22's in air-force service; another 300-plus are deployed by the Soviet navy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All these weapons are deployed against targets in Western Europe and Asia, and they are more than sufficient to offset the small nuclear forces of Britain, France, and China.* Yet Russian negotiators in the SALT talks have persistently tried to obtain a significant margin of superiority in intercontinental-range weapons on the grounds that the Soviet Union has several nuclear enemies while the United States has only one. More remarkable still, this argument has been accepted—and echoed—by some American arms-control experts.

THE destructive capacity of nuclear weapons is awesome, but it is the *non*-nuclear balance of military power which presents the more pressing problem for American policy. For a comparison of the navies, the ground forces, and the tactical air power of the two sides reveals much sharper differences and more disturbing trends; and these are acknowledged even by some who are inclined to dismiss the strategic balance as an abstract calculus of meaningless capabilities.

Because of the sudden emergence of the Soviet fleet over the horizon of public visibility, and also perhaps because of the new concern over the security of American raw-material imports, the naval question has become central to the defense debate. Again, the facts are not in serious dispute. Always a major continental power, and with a claim to primacy on land ever since Napoleon's defeat, Russia was never more than a middle power on the oceans of the world. This remained so after the Bolshevik revolution and in the immediate postwar period, when the uncontested supremacy of the United States provided the ultimate guarantee against a major failure of containment. During the 1950's and until the early 1960's, the navies of the world were either allied to the United States or insignificant. But seemingly overnight a great change took place. After 1967 the public suddenly learned of the existence of a large and rapidly growing Soviet navy which was actively contesting American naval supremacy. From the first revelation the picture became steadily darker, as increasingly disturbing comparisons of the Soviet and American fleets were widely published; and in a famous pronouncement, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt announced that the U.S. had lost control of the vital sea lanes to Europe and the Middle East.

There followed the great controversy that is still with us. In hundreds of newspaper articles and in endless congressional debates, the two navies have been compared, most often in simple numerical terms. More so than the other defense sub-debates, the naval controversy has engendered wild exaggerations and gross distortions on both sides of the fence. A warship is not a unit of measurement, and yet much of the controversy has featured the exchange of rival sets of ship numbers, in which 90,000-ton aircraft carriers and 500-ton corvettes are frequently counted as equal units, or in which the strength of allied navies is added directly to the American, as if these were equally fit and equally available under American command.

In retrospect the causes of the initial surprise and of the subsequent confusion are not obscure. From the mid-1960's the Soviet navy began for the first time to operate beyond in-shore waters. By 1964 a standing patrol was present in the Mediterranean, by 1968 another appeared in the Indian Ocean, and by 1969 Soviet ships were frequently to be seen in the Caribbean. At the same time Soviet fleets began to conduct large-scale exercises in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. These ships had not been built overnight but were the fruits of a large naval armament effort which began immediately after the end of World War II. What changed so quickly after 1964 was not the Soviet fleet but the pattern of its operations.

By coincidence, the years in which the Soviet fleet made its sudden appearance on the oceans of the world also happened to be the years in which the U.S. navy was faced with the block obsolescence of the warships built in the great wave of wartime construction of 1943-45. Hence the drastic decline in the number of navy ships from 917 in 1964 to 489 in 1977. In the meantime, the 450-ship force gradually built by the Russians made its entrance on the world scene, and immediately gained for the Soviet Union the new status of an oceanic power.

HOWEVER, the direct comparison of U.S. and Soviet naval forces is peculiarly misleading. The two navies have fundamentally different strategic tasks, and their capabilities must be evaluated by quite different standards. The American fleet must keep the sea lanes secure to reinforce NATO and to import raw materials in wartime; the Soviet fleet need only deny secure transit to cripple NATO and insulate the United States. Hence a true naval parity requires the United States to be much stronger at sea, because it is so much easier to attack targets of choice in a stream of merchant shipping than to defend the whole population of tankers and freighters. To be sure, the American navy also has other tasks, primarily to assist the ground and air forces in the event of war by operating on the maritime flanks, off Norway and in the North Sea, in the Mediterranean, and in the seas around Japan and Korea. But all these missions first require a reasonable measure of control over the sea areas concerned.

Although it is the much-photographed surface ships of the Russian navy which have attracted the world's attention, the major Soviet strength is still its attack-submarine fleet, by far the largest in the world; at the last count there were 84 nuclear and

* Mainland China deploys some 70 medium bombers, and perhaps 100 land-based ballistic missiles of various types; the British have four nuclear submarines with 64 missiles (Polaris A-3's) in all, while the French have 64 submarine-borne missiles, 18 land-based missiles, and 36 Mirage-IV light bombers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some 150 diesel submarines. These numbers may be compared to the 57 infinitely less capable U-boats that Doenitz had at his command at the outbreak of World War II. Of course, there has been much progress in anti-submarine warfare techniques since then, but the peculiar properties of sea water continue to shield well-built and well-handled submarines from detection. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the nuclear submarine is altogether greater than that of the wartime U-boats. The modern nuclear submarine is a true underwater vehicle. By contrast, the wartime U-boats were only small warships which could dive to shallow depths, there to crawl at low speed.

The United States has 70 nuclear submarines of its own, and many would be used as hunter-killers, to ambush Soviet boats as they pass through narrow seas, or even as they leave their ports. In addition, there are some 140 destroyers and frigates to protect convoys and hunt submarines in cooperation with 388 long-range patrol aircraft based on land.* This is an impressive array of forces, but it would be wildly optimistic to assume that it is adequate. The logic of the struggle against the submarine heavily favors the latter, and just as it takes a watchman at every door to keep out the single sneak thief, it takes several ships and aircraft to find and destroy the single submarine.

The major question is, of course, the *strategic purpose* of the Soviet naval build-up. The fact that the Soviet Union, until recently a land power with strictly continental interests, is now in the process of becoming an oceanic power as well, would certainly seem to justify the anxieties of those who believe that the Russians have moved into an expansionist phase. If the United States were to accept naval parity with the Soviet Union —and some have suggested a naval counterpart to SALT—we would be dividing equally what is now ours, while the Russians would continue seeking the continental hegemony which is already partly theirs.

In the nuclear and naval dimensions the United States can still reasonably expect—if the right policies are followed—to maintain a rough parity, or even a small margin of superiority. As far as the land forces are concerned, any hope of parity has long since been abandoned, and the sharp inferiority of the American ground forces is only very partially offset by the high quality of American tactical air power.

There are now some 170 divisions in the Russians army versus 16 U.S. army and 3 marine divisions. These numbers mean little; Russian divisions are smaller, and roughly one-third are only partly-manned cadre units, little better than the divisions of the U.S. National Guard. But the comparison of the overall manpower figures is meaningful. There are some 1.8 million Soviet ground troops (and 450,000 militarized security troops) versus 978,000 men and women in the American army and marine corps. And the wide margin of the Soviet advantage is no longer offset by inferior equipment. While a few Soviet weapons may still be inferior in quality, more are not, and they are all available in abundance. Besides, the quality of Soviet tanks, armored carriers, and artillery has been improving rapidly.†

The United States does, however, retain a substantial margin of superiority in tactical air power. While the Soviet Union has more combat aircraft, the American advantage in quality is still very great and especially in air-to-air combat, quality is decisively more important than the mere numbers.** And in the whole range of air-to-ground weaponry the United States is far ahead.

But the great difficulty is that tactical aircraft as a whole can no longer operate freely over the battlefield. The Russians have clearly been aware of their weakness in the air, the inevitable consequence of a less creative science and technology. And they have found a solution for their weakness in the mass deployment of anti-aircraft weapons. In October 1973 the SAM-6 attracted much attention even though it was the Soviet anti-aircraft cannon which shot down most Israeli aircraft; by now the SAM-6 has been joined by two still newer battlefield missiles. In any major theater of war, the Russians will have very dense battlefield air defenses, and these are likely to absorb much of the American superiority in tactical air power.

In the context of a European war, the United States would of course fight with its allies; but the Soviet Union has its Warsaw Pact subject armies to strengthen its own forces, and when all the forces are counted its superiority is not seriously diminished. In the crucial sectors of Northern and Central Europe, there are now 635,000 NATO troops against 910,000 troops for the Warsaw Pact.

Thus, while the loudest American voices ceaselessly argue that mere numbers are meaningless, if not that military power is itself *passé*, the Russians are building missiles, bombers, and warships to acquire a worldwide strategic reach, while at same time continuing to strengthen their traditional array of continental forces in Europe and on the borders of China. In spite of an economy which has ceased to be dynamic, in spite of the strangulation of scientific and technical creativity which the general re-

* In addition, U.S. aircraft carriers are now being given multipurpose air wings which include anti-submarine aircraft (S-3's) and helicopters.

† The Soviet T-62 tank may on balance be slightly inferior to the American M-60 but the new T-72 is not; the BMP-76 combat carrier is much superior to the M-113. Soviet artillery was always superior but it was not self-propelled. Now the Soviet Union is mass-producing self-propelled howitzers. Only in helicopters is the U.S. army still better provided than the Russians.

** The newer Soviet fighters of the MIG-23 family are much inferior to the F-15's; no Soviet interceptor is as good as the F-14, and the new low-level SU-19 strike-fighter is inferior to the ten-year-old F-111A/E.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pression of Soviet society has inevitably caused, the political leaders of the Soviet Union have their people so well regimented that their military power continues to grow relative to our own.

Many in America continue to say that we should settle for parity wherever we had superiorities and tacitly accept inferiorities elsewhere. Yet it is now clear that the Soviet Union will not permanently accept parity in *any* dimension of military power. To its leaders, parity obviously means no more than the transitory moment in which the ascending curve of their strength meets the descending curve of our own.

It has by now become hard to deny that this growing strength signifies an expansionist intent. Indeed, Russian imperial strategy has already emerged fully formed in the classic mold, with Cubans sent to Angola, North Koreans not long ago fighting in Syria, and South Yemen guerrillas newly dispatched to the ex-Spanish Sahara, with the whole network being supported by the modern equivalents of the 19th-century coaling stations—missile depots, airfields, logistic bases, and naval facilities in Somalia, South Yemen, Cuba, Iraq, Angola, Guinea, and probably soon Mozambique also.

The disarray engendered by the Vietnam war, the best hopes and worst delusions encouraged by détente, and the revulsion caused by a President for whom "national security" was not much more than a good cover for a bad cover-up, have all contributed to the indirection of American military policy over the last decade. There is a great need to frame a purposeful strategy for Western security. In the final analysis, neither the bureaucratic instincts of the armed services, nor Anglo-Saxon pragmatism, nor even the sudden military enthusiasms of an intermittently aroused public, will suffice to direct the necessary evolution of American military power in the face of the Soviet Union, a country where nothing works except for the army, and whose leaders understand very little except for the uses of power, which they understand all too well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bakke vs. University of California

John H. Bunzel

FEW issues today have generated more widespread debate or created more difficult problems than the issue of special preference for "minority groups" in employment and education. Over the last ten years or so an increasing number of social-policy decisions and practices, growing out of the affirmative-action programs undertaken in the name of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, have depended upon the criterion of race as a means of eliminating discrimination or of improving the condition of "disadvantaged minorities" in American society.* These decisions and practices have aroused a storm of controversy, for the use of race as a qualifying standard has itself seemed to many to be racially discriminatory and a violation of the principle of equal treatment under law.

This past year, the various complex issues involved in the theory and practice of preferential treatment and "reverse discrimination" were focused dramatically in the decision rendered by the California Supreme Court in the case of Allan Bakke.

In 1973 and again in 1974 Bakke, a white, thirty-six-year-old civil engineer from San Francisco, had applied for admission to the medical school on the Davis campus of the University of California. Both times he had been rejected, although in these same years the university had accepted "minority-group" students, who were less qualified than Bakke, under a special program that applied separate standards of admission to them.

Bakke went to court. He charged that the University of California had denied him admission solely because he was white and that it was therefore in violation of the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The university filed a cross-complaint. It asked the court to determine that the special-admissions program was valid, asserting that the "minority-group" status of an applicant was only one factor out of several in the selection process. The university further stated that the purposes of the program were to promote diversity in the student body, to expand the opportunities for medical education to persons from economically- or educationally-disadvantaged backgrounds, and to provide for greater representation of blacks and Mexican-Americans in the medical profession. Such a program, university officials contended, benefited society, and this by itself was enough to justify the policy of preferential treatment.

Last September, by a 6-1 decision written by Justice Stanley Mosk, the California Supreme Court ruled that the university's special-admissions program for "minorities" was unconstitutional. The court ordered the program abolished and, subsequently, that Bakke be admitted to the Davis medical school. The California court, by reputation one of the most liberal in the country, declared that the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to "any person," white as well as black, and that its "lofty purpose" of securing equality of treatment for everyone is incompatible with the premise that "some races may be afforded a higher degree of protection against unequal treatment than others."

In November, the University of California's Board of Regents announced that it would seek review of the case by the U. S. Supreme Court. If the Court agrees to hear the *Bakke* case, it will be the first time since 1974 that it will have had the opportunity to rule on whether special-admissions programs for "minorities" are permissible and whether a university can turn away a

JOHN H. BUNZEL, here making his first appearance in COMMENTARY, is president of San Jose State University in California and the author of *Anti-Politics in America,* among other books.

* I have placed the terms "minority groups" and "disadvantaged minorities" in quotation marks because they themselves are not the least debatable element in this entire area of policy. Generally they are taken to refer not to all minority groups but to blacks and Spanish-surname Americans, sometimes also to American Indians, and occasionally to women as a group. Frequently no distinction is made as to the relative degree of disadvantage of individuals within these groups; merely belonging to one of them suffices to qualify the individual for special consideration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

qualified white applicant and admit a less qualified "minority-group" applicant if that decision is based on race.*

BECAUSE of the importance of the issues involved in the *Bakke* case, the specific admissions procedure followed by the Davis medical school is of some concern.

Every applicant is required to take the Medical College Admission Test. The score on this test is included in the application, which also calls for a description of extracurricular and community activities, a history of the applicant's work experience, and his personal comments. In addition, the applicant is required to submit two letters of recommendation and transcripts from schools previously attended. It is the task of the regular admissions committee to determine whether the applicant reflects sufficient promise to warrant a personal interview. Those with a college grade-point average below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 are summarily rejected.

The committee members rate each applicant on a scale of from 0 to 100. The individual ratings are then added together and the applicant's total rating—essentially the admissions committee's evaluation of his or her potential ability—is used as a "benchmark" in the selection of students. In 1973, the highest possible rating was a score of 500. In 1974 (because two interviews were conducted), the highest score was 600.

Bakke had a grade-point average of 3.51. His scores on the verbal, quantitative, science, and general-information portions of the Medical College Admission Test (expressed in percentiles) were 96, 94, 97, and 72 respectively. His application warranted an interview in both years for which he applied. In 1973, his combined numerical rating was 468 out of a possible 500, and in 1974 it was 549 out of a possible 600. Yet despite the fact that Bakke was qualified for admission in each of the years he applied, the medical school rejected him both times.

In addition to the regular admissions procedure, the medical school at Davis operates the "special-admissions program" mentioned above—a program which, according to the university, is intended to "increase opportunities in medical education for disadvantaged citizens." Although no definition of the term "disadvantaged" has ever been formulated by the university, the special-admissions committee has been heavily staffed with "minority-group" personnel and only "minority-group" students have been admitted under the program since its inception.

Applicants are asked to indicate whether or not they wish to be considered for admission under the special program. In 1974, the applicant was asked whether he "describes" himself as a "White/Caucasian" or a member of some other identifiable racial or ethnic group, and whether he wished to be "considered as a minority-group applicant." Once an applicant has indicated such a desire, his application is reviewed by the special committee which conducts a separate screening procedure, parallel to that of the regular admissions committee. Unlike the regular admissions committee, however, the special committee does not automatically disqualify an applicant who has a grade-point average below 2.5. In 1973 and again in 1974, "minority-group" students were interviewed *and admitted* under the special-admissions program even though their grade-point averages were well below the 2.5 cut-off point.

Following the interview, the special committee assigns the various special applicants an overall personal rating, similar to the "benchmark" procedure of the regular admissions committee. Finally, the special committee recommends various candidates for admission to the medical school. Of the 100 places available, 16 are set aside for the "minority-group" applicants, and the regular committee admits those who fall into this category until all 16 places are filled.

IT IS generally acknowledged that the university's special-admissions program is not designed to benefit the economically or educationally disadvantaged regardless of race, but is in fact a program *based* upon race. Bakke contended that the allotment of 16 per cent of the places in the first-year class at the medical school to "minority-group" applicants constituted nothing but a racial quota. The California Supreme Court concurred, saying "it is difficult to avoid considering the university scheme as a form of an education quota system." Since Bakke was better qualified for admission than the "minority-group" students accepted under the special program, the question before the court was "whether the rejection of better qualified applicants on racial grounds is constitutional."

It should be stressed that race *per se* is not flatly prohibited by the courts as a relevant consideration under any and all circumstances, although the U. S. Supreme Court has ruled (in 1944 in *Korematsu* v. *United States*) that it is a "suspect classification" subject to "strict scrutiny." The question is when and for what purposes it may be used. Some of the considerations include whether the

* In 1974, the validity of preferential admissions to a professional school was before the Supreme Court in *DeFunis* v. *Odegaard*, which involved a special-admissions program at the University of Washington law school. Marco DeFunis, Jr., a white applicant, was denied admission, and, as in the present case, charged that the program violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court ruled in his favor, but its judgment was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court, which found a "compelling state interest" in integration of the school and the profession. The U. S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision, declared the case moot because DeFunis had later been admitted to the law school and was about to graduate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

use of race is harmful (and to whom), whether it will have little or significant value to society, and whether the process by which race is invoked as a factor is itself sound or defective. The fact, for instance, that the special-admissions program at Davis classified applicants by race did not by itself render the program unconstitutional, in the court's view. Such classification has been upheld in a number of cases in which the purpose was "to benefit rather than to disable minority groups." Racial classifications have been approved to achieve integration in the public schools, to require a school system to provide instruction in English to students of Chinese ancestry, and to uphold the right of certain non-English speaking persons to vote.

WHAT should be the appropriate standard in determining the constitutionality of an admissions program which classifies applicants by race? According to the courts, the purpose of such a classification must be to serve a "pressing public necessity" or (as it is more usually called) a "compelling state interest." And the burden of proof—i.e., to demonstrate a "compelling" interest—is on the government (in this instance, the University of California). But that is not all. The classification by race must not result in injury or damage to others because of *their* race, or deprive them of benefits which they could have otherwise enjoyed.

The university contended that its special-admissions program did indeed serve a "compelling state interest" because its purpose was to integrate the medical school and the profession, and to increase the number of doctors serving the "minority" community. But the university also argued that its special-admissions program should not be subject to the "suspect classification" standard in the first place because the goal of the program as well as its immediate effect would be to benefit "minority" persons. Racial classifications, it said, are suspect only if they result in *invidious* discrimination, and invidious discrimination occurs only if the classification (in the words of the court) "excludes, disadvantages, isolates, or stigmatizes a minority or is designed to segregate the races." According to the university, white applicants denied admission were not so stigmatized.

This line of reasoning was upheld in the dissenting opinion in the *Bakke* case entered by Justice Matthew O. Tobriner, who scolded the California court for failing to distinguish between invidious racial classifications and remedial or "benign" racial classifications. "Our society cannot be completely color-blind in the short term if we are to have a color-blind society in the long run," he argued, and thus the use of racial classifications to promote integration and to overcome the effects of past discrimination was neither "suspect" nor presumptively unconstitutional. The "benign" racial classifications embodied in the special-admissions program were used not to exclude any particular racial group from participating in the medical school, "but to assure that qualified applicants of all racial groups were actually represented in the institution." They gave "realistic recognition to the continuing effects resulting from several centuries of discriminatory treatment," and were "remedial measures voluntarily implemented to give all students the distinct educational benefits flowing from an integrated education." Justice Tobriner further maintained that nothing in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to preclude the federal government or the states from "especially attempting to meet the peculiar needs of minority groups, even when such efforts could be construed as according minorities some measure of preferential treatment."

But the court disagreed. It rejected the notion that the rights of whites claiming discrimination should be determined by different constitutional standards from those applied to "minority-group" members. It was, it held, "abundantly clear" that whites suffered a "grievous disadvantage" when they were excluded from the university's medical school on racial grounds. The fact that they were not also "invidiously discriminated against in the sense that a stigma [was] cast upon them because of their race" did not change matters. To the argument that racial classifications may be used for "benign" or "favorable" purposes, the court answered that the special-admissions program was certainly not benign to Bakke and other non-"minority-group" students who were displaced by it. Everybody who applies to the Davis medical school should compete for all 100 places. Because he was white, Bakke was unable to do so. He was specifically excluded solely because of his race from 16 places which were set aside and reserved for applicants of other races. The court believed that Bakke was entitled to have his application evaluated without regard to his race *or the race of any other applicant.*

Although the court was ready to assume that the objectives which the university sought to achieve by the special-admissions program—including integration of the student body and the improvement of medical care for minority groups—represented compelling state interests, in the end it was not persuaded that an admissions program which discriminated against white applicants because of their race was necessary to achieve these goals. The university had not met its burden, the court said, "of demonstrating that the basic goals of the program cannot be substantially achieved by means less detrimental to the rights of the majority."

What, in the court's view, would meet the test of constitutionality? The answer was an admissions program aimed at enrolling disadvantaged students *without* regard to race. This would not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mean, the court stressed, giving sole weight to test scores or grades. Although the academic scores of disadvantaged students are often lower, the court recognized that their potential for success—based on such other factors as the personal interview, character recommendations, and the applicant's professional goals—might be "equal to or greater than that of an applicant with higher grades who has not been similarly handicapped." But the university could not adopt a program of special preferences set up on racial grounds to increase the number of "minority-group" members without having first tried methods that were less intrusive and discriminatory to the majority. In short, disadvantaged students were clearly eligible for sympathetic consideration. But race could not be the decisive factor in determining who among the disadvantaged should be admitted.*

THIS, then, is the fundamental conflict which the U. S. Supreme Court is being asked to resolve. The California court has ruled that preferential treatment based on race is anathema, whether or not its purposes are "benign." The university argues (and will argue) that preferential treatment serves a "compelling" end and that race-conscious means which are directly related to the goals of the state should not be struck down simply because the court (to quote the university's petition for review) prefers some "hypothesized means that spring from the imagination of judges, not educators, and that carry no assurance that the state's objectives will be served equally well or, indeed, even meaningfully at all."

There are at least three possible courses open to the U. S. Supreme Court: (1) it could refuse to review the *Bakke* decision, in which case the opinion of the California court would stand and the University of California would be required to change its admissions procedures; (2) after hearing the case, it could uphold the California court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby strike down similar university admissions programs throughout the country; or (3) it could reverse the California court, ruling that the university had proved its case, that not only were the goals of its special-admissions program plausible and compelling, but also that the racially-conscious means, closely tailored to fit the ends, passed muster.

Whatever the court's ultimate decision may be, there are a number of broad philosophical questions which emerge from and sometimes transcend the *Bakke* case, and which touch on some of the most difficult problems confronting a political democracy that is seeking agreement on the principles of distributive justice and equality.

One such problem is the issue of individual rights versus group rights. In higher education and in many other areas of society, traditional notions of equality of opportunity have been repeatedly challenged in recent years by those who want the federal government to assume a positive responsibility for producing equality of condition or results. Instead of equal access for all individuals, there is a pronounced movement to special rights and proportional representation for particular groups. One immediate legal question arising out of the *Bakke* case and others similar to it is whether the Constitution is to be interpreted to mean the protection of individual rights, or whether the Supreme Court should approve some notion of group rights instead.

It is true that over the course of American history groups *have* been protected and favored in a variety of ways, and that many groups have frequently been given preferential treatment—railroads, farmers, business associations, veterans, etc. It is equally true that special-interest groups of all kinds are deeply involved in the political process. Further, the Congress clearly is empowered to make public policy advantageous to particular groups in the economic sphere. It can encourage small farmers by an irrigation policy that will discourage large conglomerates from acquiring all the water; it can adjust the economic levers in society to give a competitive advantage to certain economic groups in the marketplace by enacting special tax laws to drive out gambling interests, and so forth.

Still, it does not follow from this that the Congress can pass Jim Crow laws or Nuremberg decrees. And nowhere in American society are rights held in any restrictive or exclusive sense by racial groups *per se*. It is quite properly illegal and immoral for Caucasians, for example, to have rights which blacks do not have, or for Chinese-Americans to be prevented from exercising political rights because they are Chinese-Americans while Irish-Americans are allowed to exercise those same rights. Similarly, the attempt to do away with discrimination against some groups by creating disadvantage for others—either groups that have allegedly perpetrated discrimination against others or groups that are known to be innocent—should be regarded as illegal and unjust.

But (some will ask) is not preferential treatment given to the blind, deaf, disabled, and other such

* The court's decision has left an unanswered question. Suppose its suggested test for disadvantage were tried for a period of time and failed to increase the number of "minority-group" students in the medical school (a goal which the court agreed was legitimate and compelling). Would that failure be sufficient proof that a non-racial admissions procedure cannot significantly increase the number of "minority-group" students and would the court *then* grant permission to use "color-conscious" means? In other words, did the court rule only that the university must exhaust all "less intrusive" alternatives before resorting to race, or did it say that a program of racial preferences (with or without quotas) is illegal under *any* circumstances? This ambiguity in the court's decision may be its most serious vulnerability.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disadvantaged groups in our society? This is an argument-by-analogy sometimes made by those who claim precedent for giving preferential treatment to "minorities." But a blind, deaf, or disabled person gets help because that *person* is disabled—a very different thing from preferential treatment given to all blacks or Mexican-Americans or women whether or not they are "disabled." Perhaps the whole question should be faced more openly and honestly. Perhaps the Congress should pass legislation granting tax exemptions to some particular racial group or, better yet, to all those who have not completed high school and have thereby suffered economic deprivation. At the very least such an action would have the virtue of being clear public policy based on demonstrable personal need.

There are other concerns. In a country of many minority groups, is it possible to discriminate in favor of a minority without discriminating against another minority (let alone the majority)? Who is to decide which groups are to receive special treatment, and whether that special treatment is to be temporary or permanent, and what guidelines will be used to make these determinations? If an institution of higher education makes decisions about faculty hiring by favoring certain groups on racial or ethnic grounds, will it have compromised the long-standing belief that a university should hire the best person available without regard to race, color, or national origin? Should the government be in the business of treating groups of certain ancestral backgrounds differently from those of other backgrounds? Against the backdrop of these and other questions, there is a need to examine the modish contemporary philosophy of "group-think" which is committed—perhaps unwittingly—to the belief that it is legitimate to give rights and special preference to some groups which are denied to others.

ANOTHER issue arising from the *Bakke* case and others like it is the appropriate application of academic standards. The Medical College Admission Test and the "national boards" which students take to become licensed physicians are frequently charged with being biased against students from lower-income levels or from "minority groups." Deprived students, it is pointed out, do poorly on standardized tests, especially those that emphasize conceptual reasoning (both verbal and mathematical); unlike middle-class children, they have not been reared in environments that stress logical and abstract methods of thought and communication. The result is that medical school admissions, in the words of one program director, are "rigged to favor upper- and upper-middle-class students—white, usually—and rigged against minorities."

It is no secret, moreover, that many law school graduates who were admitted under special programs are now finding it difficult to pass state bar examinations. According to one account, roughly 60 per cent or more of the black and Chicano special-admissions graduates in more than a dozen states (including California) have failed the bar exam on their first attempt. In some cases the failure rate on the second and third attempts has been almost as high. In the face of this, some have claimed that the bar exam favors those who can "think, act, and react from a white middle-class mold" and that it discriminates in the way it is written and how it is graded. Several years ago, the Pennsylvania state board of bar examiners lowered the passing grade, with the result that the passing rate jumped 20 points (to about 90 per cent) and, reports the *Christian Science Monitor*, "minority applicants generally were placated." In California, the "Third World Coalition for Justice in the Legal System" is calling for a similar lowering of the bar-exam passing grade.

No one would deny that standards applied more harshly (and therefore unequally) to blacks than to whites are clearly discriminatory. But are standards which are applied uniformly to everyone also to be considered racially discriminatory because they have a "differential effect" on members of "minority groups"? The Supreme Court ruled in *Griggs* v. *Duke Power Company* (1971) that uniformly applied standards (such as tests) are discriminatory and illegal under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (but not under the Constitution) if the *effect* is to disadvantage black applicants and if the test is not related to job performance. However, a 1976 Supreme Court decision (in *Washington* v. *Davis*) ruled that a federal civil-service exam of "verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension" was not unconstitutional "simply because a greater proportion of Negroes failed to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups." The fact that the test had a "disproportionate impact on blacks as a group," wrote Justice Byron White, does not warrant a conclusion of purposeful discrimination. The test was "neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the government is constitutionally empowered to pursue." While disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, Justice White said, "it does not by itself overturn the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations."

Does this decision mean that academic and intellectual standards—more specifically, achievement tests, subject-matter examinations, and licensing procedures—which are uniformly applied and "neutral on their face" will now be less frequently viewed as violations of human or civil rights? Or will an admissions test or a bar examination still be considered culturally biased or bounded by middle-class values unless those who have been disadvantaged by their background and education perform as well as the advantaged? Is a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rough equality of performance the only test of a fair exam? It is impossible to say how these questions will be answered in the years ahead. What can be said is that in *Washington* v. *Davis* the Supreme Court emphasized that "the basic equal-protection principle [is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."

THERE is a compelling need today for a vast remedial effort in the field of higher education. What is necessary, above all, is a state and national search program at the high-school level, where talented young people—blacks, Chicanos, poor whites, and all those disadvantaged who otherwise become locked into a lifetime of inequality—can be found and helped. Good young minds must be rescued before they become dulled and ill-equipped to go on to college. There is reason to believe that Americans would be willing to pay for an educational program that would benefit the victims of discrimination. But they will engage in *that* fight not by granting special privileges to some groups at the expense of others, but by providing all of the disadvantaged with real and tangible assistance. The decisions in the *Bakke* case so far have gone some way toward enunciating the proper ground of principle on which such a program can be based.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vanadium

A Memoir

Primo Levi

A VARNISH is an unstable substance by definition: at a certain point in its career, it must change from a liquid to a solid. This must happen at the right time and place. If it does not, the results can be unpleasant or even disastrous. It can happen that a varnish will solidify (we say, harshly, it "monkeys") during its shelf-life in the warehouse, in which case the product has to be junked, or the resin can solidify during its synthesis in a ten- or twenty-ton reactor, which can verge on the tragic. Or instead, the varnish may not harden at all, even after application, which is farcical, because a varnish that doesn't "dry" is like a gun that doesn't shoot or a bull that doesn't impregnate.

In most cases, the oxygen in the air takes part in the process of solidification. Among the various vital or destructive processes that oxygen can bring to completion, we varnish-makers care especially about its capacity to react with certain small molecules, such as certain oils, and to create bridges among them, transforming them into a compact and therefore solid network. That is how linseed oil "dries" in the air, for example.

We had imported a batch of resin for varnishes, one of those resins that harden at room temperature by simple exposure to the air, and we were worried. Treated as usual, the resin set normally, but after being ground with a certain type of lampblack (no substitution was possible), its capacity to harden diminished until it disappeared. We had already put aside several tons of black enamel that, despite all attempts at correction, remained sticky indefinitely after application, like flypaper in mourning.

In cases like this, we had to be cautious before making charges. The supplier was W., the great and respected German firm, one of the units the Allies had created by dismembering the omnipotent IG-Farben Company. Firms of that type, before conceding they are in the wrong, put into the balance all the weight of their prestige and all their capacity to wear out their opponents. But there was no way to avoid the controversy—the other batches of resin had behaved well with the same batch of lampblack; the resin was of a special type produced only by W.; and we were bound by a contract and absolutely had to continue to supply this black enamel without falling behind.

I wrote a polite letter of protest, explaining the details of the problem, and a few days later I received an answer. It was long and pedantic, advising us to use techniques we had already adopted with no results, and it included a superfluous and deliberately confusing exposition on the mechanism of the oxidation of resin. It ignored our need to deliver promptly, and on the issue in question it said only that the appropriate quality controls were in effect. There was nothing for us to do but order another batch, requesting W. to check with particular care the behavior of the resin with that type of lampblack.

A letter arrived with the confirmation of this latest order, almost as long as the first, and signed by the same Doktor L. Müller. It was somewhat more pertinent than the first, recognizing the justice of our complaint, and containing advice less trivial than before: "*ganz unerwarteterweise*," that is to say quite unexpectedly, the gnomes of their lab had discovered that the contested batch would be remedied by the addition of 0.1 per cent of vanadium naphthenate—an additive that had never been heard of or spoken of in the world of varnishes before that time. This unknown Dr. Müller invited us to verify their affirmation immediately. If the effect were confirmed, it would spare both parties from the worries and unknown factors of an international controversy and a reexportation.

Müller. There was a Müller in one of my previous incarnations, but Müller is an extremely common name in Germany, like Miller in English or Molinari in Italian, whose exact equivalent it is. Why continue to think of it? Yet rereading the two letters, with their heavy, intricate sentences

---

PRIMO LEVI, born in Turin, Italy, in 1919 and a chemist by profession, is the author of two volumes of stories and two books about his experience in the Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz and his return to Italy after the war, *Se questo è un uomo* (1947; translated into English under the title *If This Is a Man*, 1959, and reissued as *Survival in Auschwitz*, 1961) and *La tregua* ("The Armistice," 1963; English translation, *The Reawakening*, 1965). The present essay forms a chapter in Mr. Levi's autobiographical work, *Il sistema periodico* ("The Periodic Table," 1975) in which each chapter is named for a chemical element. The translation from Italian is by GEORGE JOCHNOWITZ.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the burden of their technical vocabulary, I could not quiet a doubt—one of those you can't put aside and which hums around you like a mosquito. Come on now. There must be two hundred thousand Müllers in Germany. Forget it and think of correcting the varnish.

And then, suddenly, a part of the second letter that had escaped me caught my eye. It was not a typographical error; it was repeated twice: there was the word "napthenat" and not "naphthenat" as it should have been. You see, I keep memories of that world which has by now become remote with a pathological precision. Well, that Müller too, in an unforgotten laboratory full of cold, hope, and terror, said "beta-napthylamine" instead of "beta-naphthylamine."

THE Russians were at the gates; Allied planes came two or three times a day to smash the Buna factory to bits. There wasn't a window intact; we lacked water, steam, and electricity. But the order was to begin producing Buna rubber, and Germans do not discuss orders.

I was in a laboratory with two other skilled prisoners, like the indoctrinated slaves imported from Greece by rich Romans. Working was as impossible as it was useless; almost all our time was spent taking down our apparatus when the air-raid warning sounded, and reassembling it at the all-clear. But of course, orders were not discussed, and every so often some inspector made his way to us across the ruins and the snow to certify that the work of the laboratory was proceeding according to plan. Sometimes a stone-faced SS guard came; other times an old soldier of the Territorial Force, as frightened as a mouse; at still others, a citizen. The citizen who appeared most often was called Doktor Müller.

He must have had a position of authority, because everyone saluted him first. He was a tall, corpulent man in his forties, and seemed rough rather than polished. He had spoken to me only three times, and each time with a timidity rare in that place, as if he were ashamed of something. The first time he spoke only of questions of work (of the dosage of "napthylamine," to be exact); the second time he asked me why my beard was so long, to which I replied that none of us had a razor, in fact, not even so much as a handkerchief, and that according to regulations we were shaved every Monday; the third time he gave me a neatly typed note authorizing me to be shaved on Thursdays and to pick up at the *Effektenmagazin* a pair of leather shoes. He asked me, using the polite form, "Why do you seem so ill at ease?" I used to think in German at that time, and concluded to myself: *"Der Mann hat keine Ahnung"*—that guy hasn't the faintest idea.

FIRST to duty. I hurried to hunt down a sample of vanadium naphthenate among our suppliers, and discovered that it wasn't easy. The product was not normally manufactured, but was only made to order in small quantities; I placed the order.

The return of that "pth" had thrown me into a state of violent excitement. To find myself, man to man, settling accounts with one of the "others" had been the sharpest and most permanent desire of my post-Auschwitz years. I had only been partially satisfied by letters from my German readers. I was not content to get these honest and generic declarations of repentance and solidarity from people I had never seen, whose other side I did not know, and who probably were not implicated except emotionally. The meeting that I hoped for with so much intensity that I dreamt about it at night (in German) was an encounter with one of those from there, who had charge of us, who never looked us in the eyes, as if we had no eyes. Not to take vengeance—I am not a Count of Monte Cristo—only to reestablish proportions, and to say "well?" If this Müller was my Müller, he wasn't the perfect antagonist, because in some way, perhaps only for a moment, he had had pity, or even only a trace of professional solidarity. Perhaps even less—perhaps he had only responded to the fact that this strange hybrid of colleague and instrument, that still was a chemist after all, frequented a lab without the *Anstand*—the decorum—that the laboratory required. But the others around him had not even felt that. He wasn't the perfect antagonist, but as everybody knows, perfection is one of those things you talk about, not something you experience.

I got in touch with the representative of W., in whom I had sufficient confidence, and asked him to check up discreetly on Dr. Müller. How old was he? What did he look like? Where had he been during the war? The answer was not long in coming: his age and looks matched; he had first worked at Schkopau learning the manufacture of synthetic rubber, then in the Buna factory near Auschwitz. I obtained his address, and sent him, as one individual to another, a copy of the German translation of my book, *If This Is a Man*, with an accompanying letter in which I asked if he was really the Müller from Auschwitz and if he remembered "the three men in the lab," and that he excuse the brutal introduction and return of nobody—I was one of the three, in addition to being the customer concerned with the resin that didn't harden.

I prepared myself to wait for the answer, while at the management level, like the oscillation of an enormous and very slow pendulum, the exchange of letters continued about the Italian vanadium that didn't work so well as the German vanadium. Therefore kindly send us with all possible promptness the specifications of the product and ship us 50 kilos by air mail, whose cost will be deducted, etc. On the technical level the process was well under way, but the fate of the faulty batch of resin remained unclear: whether to keep it with a discount or reexport it at the expense of W., or re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quest that the issue be submitted to arbitration. In the meantime, we threatened each other with resort to the vicissitudes of litigation, *"gerichtlich vorzugehen."*

I CONTINUED to wait for the "individual" correspondence to resume, which was almost as irritating and enervating as the managerial dispute. What did I know of my man? Nothing. In all likelihood he had erased everything, deliberately or not. My letter and book had been for him a rude and bothersome intrusion, a maladroit invitation to stir up the sediment that had already settled, an attempt against *Anstand.* He would never answer. Too bad. He was not a perfect German. But are there perfect Germans? Or perfect Jews? They are an abstraction. Passing from the general to the particular always introduces stimulating surprises, when the phantom, featureless antagonist defines himself in front of you, a bit at a time or in a single stroke, and becomes a *Mitmensch*—a fellow human being—with all his substance, tics, anomalies, and solecisms. By now almost two months had passed; the response would never arrive. Too bad.

It arrived, dated March 2, 1967, on elegant paper inscribed in vaguely gothic script. It was a letter of introduction, brief and reserved. Yes, he was indeed the Müller of Buna. He had read my book, recognizing people and places with emotion, and was happy to learn I had survived. He asked for news of the other two "men of the laboratory," and up to this point nothing was odd, since they had been named in the book; however, he also asked about Goldbaum, whom I had not mentioned. He added that because of the occasion he had reread his own observations on that period and would gladly discuss them with me at a hoped-for personal meeting, "useful both to me and you, and necessary for the purpose of overcoming that terrible past" (*"im Sinne der Bewältigung der so furchtbaren Vergangenheit"*). In conclusion he declared that of all the prisoners he had met at Auschwitz, I had made the strongest and most lasting impression upon him, but that comment might well have been flattery. From the tone of the letter, and especially because of the sentence about "overcoming," it seemed that the man expected something from me.

Now it was my turn to answer, and I felt embarrassed. Here I was—the enterprise had succeeded, the adversary was collared. He was before me, practically a fellow varnish-maker. He wrote as I did, on engraved stationery, and even remembered Goldbaum. He was still rather fuzzy, but it was clear that he wanted something like absolution from me, because he had a past to overcome and I did not—all I wanted from him was a discount on the invoice for defective resin. The situation was interesting, but atypical, and coincided only partially with the question of the reprobate before the judge.

To begin with, in what language should I reply to him? Certainly not in German, I would make ridiculous errors that my role did not allow. Better to continue to fight on one's own field—I wrote in Italian. The two others from the lab were dead; I knew neither where nor how. As for Goldbaum, he had died of cold and hunger during the evacuation march. The essential facts about me he knew from my book, and from the administrative correspondence about the vanadium.

I had many questions to ask him—too many, and too weighty for him and for me. Why Auschwitz? Why Pannwitz? Why the gassed children? But I felt it was not yet the moment to cross certain limits, and so I only asked if he accepted the judgments, implicit and explicit, of my book. Did he maintain that IG-Farben had spontaneously accepted the service of slave labor? Was he aware at that time of the "plants" of Auschwitz, which swallowed ten thousand lives a day seven kilometers from the Buna rubber plant? Finally, since he had mentioned his "observations on that period," could he send me a copy?

I did not speak of the "hoped-for meeting" because I feared it. It is useless to look for euphemisms, to speak of modesty, timidity, restraint. Fear was the word: I consider myself neither a Monte Cristo nor one of the Horatii—neither a seeker of personal revenge nor a champion of my people. I do not feel capable of representing the dead of Auschwitz, and it didn't even seem sensible to me to recognize Müller as the representative of the murderers. I know myself: I cannot argue on my feet; the adversary distracts me, interests me more as a human being than an adversary. I am ready to hear him and risk believing him. Indignation and good judgment are left behind, and only recaptured later, when they are no longer of use. It was better for me to continue by letter.

MÜLLER wrote me administratively that the fifty kilos had been sent and that W. was confident of an amicable resolution, etc. Almost at the same time, the letter I was waiting for arrived at my house, but it was not what I expected. It was not a model letter, following a paradigm. At this point, if my story were fiction, I could introduce only two types of letter: a humble, warm, Christian letter by a redeemed Nazi, or a ribald, haughty, glacial one, from an obstinate Nazi. However, this story is not fiction, and reality is always more complex than invention —more unkempt, ruder, less symmetrical. It is rarely limited to only one level.

The letter was eight pages long, and included a photograph that made me shudder. The face was *that* face—older, and at the same time ennobled by a clever photographer. I felt it high above me pronouncing those distracted and momentous words of compassion, "Why do you seem so ill at ease?"

It was clearly the work of an inexperienced

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

writer—rhetorical, half-sincere, full of digressions and long-winded eulogies, moving, pedantic, and cumbersome; it defied any summary, overall judgment.

He attributed the fact of Auschwitz to Man, making no distinctions. He deplored it, and found consolation in the thought of the other men cited in my book: Alberto and Lorenzo, "against whom the weapons of the night became blunt." The phrase was mine, but when repeated by him it sounded hypocritical and discordant. He told his story: "Initially swept by the general enthusiasm for the Hitler regime," he had joined a Nazi student league, which after some time had been officially incorporated into the SA. He had obtained a dismissal from it, and commented that "this too was therefore possible." In the war, he had been mobilized for anti-aircraft duty, and only then, facing the ruins of the cities, had he felt "shame and scorn" for war. In May 1944 he had been able to put to use (like me!) the fact that he was a chemist, and he had been assigned to the Schkopau factory of IG-Farben, of which the factory at Auschwitz was an enlarged copy. At Schkopau he had been in charge of breaking in a group of Ukrainian girls to do laboratory work—girls I had met at Auschwitz and whose strange familiarity with Dr. Müller I could not explain. He and the girls had been transferred to Auschwitz only in November 1944; the name Auschwitz at that time had no meaning either for him or his acquaintances. Nevertheless, upon his arrival he had had a brief introductory meeting with the technical director (presumably the engineer Faust), and had been warned that "the Jews of Buna were to be assigned only the lowest jobs, and that compassion was not tolerated."

He was directly subordinate to Doktor Pannwitz, the one who had subjected me to a curious "state exam" in order to ascertain my professional capacities. Müller showed he had a low opinion of his superior, and informed me that Pannwitz had died in 1946 of a brain tumor. It was Müller himself who was responsible for the organization of the Buna lab. He stated he had known nothing of that exam, and that he was the one who had chosen the three specialists, and me in particular. According to this news, improbable but not impossible, I was therefore obligated to him for my survival. With me, he said, he had had a relationship almost like friendship between equals; he had conversed with me about scientific problems, and had meditated, in that situation, on what "precious human values were destroyed by other men through sheer brutality." Not only do I not remember any conversation of that sort (and my memory of that period, as I have said, is excellent), but the very suggestion of it, in that site of destruction, of mutual distrust, and of mortal fatigue is totally contrary to reality, and only explicable as the result of extremely ingenuous post-facto wishful thinking. Perhaps this conversation was an event he used to recount to many people, and did not realize that the one person in the world unable to believe it was precisely myself. Perhaps, in good faith, he had constructed a comfortable past for himself. He did not recall the two details of the beard and the shoes, but he remembered equivalent ones that seemed plausible to me. He had learned of my scarlet fever, and had worried about my survival, especially when he found out that the prisoners were to be evacuated on foot. On January 26, 1945 he was assigned by the SS to the *Volksturm*, the pieced-together army of pensioners, old men, and children which was supposed to resist the advance of the Soviets. Fortunately he had been saved by the technical director named above, who had authorized him to flee with the retreating forces.

To my question about IG-Farben he answered bluntly that they had indeed used prisoners, but only to protect them. He formulated the (crazy!) opinion that the entire Buna-Monowitz factory, eight square kilometers of gargantuan plants, had been constructed with the intention of "protecting the Jews and contributing to their survival," and that the order not to have compassion on them was "*eine Tarnung*"—a camouflage. *Nihil de principe*—not a single accusation against IG-Farben: my man was still dependent upon W., which was its heir, and one doesn't spit into the plate one is eating from. During the brief time he spent at Auschwitz, he "never came to learn of any section that seemed designed for the killing of Jews." Paradoxical, offensive, but not automatically to be excluded—at that time it was the general practice of the silent German majority to know as few things as possible, and therefore not to ask questions. He too, apparently, had not asked for explanations from anyone, not even himself, although the flames of the crematorium were visible from the Buna factory on clear days.

Shortly before the final collapse, he was captured by the Americans and detained for several days in a camp for prisoners of war, which he described, with unintended irony, as being "primitively equipped." As he had done when I first met him in the laboratory, Müller continued at the moment he was writing to have "*keine Ahnung*"—not the faintest idea. He had returned to his family at the end of June 1945. This was substantially the content of his observations which I had asked to know about.

He perceived in my book a rising above Judaism, a fulfillment of the Christian precept to love one's enemies, and an affirmation of faith in Man. He concluded by insisting on a meeting, in Germany or Italy, where he was ready to join me whenever and wherever I pleased—preferably on the Riviera. Two days later, a letter from W. arrived through managerial channels, which bore, certainly not by chance, the same date as the long personal letter, besides having the same signature.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It was a conciliatory letter, recognizing their error and declaring themselves open to any offer from us. They wished to make clear that not all difficulties caused harm: the incident had brought to light the value of vanadium naphthenate, which from now on would be added directly to the resin, no matter what customer it was being sent to.

WHAT to do? This personage, Müller, had *"entpuppt"*—had come out of his cocoon into focus. He was neither base nor heroic; after filtering out the rhetoric and lies, in good or bad faith, there remained a typically gray example of humanity—one of the not insubstantial number of the one-eyed in the kingdom of the blind. He granted me an undeserved honor by attributing to me the virtue of loving my enemies. No, despite the bygone privileges he had secured for me, and although he was not an enemy, strictly speaking, I did not feel I loved him. I didn't love him, and didn't care to see him, although I felt a certain measure of respect for him: it isn't easy to be one-eyed. He was neither vile nor unfeeling nor cynical. He had not made an adjustment; he was settling accounts with the past, and the accounts were not profitable. He was trying to turn a profit—certainly cheating a little. Could one ask for much more from a former SA member? The encounter, which I had had occasion to make so many times with other honest Germans I had met on the beach or in the factory, was entirely in his favor. His condemnation of Nazism was timid and periphrastic, but he had not sought vindication. He was seeking a dialogue; he had a conscience, and was striving to keep it quiet. In his first letter he had spoken of "overcoming the past"—*"Bewältigung der Vergangenheit."* I later learned that this was a cliché, a euphemism of contemporary Germany, where it was usually understood as "redemption from Nazism." However, the root *"walt"* that is included in it occurs also in words meaning "dominion," "violence," and "rape," and I believe that translating the expression as "distortion of the past" or "violence done to the past" would not deviate very far from its deeper meaning. Yet this taking refuge in the commonplace was better than the florid obtuseness of the other Germans. His efforts at overcoming were clumsy, a bit ridiculous, irritating, and sad, but nevertheless dignified. And hadn't he provided me with a pair of shoes?

On my first free Sunday, filled with perplexity, I girded my loins to prepare a reply as sincere, balanced, and dignified as possible. I drew the letter out. I thanked him for admitting me into the laboratory. I declared I was ready to forgive my enemies, and indeed also to love them, but only when they showed certain signs of repentance—that is, when they ceased to be enemies. In the opposite case, where the enemy remained so and persisted in his desire to create suffering, it was certain that he could not be pardoned. One could try to reform him; one could (one had to!) communicate with him, but one's duty was to judge him, not to pardon him. As for the specific judgment of Müller's own behavior, which he had implicitly asked me for, I discreetly mentioned two cases known to me where his German colleagues, in our encounters, had done things much more courageous than anything he could take credit for. I granted that we were not all born heroes, and a world in which *everyone* were like him, honest and unarmed, would be tolerable, but would also be an unreal world. In the real world the armed exist; they build Auschwitz, and the honest and unarmed smooth the way for them. For this reason every German must answer for Auschwitz—no, every human being, and after Auschwitz it is no longer legitimate to be unarmed. About the meeting on the Riviera I did not say a word.

That very evening Müller called me on the telephone from Germany. The connection was poor, and in any event it is not easy for me to understand German on the phone. His voice sounded strained and cracked, the tone agitated. He announced that for Pentecost, in six weeks, he would come to Finale Ligure: could we meet? Taken by surprise, I answered yes, asking him to inform me of the time and details of his arrival, and putting aside my letter, which had become unnecessary.

A week later I received from Mrs. Müller the announcement of the unexpected death of Dr. Lothar Müller, in the sixtieth year of his life.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Abu Daoud and the Law

Sandra E. Rapoport

On January 7 of this year, Abu Daoud, a Palestinian revolutionary and leader of Al Fatah, was arrested in Paris, where he had arrived to attend the funeral of another Palestinian. Abu Daoud had entered France using an Iraqi passport and an assumed name. Officers of the French counterintelligence service, the DST, made the arrest pursuant to an international warrant and after receiving pertinent information about the suspect from the West German police.

Abu Daoud was suspected of having masterminded the massacre of eleven Israeli Olympic athletes and six other persons in Munich on September 4, 1972, and he was accordingly wanted both in Israel and in West Germany. On January 10, the Jerusalem Magistrates Court issued a warrant for Abu Daoud's arrest and on the same date Israel submitted an urgent request to the French authorities for the provisional detention of their prisoner pending extradition proceedings. West Germany also submitted a request for extradition.

The West German request was rejected by France on technical grounds (improper identification of the prisoner), and on the grounds that West German officials had not formally confirmed the request through diplomatic channels. As for Israel's request, after deliberating for twenty minutes the French court ruled that Israel had no right to demand extradition since the crimes in question had not been committed on Israeli soil or by an Israeli citizen. It further held that the extradition agreement between France and Israel was not applicable to the present case because the acts had been committed prior to the effective date of the agreement.

The French action in the Abu Daoud affair provoked a worldwide storm of protest that has not yet abated. France has been condemned for the precipitous haste with which it acted, the callousness it displayed toward the families of the slain athletes, and its cowardice in the face of Arab pressure. Still, although France stands *morally* accused in the eyes of the world, it seems to be generally accepted that in acting as it did the French court was well within the bounds of France's international *legal* obligations. In fact, however, the action of the French court in releasing Abu Daoud constituted nothing less than an illegal breach of those obligations.

On November 12, 1958 France and Israel signed an extradition treaty which was ratified and went into effect on November 14, 1971. On the basis of this convention Israel has granted extraditions to France since November 1971, and pursuant to it Israel requested the extradition of Abu Daoud. The relevant article of the treaty required France to keep the subject in provisional detention for a period of up to sixty days, pending a formal request for extradition. Such provisional detention is in the nature of a "holding action," designed to maintain the status quo, much as in a civil action a temporary restraining order keeps a situation stable pending formal proceedings. As a criminal suspect "wanted" by two separate nations, Israel and West Germany, Abu Daoud would have been held until one or the other of the requesting nations had followed through on its request for extradition.

Provisional detention is an infringement on a suspect's liberty, but this must be balanced against the irreparable damage which can result if a suspect is not held at least until the matter can be examined thoroughly. Abu Daoud was a wanted suspect for a heinous crime—in fact, in February 1973 he had publicly confessed over Jordanian television to his part in the Munich massacre—and holding him for a formal inquiry would not have been an extraordinary step for the French court to take. Moreover, since he had entered the country using a false name and under a foreign passport, he could have been detained anyway for eighteen days, time enough in which to begin formal extradition procedures.

The French claimed that their extradition treaty with Israel did not go into effect until 1975, and that since the acts attributed to Abu Daoud had been committed in 1972, the treaty did not apply to them. In fact, not only did the extradition treaty go into effect in 1971, but Article 23 of the treaty expressly states that its provisions apply even to crimes committed prior to its coming into force. Since the acts in question *were* crimes when they were committed, the procedures delineated in the treaty for extraditing persons to and from the signatory nations were fully applicable to the case of Abu Daoud; there would have been no unlawful *ex post facto* application of the statute.

When Adolf Eichmann was abducted from Argentina and taken to Israel for trial in 1960, no extradition treaty was in force between Argentina and Israel. Argentina claimed, correctly, that its territorial sovereignty had been breached by the Israeli action. As it happens, Israel's jurisdiction over Eichmann was upheld by the international legal community and Argentina soon acknowledged that no damage had been done to its citi-

Sandra E. Rapoport, *a new contributor, is a practicing attorney on the legal staff of the American Jewish Committee.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

zens or territory by the abduction (Eichmann was an illegal alien).* Nevertheless, had Israel and Argentina in 1960 been signatories to a pact such as the one in effect between Israel and France, Israel would have been hard-pressed to show why it had bypassed the treaty's mechanisms and unilaterally taken the suspect into custody. In the present instance, however, not only had the mechanism for extradition been set up, it had even been used by the two nations prior to the Abu Daoud affair. Thus when Israel put the process into motion once again, it had every reason to believe that it would be carried forward according to the terms of the treaty. The frightening implication of France's failure to administer the law is that next time the mechanism of the law may be bypassed altogether.

IN ADDITION to the extradition treaty in effect between Israel and France, another document relevant to the Abu Daoud case is the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, worked out by the Council of Europe and adopted unanimously on November 10, 1976. This treaty has not as yet been ratified and therefore is not binding statute. The fact, however, that France's foreign minister was among those who adopted it is a powerful reason to regard it as germane to the Abu Daoud case. International law is comprised of custom as well as treaty, and the adoption of a convention like the one on the Suppression of Terrorism certainly represents a formalization of the community's intentions, well on the way from custom to statute. The French, moreover, have lately been advocating stricter measures for handling terrorists. Abu Daoud's part in the Munich massacre can be seen as falling well within the scope of the convention's coverage.

Article 1 of the convention lists, among the offenses which are not of a narrowly "political" nature, attacks against the life of internationally protected persons and diplomats, kidnapping and taking of hostages or any unlawful detention, or complicity in any of these acts. Article 2 gives contracting states the right similarly to recognize "other serious acts of violence against persons" as "non-political" offenses, and here again accomplices are included.

The careful language of Article 2 has its basis in the well-established principle which exempts political offenders from extradition. In theory, the reason for this exemption is that a true political offense —for example, sedition, treason, or espionage—is directed exclusively against the state, and has no element of an ordinary crime. What the convention is saying is that in the face of such acts as the seizure of aircraft, the taking or unlawful detention of hostages, the use of bombs or firearms or other serious acts of violence against persons, the possible "political" nature of the crime is to be disregarded in favor of extradition. The adopting countries are in effect stating that the policy against terrorism supersedes the state's need to retain autonomy over criminal "political" offenders.

Thus, even if Abu Daoud had claimed that the nature of the Munich crimes was "political" and therefore immune to extradition, France was already on record as having rejected such a defense. In fact, however, Abu Daoud made no claim to "political" immunity to extradition. Instead, his defense rested on the purported absence of a jurisdictional link between Israel —the requesting state—and the crimes in question. Abu Daoud's only claim to immunity was based on his status as a member of the delegation sent by the Palestine Liberation Organization to attend a funeral in France. This point was not even ruled upon by the French court. It would have made, indeed, a complete mockery of criminal justice if it were possible to cloak oneself with such "immunity" in order to avoid apprehension for past crimes.

BUT what about the issue of jurisdiction? The French court claimed that Israel lacked jurisdiction over Abu Daoud because the crimes in question had not been committed on Israeli soil, or by an Israeli citizen. In so ruling the court was basing itself on one or more tenets of international law that apply to the right of extradition.† Thus, according to the "territorial" principle, a state is prevented from exercising its power in any form in the territory of another state, "failing a permissive rule to the contrary." This principle entitles a person to be tried where his offenses are charged to have been committed. According to a second tenet, the "nationality" principle, a state has jurisdiction over its own citizens or nationals even when they commit crimes outside that state's territory.

In the case of Abu Daoud, the "territorial" principle would have been the basis on which West Germany would have claimed jurisdiction and extradition, had that country's lengthy extradition procedure been completed. As for the "nationality" principle, Abu Daoud holds an Iraqi passport, and is generally termed a "Palestinian" national, but it is clear that no Arab nation claimed or claims jurisdiction over him for purposes of prosecution for the Munich massacre.

But these are not the only tenets of international law upon which jurisdiction may be based in extradition cases. The "protective" principle permits a state to try criminals, including aliens, for crimes committed outside that state's territory, if those crimes are "against the security, territorial integrity, or political independence of the state." The Munich massacre of eleven Israeli athletes does not fall squarely into any one of these categories, but may be seen as an aspect of all three: Abu Daoud was acting as a member of the "Black September" (Al Fatah) terrorist group, which is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. As one tactic in this overall strategy, the Munich

* At the time of the Eichmann case, the relevant law was articulated by two U.S. Supreme Court cases. Known as the *Ker-Frisbie* doctrine, it held that in the absence of an extradition treaty the manner in which an accused was brought to trial in no way affected the competence of that court to try him. Since 1960, however, the law has moved away from that notion to the position that illegal seizure may indeed taint a court's competence to try a defendant.

† See George R. Parsons, Jr., "International Law: Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime," 46 *Cornell Law Quarterly* (1961), p. 326.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

massacre was likewise aimed at destroying Israel's security, territorial integrity, and political independence.

Finally, the "passive-personality" principle allows a state to exercise criminal jurisdiction over an alien if the latter's *victim* was a citizen of the requesting state. This was the principle followed in the Eichmann case, when Israel's jurisdiction was established on the basis of the "quasi-nationality" of Eichmann's victims—i.e., Jews—even though at the time the crimes in question had been committed those victims were not citizens of the state claiming jurisdiction (nor was that state yet in existence). Since eleven victims of the Munich Olympic massacre *were* Israeli citizens, the "passive-personality" principle solidly applies.

On the basis of these two principles of international law, Israel's jurisdiction over Abu Daoud would seem to be irrefutably established.

FRANCE, then, was under an international legal obligation to hold Abu Daoud pending extradition procedures. But even if it had done so and *then* decided not to extradite him, France was bound to try Abu Daoud itself. The 1976 Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism contains a provision making it incumbent upon the state holding a fugitive to charge and try him if he is not extradited. This provision carries the policy of the agreement to its logical end: terrorist acts must be stopped, and a forum for trials of the accused must be supplied.

Aside from the provisions of the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, international law provides universal jurisdiction over "pirates," those who are recognized as the common enemies of all mankind: *hostes generis humani*. This long-standing principle is the basis of an extraordinary exercise of jurisdiction, since it allows such common enemies to be detained and brought to justice even by states that bear no jurisdictional nexus to the criminal. The reason is that they are a threat to every state, and may be treated as outlaws. It is no doubt this theory which lies behind the provision in the convention which places the duty of charging and trying the accused, if all else fails, on the nation that holds him.

THE release of Abu Daoud following a private proceeding in a French court was a monumental breach of France's legal obligations to the sovereign states of Israel and West Germany. As Israel's Foreign Minister, Yigal Allon, said in the Knesset on January 11, France was put to an "elementary test between minimal courage and maximum cowardice." France failed.

Music

German Wartime Broadcasts

Samuel Lipman

BASF—the record label owned by the giant German chemical combine Badische Anilin-und Sodafabriken—has recently made available on the American market nearly one hundred LP's containing vocal performances recorded on early magnetic tape and broadcast on German radio during World War II. On the jacket of an introductory record containing excerpts from these wartime transcriptions, the series (which also includes a few broadcasts made before 1939 and a larger number of what one assumes to be studio recordings made after 1945 for commercial release) is described in the following understated and discreet way:

> These recordings are more than just recollections. They are a documentation of an epoch of German Music, which was characterized by Great Names and masterful interpretations. And yet, due to chaotic times, they remained relatively unknown.

A release of this size cannot but possess significance, both as historical documentation and as a unique musical statement about a repertory which remains of central importance today. And representing as it does a cultural manifestation of a period and a society with which we have yet to come to terms, its implications cannot be restricted to music or musical history alone.

The basic statistics of the release are impressive in themselves. It can be divided into three categories. There are operas (all but two—Hugo Wolf's *Der Corregidor* and Flotow's *Martha*—in highlight form); there are two-LP sets each featuring a famous singer of the period in solo arias and ensembles; and there is an amorphous group of collections organized either around the work of a single composer (Puccini arias, and lieder of Schubert and Wolf) or an institution (Bayreuth, the Dresden Opera, or the Berlin *Staatsoper Unter den Linden*) and its featured artists. As frequently happens in this age of record packaging and repackaging, there are many duplications, with arias sung on the opera records appearing frequently

---

SAMUEL LIPMAN *is a concert pianist whose music criticism appears regularly in these pages. His most recent contributions include "The Performer's Predicament" (January) and "Schoenberg's Survival" (November 1976).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the discs devoted to the individual singers. More rigorous editing would have eliminated the errors which dot the explanatory jacket material, and certainly, given the historical character of these records, one would have welcomed more information as to the circumstances of the recordings and the broadcasts which transmitted them. Of equal interest would have been some description of the vicissitudes of the custody of these tapes as they made their way to their present owners.

The broad range of the operas represented here comes as something of a surprise; of the twenty-six works by eleven composers, only five belong to the standard heavyweight German repertory—*Der Fliegende Holländer, Tannhäuser, Lohengrin,* and *Tristan und Isolde* of Wagner, and *Der Rosenkavalier* of Richard Strauss. Among the less traditionally heavy German works included are, in addition to Wolf's *Der Corregidor,* Strauss's *Capriccio* (in a performance using with one exception the cast of the first performance in 1942), and Mozart's *Die Entführung aus dem Serail.* The other seventeen range from *Carmen* (Bizet) through *Andrea Chenier* (Giordano) and *Faust* (Gounod) to *La Bohème* and *Tosca* (Puccini) and no fewer than ten works of Verdi, including all the famous ones—even *Otello*—and *Luisa Miller* and *Macbeth* as well. Everything, in line with an old tradition, is sung in German, thus presenting the non-German works in what must be to us an unfamiliar and somewhat disconcerting aspect.

The singers who perform in these operas and are featured on their own individual sets include the most famous artists who were able—or chose—to remain and work in Nazi Germany. Several had great international careers prior to 1939; among these are three who appeared in Sir Thomas Beecham's legendary 1937 Berlin recording of Mozart's *Die Zauberflöte,* the sopranos Erna Berger and Tiana Lemnitz and the tenor Helge Rosvaenge. Several others rather less familiar (to record buyers) outside Germany but of the highest stature in the history of prewar opera performance in Europe are also represented here. One such is Max Lorenz—the great *Heldentenor* whose career spanned appearances at the Metropolitan Opera in 1931 and at La Scala in 1950 as Siegfried in the Furtwängler *Götterdämmerung*—and another is Heinrich Schlusnus, a baritone who over almost forty years was distinguished equally as opera and lieder singer. Neither of these singers is available on any other major label in this country.

Other singers whose fame was at its height during the war but did not, due to their early deaths, long survive it, make strong impressions on these records. They include Maria Cebotari, a Russian-born soprano whose career had been made mainly in German-speaking countries after 1929 (and whose successful work as a film actress culminated in a 1942 movie entitled *Flammen über Odessa*), and the commanding bass-baritone Georg Hann, whose portrayal of Caspar in Weber's *Der Freischütz* on an early American Decca LP (possibly of wartime origin also) remains unsurpassed on records. Still another generation of singers—perhaps chief among them the leading Hans Sachs of the postwar period, Paul Schöffler, and the greatest Wotan of the same period, Hans Hotter—who were only to achieve full world stature in the postwar period, is represented; as an indication of the things which were yet to come, a bit player on one of these records is Elisabeth Schwarzkopf.

It is unfortunate that the collection of four records devoted to the Bayreuth Festival includes so few actual wartime performances from the *Festspielhaus.* Though it does provide some documents of the highest historical and musical interest from prewar days—most remarkably a 1931 performance of the prelude from *Tristan* under Furtwängler and the closing pages of *Parsifal* with Richard Strauss conducting—only about 20 per cent of this collection comes from the 1939-44 Festival. What there is (the prelude to *Die Fliegende Holländer,* Loge's narrative from *Das Rheingold,* the opening and part of Act II from *Die Walküre,* and the prelude and chorale from Act I of *Die Meistersinger*) is of excellent quality and leads to the hope that future releases may include the complete performances of these operas, as well as of the other Wagner operas which were done in Bayreuth during this time. The fact that one such performance, that of *Die Meistersinger* conducted in 1943 by Furtwängler, has recently been issued on the Electrola label suggests that rumors about the existence of other tapes in German (both East and West), or possibly Russian, archives may be well founded.

THE technical quality of the BASF records is never less than acceptable, and often—save for a tendency to register vocal climaxes at too high a level—spectacular, especially considering how long ago the original transcriptions were done. Little effort was evidently made to imitate the acoustics of an opera house or concert hall; instead the voices were often placed at an unvaryingly close distance to the microphone and thus became capable at all moments of riding triumphantly over even the most dense orchestration. If some degree of musical realism was thereby lost, much was also gained in clarity of vocal detail and immediacy of the singers' physical presence. Perhaps the highest tribute that can be paid to the technological achievement these original tapes represent is simply to note that several of these recordings were successfully issued in the 1950's in the United States without any mention of their origin in wartime broadcasts.

The musical achievement of the artists represented here is similarly high. In general the male singers—particularly the tenors Peter Anders, Rosvaenge, and Franz Völker, as well as the baritone Schlusnus and the bass-baritone Hann—can be placed among the greatest recorded voices of the century. If the same cannot on the whole be said about the female voices, even after taking into account the many beautiful sounds captured here, two reasons come immediately to mind. The first is the remarkable standard of female vocalism in the past fifty years; one's models are inevitably

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Flagstad and Nilsson in the German repertory and Callas and Tebaldi in the Italian repertory. The second reason pertains more to the special sound of singers trained in the German vocal tradition; all too frequently the women suffer from a certain unsteadiness when singing out, a quality which becomes breathy and tremulous in softer passages. These qualifications do not, of course, deny either the strong dramatic presence of the sopranos and contraltos (of which Margarete Klose's Fricka in the 1940 Bayreuth *Die Walküre* is a supreme example) or the sterling musicianship which they bring not only to these operas but also to the several lieder records in this series.

Perhaps the chief musical surprise contained in these records is the infectious vitality of the orchestral playing and the grasp of pacing and scale shown by so many of the conductors. The depth of the orchestra personnel available in a wartime Germany even after the bloody purges of Jewish musicians testifies to the broad basis of the German (and Austrian) performing tradition stemming from the hated Weimar era and before. The conductors here, of whom only Clemens Krauss was internationally known, also include Karl Elmendorff, Robert Heger, and Arthur Rother. To hear their performances is to realize how completely the breed of great opera conductors is now vanishing.

Taken all together, the outstanding characteristic of these records is their undeviating weight, commitment, and seriousness. Without doubt some of this atmosphere of tense dedication comes from the physical and emotional conditions of wartime performance under bombing and ominous reports from the military fronts. But even more, it must be a product of a specifically German competence in music. Every one of the works in this series is treated as if it were Beethoven, as if it contained in itself all that is valuable in music. From this attitude toward each work comes a concentration on its particular elements, extending down to every individual note. Such an intense application of musical intellect and quasi-religious scrupulosity is itself a manifestation—perhaps the last—of the German symphonic tradition as it unfolded (both in composition and performance) from Bach and before via Beethoven to Wagner and Strauss and even beyond into the thoroughly native music of Schoenberg, Berg, and Webern which the Nazis so ruthlessly suppressed.

But of course no tradition, even one of such immortal greatness, can be of universal validity. So it is to be expected that problems might well arise when non-German and non-symphonic music is approached according to the lights of the best German tradition. Such is the case with the performances on these records of Puccini. Puccini's delicate orchestral effects and soaring melodic lines culminating in lush climaxes clothe an essentially simple music, a music which is the natural expression of ordinary human emotions of love, jealousy, and grief. To invest these emotions with mythic, superhuman significance, as the scale and intensity of the German performances do, is simultaneously to bloat the music and thus render it trivial, to present Puccini as a composer of large-scale operettas.

With Mozart's *Don Giovanni* and *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* these records are on surer ground. For this is German (or to be more accurate, Austrian) music, despite its strong Italianate component; *Die Entführung* was written to a German text and *Don Giovanni*, whatever Mozart or his contemporaries may have thought, is today perceived as mythic. Moreover, there is little danger of Mozart's music suffering from an excess of care or devotion. Not surprisingly, then, the performances of these operas are excellent—for their effortlessly brilliant vocalism (particularly in *Die Entführung*) and intense orchestral playing and direction—even though they may lack, for those accustomed to today's international casts, the final grace of Mozart performed in the Italian manner.

THE great value of the musical approach so characteristic of these recordings is shown by the examples of Verdi included here. Something of the higher dimension in Verdi has been known since Toscanini showed that it was possible to take these works seriously as great music rather than as mere grand opera with its concentration on vocal display and florid acts of passion. But even in Toscanini's magnificent performances one could detect a certain throbbing emotionalism related more to the tradition of Italian stage production than to the pure musical and dramatic content of the works themselves. These German broadcasts of, among others, *La Traviata, La Forza del Destino,* and *Macbeth,* reach their summit in the 1942 *Aida* and the 1943 *Otello* (unfortunately limited here to excerpts). Usually *Aida* is performed as a brassy collection of tunes and ceremonial numbers, and *Otello* as a musically fragmented and cause-ridden—albeit successful—attempt by Verdi to be serious. But on these records the symphonic richness common to both operas is used to make them musically and therefore dramatically forceful. Treated thus, Verdi takes his place in the history of music not as an opponent of Wagner (which is how he has been seen by conventional opinion) but as his co-worker in perfecting the 19th-century orchestral music-drama.

Yet as for Wagner himself, what is somewhat surprising about these records is that none of his operas as presented here (with one stunning exception) is a completely satisfactory achievement. Both the *Tristan* (1942) and the *Tannhäuser* (1943) excerpts—though better than anything one gets in present-day opera houses—suffer from a hyper-intense emotionalism which verges upon distasteful ranting, and *Die Fliegende Holländer* (1944), while marvelously conducted by Clemens Krauss and distinguished by Georg Hann's great Daland, is marred by the bad wobble of the Senta, Krauss's wife, Viorica Ursuleac.

No such reservations apply, however, to the two-record set of *Lohengrin.* Made on December 12, 1942 at an actual performance of the Berlin *Staatsoper,* it is more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

realistic in sound than the other, studio-made, recordings, and its cast includes some of the greatest German Wagner singers of their generation—Franz Völker, Maria Müller, and Margarete Klose as Lohengrin, Elsa, and Ortrud. These three artists together offer what are unquestionably the finest portrayals of their roles in memory, and the conducting by Robert Heger is equally good. This *Lohengrin*, by eschewing the comfortable self-indulgence so apparent in this season's production at the Metropolitan, manages to focus attention on the overall thrust of the story and its music. Through such a performance it becomes obvious that *Lohengrin* is not just a popular early work but one link, and a strong one, in the chain of Wagner's unsurpassed orchestral genius which stretches from *Die Fliegende Holländer* of 1843 to the *Parsifal* of thirty-nine years later. Not only is this recording the high point of the entire BASF series; it may very well be one of the supreme examples of opera on records.

AFTER every musical tribute, so richly deserved, has been paid to these performances, however, nagging doubts remain. Were they poor from an artistic standpoint, they would have been easy to dismiss as degenerate products of a notoriously evil society, in somewhat the same way as brilliant products of a praiseworthy society are commonly seen as manifestations of the collective virtue. But the very musical excellence of these records presents a problem.

In the explanatory text which accompanies the more than 35 records cited here, Hitler and Nazism are never mentioned; of the events of the war only the bombings and the approach of the Russian armies are referred to; nothing is said about the political pressures which must have dictated the choice of artists, repertory, and administrators; there is no allusion to official cultural policy regarding the use of both music and the radio as vehicles of propaganda; completely ignored is the fact that many of these artists were making great careers as replacements for musicians who had, to put it gently, emigrated.

The effect of such omissions is to provide a sanitized atmosphere, free of both recriminations and the truth about the infamous years in which the artists recorded here flourished. It is an atmosphere thus highly favorable to a concentration on the virtues of these records, virtues which in themselves can only be highly praised. Nevertheless, just as we are careful to protect art from political judgments, care must be taken to protect our political judgment from being influenced by art. Such care is not always taken nowadays in connection with the Nazis. For example, the growing worldwide popularity of the music of Wagner has enabled his daughter-in-law to reappear before the public for the first time since the war in a five-hour filmed interview timed to coincide with the hundredth anniversary of the Bayreuth Festival; in it she has been allowed, and perhaps even encouraged, to express her high opinions of Hitler as music-lover and family man.

This kind of thing would be bad enough at any time, but it becomes especially pernicious at a time when at least a partial revision of the older totally condemnatory attitudes toward Hitler, Nazism, and wartime Germany is so clearly gaining ground. Thus, A.J.P. Taylor has examined Hitler's "principle and doctrine" and found them no worse than those of many other contemporary statesmen; Bruce Russett has called it a myth that the Germans initiated bombings of residential areas. Similarly, recent bestsellers, though hostile to Hitler, have still managed, in the process of attempting to give a rounded portrait, to find in him the great modernizer of Germany and the last believer in the historical mission of Europe. One hopes—uneasily—that the intrinsic artistic excellence of these BASF records will not serve to further such perversions of moral and political judgment.

Movies

1976 Minus One

William S. Pechter

BY COMMON consent, last year was the worst year for movies within recent memory—that is, unless one remembers the year before, and the year before that. Yet insofar as such impressions can be changed by the appearance of one single, overwhelming new film, I don't think 1976 had to be so. For I did see one new film last year that seemed to me a stunning achievement. And though just when others will have a chance to see it remains, at this point, an open question, it seems to me nearly unthinkable that a work of such power will stay under wraps for very long.

The name of the film is *Victory March*, and its director is Marco Bellocchio, whose recent work seems to me more exciting than that of any other director younger than Godard. Bellocchio was born in 1939, a year before his most famous contemporary in the Italian film, Bernardo Bertolucci, and the two men's careers offer a natural and interesting comparison. Though Bertolucci directed his first film (*La Commare Secca*) four years be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fore Bellocchio made his, the film often taken to be Bertolucci's first, *Before the Revolution*, precedes Bellocchio's debut by only two years. Like *Before the Revolution*, Bellocchio's 1966 *Fists in the Pocket* seems to have a high autobiographical component, in feeling if not in its fidelity to any actual events, though its claustrophobic depiction of a wealthy family's brood of monsters—with epilepsy, intimations of incest, and murder thrown in for good measure—seemed also to owe something to Cocteau's *Les Enfants Terribles* and, in its taste for the shockingly blasphemous gesture, to Buñuel.

Both *Before the Revolution* and *Fists in the Pocket* confirmed the presence of strongly compelling talents, but, by and large, I much preferred the spacious, grandly romantic gestures of *Before the Revolution*—once it got past its influences, especially that of Antonioni in its mannered early sections—to the cramped, hothouse atmosphere of the Bellocchio film. But with their succeeding works (Bellocchio's 1967 *China Is Near*, Bertolucci's 1968 *Partner*), it seemed to be Bertolucci who was courting the fate of inbred esoterica, and Bellocchio who was reaching out to a wider audience. *China Is Near* (released here before *Fists in the Pocket*) is again a depiction of a moneyed, monstrous family, but this time seen in the process of interacting with a number of other characters from the world outside, as the family head, a bumbling professor, runs for political office (as a Socialist), his doctrinaire younger brother flirts with Maoism, their sister consumes a succession of lovers, and both the professor and his sister become involved with a working-class couple in a complicated roundelay of the used and the users.

For a director of any age, no less one so young, *China Is Near* would be an extraordinary achievement, and little in *Fists in the Pocket*, besides the sense of a genuine talent at work, seemed to me to augur it. To be sure, as in *Fists in the Pocket*, there's the concentration on family relationships, but here filled out with political and social concerns extending across a wide spectrum of society; and, indeed, few films since Renoir's *The Rules of the Game* have conveyed a richer sense of social density, of capturing a whole society in microcosm. Like *The Rules of the Game*, *China Is Near* is constructed with the interlocking precision of a great play, but, unlike the Renoir, with its Beaumarchais-like exuberance, the temperamental affinities of the Bellocchio are with the cool irony and moralistic vision of a Sternheim or Schnitzler.

China Is Near was hailed as a masterpiece, by Pauline Kael among others, when it was released in this country, but it failed to attract an audience. Probably the film is inherently a hard one for audiences to warm to, given how wide a net it casts: one may begin by laughing at the hypocrisy of one or another of the characters as their political masks fall away to reveal their underlying opportunism, but before long one disconcertingly recognizes, and is laughing at, oneself among them. In Italy, despite Bellocchio's nominal Communist affiliation, *China Is Near* did, in fact, go down badly with the Left, and it was a while before he next found financial backing. By the time he did, Bertolucci had recovered from the failure of *Partner* well enough to have scored the coup, in 1970, of making two films chosen for showing at that year's New York Film Festival. Both of them continued in the vein of visual gorgeousness begun with *Partner*, but, while *The Spider's Stratagem* remained an essentially arid exercise in Borgesian enigma, *The Conformist*, with its melodramatic excitement, lushly opulent look, and striking political-sexual gestures, at last established its director with a larger audience. Two years later, that audience was enlarged still further, when Bertolucci's next film, *Last Tango in Paris*, starred Marlon Brando and provoked an international sensation, though, by this time, the visual bravura was coming suspiciously to resemble windowdressing, and the gestures to verge on posturing.

In 1973, two years after it was made (and shown at the San Francisco Film Festival), Bellocchio's next film, *In the Name of the Father*, slipped inconspicuously into American release. Set in a religious boarding school for boys, it was, like the depictions of family life which preceded it, a study of institutions and the rebellion against them, but nothing in the earlier films quite prepared for the explosiveness of this one. If I had a reservation about *China Is Near*, it was that there seemed something almost too knowing—and implicitly acquiescent—in its pervasive cynicism. But *In the Name of the Father*, from its opening shot of a father and son pummeling each other through the streets as the former escorts the latter to the school in which he's enrolled him, is permeated with a spirit of anarchic rebelliousness against authority that's almost palpable in its intensity. Shot through with a streak of surrealist fantasy, and with the earlier work's strain of Buñuel-like black humor now fullblown, the film reaches its apogee, roughly two-thirds of the way through, with the performance of a school play whose staging has been usurped by the student rebels: a sequence that's virtually intoxicating in its sense of the rebellious spirit at once run riot and ritualized theatrically. From that point on, the film seems to shift into thematic overkill and veer out of control, but, anticlimatic and cryptic as the later sections tend to be, the sense which arises from them is unmistakable: out of the chaos he has sown, the rebel leader is seen emerging as a dangerously authoritarian, even fascistic, figure in his own right.

Flaws and all, *In the Name of the Father* seemed to me the most exciting film I saw from abroad in both the year it was made and the year it was released here—and now there is *Victory March*.* Bellocchio's new film extends his preoccupation with social institutions to the army, under universal conscription, and it opens with a scene of the ritualistic humiliation of a new recruit that's like *The Brig* in miniature. The remainder of the

* I haven't seen the film Bellocchio made in 1973 between *In the Name of the Father* and *Victory March;* intriguingly titled, *Slap the Monster on Page One*, it was a project Bellocchio stepped into following the illness of the director who began it, and it reportedly deals with topical subject matter involving hippies and the press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

film concerns itself with the strange attachment that develops between this wretched conscript and a psychotic captain who first torments and then adopts the young soldier, who, on his part, eventually comes to admire and identify himself with his oppressor (and to become sexually involved with the captain's wife, on whom he's asked to spy).

Steeped as it is in the Italian realist tradition, *Victory March* may lack the allusive richness of *In the Name of the Father*, though, wildly funny and hair-raising by turns, the new film is incessantly gripping, and features an electrifying performance as the captain by Franco Nero, whom I'd previously thought of as only a dull matinee idol. Yet even if *In the Name of the Father* is a more complex work, one would be mistaken, I think, to take *Victory March* simply as an indictment of the inhumanity of the military. Rather, it seems to me another of Bellocchio's depictions of the way the exercise of power in our social institutions reflects and reinforces our psychological make-up, and a further exploration of that subject to which all his work can be seen to be directed: the psycho-sexual roots of fascism in individual character. In this sense, all of Bellocchio's films can be seen as intensely political, though in the situating of their politics in the dramatic interaction of rounded characters they are wholly unlike the films of a Costa-Gavras or Francesco Rosi. Again a comparison with Bertolucci, particularly the Bertolucci of *The Conformist*, suggests itself, but one is struck mainly by the differences—between the repressed-homosexual-into-fascist linkages of *The Conformist* and *Victory March*'s disturbing refusal to locate the fascist impulse beyond the range of our "normal" experience, and between the expressionistic flamboyance of *The Conformist*'s style and the lean muscularity of *Victory March*'s terse realism. Indeed, given the rhetorical inflation of *Last Tango in Paris* and the five-and-a-half-hour running time of Bertolucci's unreleased *1900*, one might be tempted to wonder if the increasing contrast between the two film-makers might not best be expressed as that of fat versus muscle.

Why hasn't *Victory March* opened? Largely because its single showing at last year's San Francisco Film Festival elicited a pair of newspaper notices (by two reviewers charitably described as incompetent) of a sort seen as major liabilities given the delicate mechanism that is the foreign-language film market. That *Victory March*, probably the most accessible of Bellocchio's films with its grippingly dramatic story line and strongly erotic content, will eventually go into release, I have little doubt; though it remains to be seen whether it will get the proper support or be dropped with the kind of apparent death-wish that so often accompanies the American release of foreign-language films. But whenever it may next appear, *Victory March* was, for me, the film of the year in 1976—and 1976 was memorable chiefly for being the year we didn't get to see Marco Bellocchio's new movie.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Berlin and Jerusalem

ON JEWS AND JUDAISM IN CRISIS: SELECTED ESSAYS. By GERSHOM SCHOLEM. Edited by WERNER J. DANNHAUSER. *Schocken. 306 pp. $16.50.*

Reviewed by CHAIM RAPHAEL

IT MAY seem odd that the Jewish love affair with Germany and German culture should, after all that has happened, still exert a strong influence over contemporary Jewish consciousness. But if we shut our eyes to this legacy of the German-Jewish involvement, the story of our time is left with a great hole in the middle—a sequence of events, stunning in its tragedy, that simply tears Jewish history apart, as the pages of an old calendar are torn off and discarded.

For many, perhaps, things are better left this way: the German episode is too horrible to return to, even in thought. There are some, though, who are prepared to explore the positive side of the German-Jewish involvement, not simply as a key to the past but as an enduring element in the effort of the Jew to come to terms with the modern world. Nothing in this approach is meant to soften the unspeakable tragedy, or to pretend that the Nazis were but an accident of history that might have been avoided. Rather, those who take this approach do so in an effort to identify the extraordinary power that Germany exercised over Jewish feeling, to examine the forms of Jewish thought that burgeoned under that influence, to see the fatal flaws but at the same time to show what was true, revolutionary, and lasting. The historical picture—a story of attraction, conflict, tension, and paradox—must be absorbed in appropriately dialectical terms.

A writer who seeks to project all this in meaningful fashion must have three essential qualities: he must be deeply German, deeply Jewish, and blessed with historical imagination. It is almost a ready-made description of Gershom Scholem, and in his new book this great scholar explores the German-Jewish involvement, as well as other issues arising out of the Jewish experience in modern times, with the towering authority he has already brought to his many works on Jewish mysticism.*

But whereas Scholem's earlier books—*Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, The Messianic Idea in Judaism, On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism,* and most notably *Sabbatai Sevi*—are dazzling examples of scholarship applied objectively to the content of Jewish intellectual history, this new book, a collection of scattered pieces, brings us the man himself. The essays, all published previously (some in this magazine), and edited with skill and sensitivity by Werner J. Dannhauser, are diverse in range, but they are unified by their personal tone and by the preoccupation with the two broad themes—Germany and Kabbalah.

The first piece is a long interview in which Scholem talks freely of his youth, his first involvement with the study of Jewish mysticism, his friendship with other German-Jewish writers, his Zionist hopes (fulfilled and frustrated), and the abiding question that still baffles him—how Judaism as a religion can establish living values in a secularist age. In the essays which follow he takes up particular aspects of the German involvement, illustrating his approach with a critique of other writers of the same background as his own.

Scholem—a fourth-generation Berliner—was born in 1897 into a fully assimilated family. To his father and his father's generation, German culture was the highest form of civilization. Although no "true" German ever set foot in the Scholem household, Gershom's father remained convinced that he himself was a 100 per-cent German. For such a man to have explored his Jewish heritage in any serious way would have been to risk diluting his precious Germanism.

The problem for young Scholem was that in many ways he agreed with this formulation. For him, too, he says here, the German language "bestowed the gift of unforgettable experiences: it defined and gave expression to the landscape of our youth." The appeal of Germany to German Jews was unique in its power, and there were good historical reasons for this. When emancipation began,

> it was German culture the Jews first encountered in their road to the West. Moreover—and this is decisive—the encounter occurred precisely at the moment when that culture had reached one of its most fruitful turning points. It was the zenith of Germany's bourgeois era. One can say that it was a happy hour when the newly awakened creativity of the Jews . . . impinged precisely on the zenith of a great creative period of the German people, a period producing an image of things German that, up to 1940, and among very broad classes of people, was to remain unshaken, even by many bitter and later most bitter experiences.

It was not simply that the Jews admired German culture in its own right. It seemed to them that it had been fashioned, almost by Providence, to meet their deepest feelings *as Jews.* Schiller was a "spokesman for pure humanity"—the interior message of the Jewish Bible. Goethe echoed the lyricism of the Psalms and the majesty of the Prophets. Responding to German culture with dazzling speed, the Jews did not merely adopt what lay before them but deepened it incal-

CHAIM RAPHAEL *is the author of* The Walls of Jerusalem, Memoirs of a Special Case, *and* A Feast of History. *Mr. Raphael's most recent contributions to* COMMENTARY *include "The Texture of Jewish History" (January 1977) and "The Litvak Connection and Hasidic Chic" (May 1976).*

*See the excellent study by Robert Alter, "The Achievement of Gershom Scholem," in COMMENTARY, April 1973.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Watch your Passover guests reach for seconds when you serve Yuban® coffee with richness worth a second cup.

Coffee drinkers are sure to ask for seconds of rich Yuban®...it's that delicious! Made with some of the world's richest coffee beans—including sun-ripened Colombians — Yuban's very special flavor has earned it the title of the "Simcha Coffee." So it's ideal to serve during Passover and throughout the year. Enjoy rich Yuban® with family and friends every day. Just remember to make enough for seconds!



כשר לפסח

Certified Kosher for Passover by Rabbi Bernard Levy

Yuban®

The Simcha Coffee

The Premium Coffee of General Foods

GF
GENERAL FOODS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

culably in every field of industry, science, and the arts. "A list of . . . astonishing Jewish talents and accomplishments [was] offered up to the Germans." Symbolically, "almost all the most important critical interpretations of Goethe were written by Jews."

With all this, the Jews remained ineradicably alien to the Germans. The "bourgeois" Jews (like Scholem's father) were content to love without being loved in return; but to the younger generation of intellectuals, alienness posed a problem that they had somehow to tackle—with, of course, every tool of the German intellectual tradition that they could fashion to their purpose. Many—including one of Scholem's brothers—fled into Marxist politics. To Scholem, this was just as misguided as his father's pretense that they were really all Germans. "You're deluding yourself," Scholem recollects telling his brother, "the same way Papa is deluding himself. You are deluding yourself by imagining that you represent Germany's exploited industrial workers. That's a lie: you don't represent a thing. You're the son of a middle-class German Jew. That makes you furious, so you go off wandering into other fields. You don't want to be what you are."

What was Scholem himself? He saw with admirable clarity that it was morally debasing—and self-defeating—to water down Jewish feeling; it was an expression of self-surrender. But how did a modern Jew give that feeling a positive content? The binding factor in Jewish history had been religion, but now, except for a minority, traditional faith had become meaningless. The theological dogmas of Judaism, its formal institutions, and the complex net of religious law and argument added up to a system unacceptable to an enlightened man. Was there some other form of religious belief that expressed a revolt against the dead hand of rabbinism and yet was authentically Jewish?

This was the quest that led him to Kabbalah, a body of Jewish doctrine about which nothing at that time seemed to be known *in a systematic way*. Kabbalah was a set of mystical cosmic teachings, developed and elaborated upon over the centuries, that linked the ineffable magic in the letters of God's Names to a philosophy of emanations and the ultimate restoration, through a purified mankind, of God's primordial perfection. A secret lore, it seemed to contain some inner force which had led it to burgeon repeatedly in Jewish history. What lay behind it? To assess intellectually what the kabbalists had been after could be the work of a lifetime. One didn't have to *believe* in these mysterious doctrines—how could one?—but approaching it as a historian, one could illuminate the workings of the kabbalistic mind, show the parallels to other mystical faiths, and thus pay tribute to a vitality that drew on sources beyond ordinary reason. "They know something we don't know," Scholem told himself; and this was to be the theme, repeated endlessly, of the magisterial historical works he went on to reproduce in sixty years of study and scholarship.

One sees at a glance that it was a development full of paradoxes. In rebellion against a dead formalism and hoping to spark the contemporary imagination, Scholem set about reconstructing the most intricate edifice imaginable of absolute doctrine, totally remote from the temper of the present age. From another angle, his project represented a proud and independent assertion of Jewishness in which everything most German in him was brought into play—the high standards of German scholarship, the central role of linguistic analysis, the use of Hegelian dialectic. Here, indeed, was a true bonus. To break away and yet continue fully to express his background was, for him, a resolution of the underlying German-Jewish problem. The proper relationship to Germany, he said, drawing on a phrase of Max Brod, had to be one of "distant love." The concept was dialectical. "Distance is meant to prevent an all-too-coarse intimacy, but at the same time a desire to bridge the gap."

There was a dialectical principle at work, too, behind his decision at an early age to move to the land of Israel and center his studies there. If religion was to have any meaning for a secular age, it had to break through the rationalist barrier and draw meaning from the idea of the Kabbalah that the universe itself, and not merely the individual man, had to return from "exile." In the kabbalistic conception, the Kingdom of God is not just the realization of good on earth—"a state in which the good would be done by natural impulse"—but "the actualization of this reign in all the infinite spheres of creation." Scholem sees "a vehement appeal" in this notion, and relates it to what he calls "secular messianism." It is no accident for Scholem that modern philosophers who have expressed apocalyptic ideas are often Jewish in origin and from his own background. With formal religion abandoned, there had to be a new approach to the redemption of man:

> This is the attitude behind the writings of the most important ideologists of revolutionary messianism, such as Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse, whose acknowledged or unacknowledged ties to their Jewish heritage are evident.

IF THIS broad philosophical—or theological—framework sounds daunting, and too German in flavor for some, one has to remember that Scholem is not himself a dogmatic ideologue but an expounder. Ideas appeal to him; he loves defining them with care, but instinct warns him that speculation run riot has dangers as well as joys. The warm humanity of his mind emerges enchantingly in the essays included here on three outstanding writers of the 20th century—his friends Walter Benjamin, S.Y. Agnon, and Martin Buber*—each of whom struggled as he did with the German involvement but to different effect.

The factor common to these friends of Scholem was their resolve, as young men, to do something that would transform the sterile heritage of the past. For Walter Benjamin, who is recognized now, after an

* Two of the essays originally appeared in COMMENTARY: "Reflections on S.Y. Agnon" (December 1967) and "Martin Buber's Hasidism" (October 1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For people who really deserve the huge Encyclopaedia Judaica published in 16 volumes at $625.

Here's the next best thing: Only $10 with membership in the Jewish Book Club.



The editors of the 16-volume *Judaica* have completed the monumental task of distilling their knowledge of the Jewish heritage into one over-size volume of 720 pages, 15,000 entries, and three-quarters of a million words. For the family with young people of school or college age, this "one-volume Judaica" may well be the *best* thing. It can probably tell you (and your children) more about being Jewish than any other single volume in the English language.

- **Festivals and fasts of the Jewish year (page 189).**
- **Tables to help you make sense of the Jewish calendar (page 112).**
- **Is caviar kosher? See page 158.**
- **A handy chronology of the 300 most significant events in Jewish history (pp. 262-265).**

For those who want to brush up, for those who never really knew but always wanted to, for those who know but can't put it into words for their children, here is what it means to be a Jew. You can look up any aspect of the Jewish heritage that you have ever wondered about, worried about, or suddenly needed to know more about. *The words and music of Kol Nidre? See page 350.* This home library of Jewish knowledge will serve you for a lifetime:

Menorah by Benno Elkan.

1 As a guide to Jewish history, customs, traditions, culture, and folklore as handed down from generation to generation across the centuries.

2 As a biographical dictionary of the great Jewish personalities from Genesis to the present.

3 As a museum of Jewish art, spreading before your eyes in 2,000 illustrations the very image of the Jewish past.

4 As a remarkably clear exposition of Jewish ritual and belief.

The order of the Passover seder (page 472). Two ways to don phylacteries (diagram, page 589).

King Solomon by Ben Shahn.

FOR PEOPLE WHO NEED HELP WITH THEIR HEBREW (OR HAVE TO START FROM SCRATCH): How to read the Hebrew alphabet. *For your trip to Israel:* A basic Hebrew vocabulary of 1,000 words (page 651).

Some arguments you can settle and bets you can win:

- 65 Jewish winners of the Nobel Prize (page 455) and 223 Jews who have won Olympic medals (page 462).
- The Jewish star has sometimes been Christian (page 390).
- Judaism still has priests (page 489).

A general in the Chinese Army who is known to history as "Two Gun Cohen" (page 127). *People you may not think of as Jewish:* Houdini (page 272). Lorne Greene (page 226). Erich von Stroheim (page 575). Victor Borge (page 99).

For people who could use a little help in explaining the difference between the Talmud, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: All the books of the "people of the Book" and what they contain.

THE ART OF BEING JEWISH IN PLACES WHERE MOST PEOPLE AREN'T. A gallery of Jewish art, architecture, and craftsmanship through the ages (much in full color).



Jewish gold glass from Rome 3rd-4th century.

The monumental "one-volume Judaica"

• Compiled and printed in Israel by the publisher of *Encyclopaedia Judaica* • Edited by Geoffrey Wigoder, Editor-in-Chief of the *Encyclopaedia Judaica* • Complete in one volume of 720 pages, 11¼" high, 8¾" wide. Weight 5½ lbs. • Illustrated with 2,000 treasures of the Jewish past from the great museums, libraries, galleries, archaeological sites, and private collections. • Published at $29.95.

SOME BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE JEWISH BOOK CLUB

1. Savings up to 50%: On Jewish-interest reference, fiction, history, biography, archaeology, cooking, travel, religion, art, children's books, records, limited-edition etchings, unique deluxe gift editions.
2. Quality editions: All books are identical to the publishers' editions in content, format, size, and quality.
3. Free Magazine: The *Jewish Book News* provides lively reviews of books, art, and recordings of Jewish interest.
4. A complete cultural service for the Jewish family. You'll be able to keep abreast of the best and most important books of Jewish interest — many not available to the general public or stocked by local stores.
5. Your minimum obligation: As few as four selections the first year.
6. A convenience and time-saver: Home shopping & home delivery.

HOW THE JEWISH BOOK CLUB WORKS:

After your membership is accepted, you will begin receiving the *Jewish Book News*, a free publication sent to you thirteen times a year (about every four weeks). All selections and alternates will be described in advance in the magazine.
If you want the main selection featured in the magazine, do nothing and it will be sent to you automatically. If you want an alternate or no book at all, simply indicate your choice on the order form always enclosed with the *News* and return it to us so that we receive it by the date specified. This date is designed to allow you at least 10 days to decide whether you want the selection.
Membership guarantee: If your *News* is delayed in the mail and therefore you receive the main selection without having had ten days to notify us, you may return that selection at our expense.

THE JEWISH BOOK CLUB 165 East 56th Street New York, N.Y. 10022

☐ Please send the ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF JUDAICA (regularly $29.95) at the special new member price of $10.00 and enroll me in the Jewish Book Club. I agree to accept as few as 4 selections or alternates during the next 12 months at the special member's prices plus a small charge for postage and handling. All selections and alternates will be described for me in advance in *The Jewish Book News* and I may decline any of them by returning the printed card provided.

☐ Check for $10.00 enclosed.

☐ Bill me.

☐ I am already a member of the Jewish Book Club, but would like to have the ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF JUDAICA at the special price of $10.00. Therefore, I agree to purchase an additional 4 selections or alternates during the next year.

NAME

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

SIGNATURE

A Service of the American Jewish Committee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

YOM KIPPUR AND AFTER

The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis

Galia Golan

Based on up-to-date sources from both the Soviet Union and Arab countries, the author provides the first detailed analysis of the controversial role of the Soviet Union in the Yom Kippur war in this first book on Soviet policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
$18.95

IN STALIN'S TIME

Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction

Vera S. Dunham

"Vera S. Dunham's *In Stalin's Time* is a valuable study of Soviet literature as well as one of the very few successful attempts to explain the non-political aspects of the Soviet ethos and way of life."—*The New Leader*
$16.95

IN THE ANGLO-ARAB LABYRINTH

The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretation 1914-1939

Elie Kedouri

"He manages to combine a scholarly, rigorous reconstruction and analysis with some of the narrative excitement of a Graham Greene novel."—*Book Forum*
$32.50

A CHANCE TO LEARN

The History of Race and Education in the United States

Meyer Weinberg

This book studies the exclusion, deprivation, and discrimination of the public schools against the Blacks, Mexican-Americans, Native Americans and Puerto-Ricans.
Forthcoming

Now in paperback . . .

THE LIFE OF RICHARD WAGNER

In Four Volumes

Ernest Newman

Volume 1 1813-1848; Volume 2 1848-1860; Volume 3 1859-1866; Volume 4 1866-1883. Each volume $ 8.95
Four volume set $29.95

Cambridge University Press
32 East 57 Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

obscure life and tragic death, as a literary Marxist of genius, it was for some time an open question whether he would follow Scholem's encouragement and give his attention to serious Jewish studies; but his absorption with European literary criticism proved too strong. The tribute to him in this book is an elegy of the deepest friendship, made all the more poignant by Scholem's still keenly-felt disappointment and irritation at the Marxist "aberrations" in Benjamin's thought.

S.Y. Agnon, the master of modern Hebrew fiction and Nobel Prize laureate, seems much closer to Russia and Israel than to Germany, but the twelve years he lived in that country (1912-24) were in fact formative, a period in which the young writer opened his mind to Western literature, absorbed but indestructibly alone in the midst of German culture. Scholem knew Agnon for fifty years, and with the guidance he offers in a loving essay, the reader can begin to come to terms with the tension that lies behind Agnon's calm, almost noble style. This elegist of Russian Jewry, bound to that community with every fiber of his being, was torn between the acceptance and rejection of tradition in a way that was utterly familiar to someone of Scholem's own, very different, background. Scholem sees him as the supreme expositor of "the *Verlorenheit* and alienation of the modern Jew who must—or fails to—come to terms with himself without the guiding lights of a tradition that has ceased to be meaningful." If Agnon's dilemma as a Jew, uprooted and left without faith, was universal in its implication, it is appropriate that Germany—arch-symbol of secularism to Russian Jews—should have been the generative focus of his vision.

But it is Martin Buber—perhaps surprisingly—who emerges as offering the deepest tribute to the German involvement. To the young Scholem and his friends, Buber—an older man—had seemed the true prophet of a Judaism restored. Rejecting the stifling rabbinic background in which he had been nurtured, Buber expressed a truly Nietzschean resolve to create new values, leaping over the sterility of exile to the true spirituality of primordial biblical feeling. By reinterpreting history as self-perpetuating myth, he seemed to be rescuing Jewish life from a dead historicism. In collecting and publishing Hasidic tales of quiet mysterious power, he was revealing the insight that lies in simplicity, in paradox, in personal involvement. *Erlebnis*—the living experience—was the locus of truth. The here-and-now, however humdrum and fleeting, could come to express eternal significance.

As the years passed, however, the windiness in Buber's approach became more pronounced, and it was probably this, more than anything else, that gradually made Scholem suspicious of what Buber was doing to resolve the Jewish problem they had all inherited. Scholem is impish with Buber, full of admiration for the power and originality of his mind, but gently satirical over the fact that, as time went on, the man whom the non-Jewish world came to regard as the apostle of a new Judaism "spoke a language that was more comprehensible to everybody else than to the Jews themselves." On the proper interpretation of Hasidism the two were straight rivals. It annoyed Scholem that Buber refused to produce the sources for his Hasidic tales, and he took this as support for his contention that in turning his back on the kabbalist theology from which Hasidism sprang, Buber was being false to history.

The real trouble lay deeper. Buber was essentially a poet, though a cloudy one, in a high-flown style redolent of the German *Geist*. "German mysticism attracted him even before he sought and came to know Jewish mysticism," Scholem says, with a certain impatience. "He wrote not as an observer but as one deeply affected." And from the inside, rather than as an observer, Buber's language had taken off into a realm beyond ordinary Jewish experience. For Scholem such an approach "could not bear the scrutiny of historical observation." Yet in expressing his own growing sense of distance from Buber's ideas, he saw the "considerable magic" they exuded, emerg-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing from a depth of direct mystical feeling that was, perhaps, beyond his own grasp. He concedes, in tribute to their lifelong friendship, that "Buber's capacity to grasp nuances of the inexpressible in words was extraordinary," even though—he quickly adds—"it makes his writings well-nigh untranslatable."

IF, FOR Scholem, the trouble with Buber is that "he wrote not as an observer but as one deeply affected," what, one is tempted to ask, is Scholem's own relation to Kabbalah, the body of thought (and practice) he has devoted a lifetime to analyzing and explaining? An anecdote in this book is very much to the point. It seems that on his arrival in Jerusalem as a young man of twenty-two, Scholem sought out a community of kabbalists. He asked the leader—a man of about seventy—if he could be instructed. The man looked at Scholem for a long time, checked his forehead lines, and said: "I am prepared to teach you, but only on condition that you do not ask any questions." Scholem thought about it, and then said, "I can't." The historian, always a questioner, was never going to become a true believer.

But if in this sense Scholem has remained outside Kabbalah, magic has surfaced nevertheless in the extraordinary impact his books have had on the Israeli reading public, especially the young. A generation overwhelmingly secular has found in his work a marvelous historical illumination—almost an annealment. In a quite unexpected way his work has enriched the Israeli present by bringing it into tune with the past. Scholem must feel this, and perhaps it serves to soften the sadness he expresses when he looks back, after his long identification with Israel, at the spiritual condition of the Jewish community there. That the tone of Israeli society is secular does not in itself disturb him; secularism is a phase that man has now to pass through. "The barbarism of the so-called new culture" would be tolerable if one could see some fructifying seed for the future. But "I see something today that I didn't see fifty years ago: the threat of death, of oblivion. . . ."

This is Scholem at an uncharacteristically somber and apocalyptic moment. Scholem the historian, however, has shown repeatedly and emphatically that history works in unpredictable ways. In what may be an unconscious kabbalistic metaphor, he says at one point that we cannot explain to ourselves "what sparks functioned and sustained whatever remained alive" in the successive crises of Jewish history. In kabbalistic terms, the readers of Scholem's books are collecting divine sparks from the *klipot*, or husks, in which God's original perfection lies scattered, awaiting restoration through faith.

Defending the Boss

TWEED'S NEW YORK: ANOTHER LOOK. By LEO HERSHKOWITZ. *Anchor Press-Doubleday. 409 pp. $12.50.*

Reviewed by SUZANNE WEAVER

ON JULY 8, 1871, the New York *Times* announced a journalistic and political coup: it had managed to get its hands on documentary evidence of enormous frauds committed against the taxpayers of New York City by the Tweed ring. These revelations helped fuel a grand-jury investigation that had already begun to examine the misdeeds of William M. Tweed, Grand Sachem of the Tammany Society, the Democratic party's political club which, many thought, controlled city politics. The upshot of the *Times* campaign was that Tweed was removed from his offices, convicted in the criminal courts, and sent off to what became death in prison and a name synonymous with urban corruption.

A century or so later, Tweed once again made the *Times* front page. This time it was because Professor Leo Hershkowitz of Queens College said he had unearthed city documents revealing that the newspaper may have pilloried an innocent man. Tweed had been sen-

SUZANNE WEAVER *teaches political science at Yale.*

"A masterwork—
the most important work on creativity and its 'magic synthesis' that the world has yet had."—*Leon Edel*

CREATIVITY

The Magic Synthesis
Silvano Arieti

This internationally renowned psychiatrist and National Book Award-winning author offers a new understanding of the process-of-mind that lies behind all creativity, in the arts and sciences, religion and philosophy, even in humor. In his provocative conclusion, Dr. Arieti examines the factors that contribute to the high incidence of creativity in the Jewish community and suggests ways these same influences can be brought to bear on society at large.

"Stimulating and valuable—this will certainly become a source book for all future writers on the subject."
—Anthony Storr, *Washington Post*

20,000 copies in print.
Main Selection, Behavioral Science Book Service.
Alternate Selection, *Psychology Today* Book Club.

Illustrated, $15.95 at bookstores, or direct from the publisher.

BASIC BOOKS, INC.
10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tenced to jail on the basis of crimes for which he was never really tried and of which he most probably could not have been found guilty.

IN *Tweed's New York,* Hershkowitz makes this charge and more. According to him, the *Times* and its allies, far from deposing Tweed in behalf of New York's best interests, had only been acting as agents of a mean-minded collection of bankers, sensation-peddlers, and politically ambitious opportunists hiding their motives under the label of reform. Not they but Tweed had been New York's champion—it was Tweed who expanded the city's transportation and park facilities, who began new social programs, who defended the educational interests of the Catholic immigrants. The *Times* in its witch-hunting had not been saving the city from Tweed, but protecting itself from the diverse, tolerant city that Tweed represented.

Hershkowitz tells in detail how this miscarriage of justice came to pass. Tweed was born in New York in 1823 to a chairmaker of Scottish descent and no discoverable religion. He cast his first vote in 1844 for the Native Americans, his second in 1846 for the Whigs. His career as an activist began in the city's fraternal organizations—in the Odd Fellows and the volunteer fire companies, from one of which he was suspended for having his men waylay and attack another company on the way to a fire. By 1850, Tweed had settled in with the Democrats, and gotten himself nominated for assistant alderman from the Seventh Ward. He finally became an alderman in 1851, and from then on was rarely without one public office or another. He rose through Democratic ranks, though not without setbacks. By 1863 he was elected president of the city's Board of Supervisors, by 1867 to the state Senate, and in 1869 he was unanimously chosen as Tammany's Grand Sachem.

But by the time he assumed that highly visible stewardship, the post was becoming something of a hazard to one's political health. As Martin Shefter, the Cornell political scientist, has pointed out, New York was then going through the kind of time that has preceded each of its major financial crises over the past hundred years. There were new social groups to be incorporated into the city's political system—in this case both the immigrant Irish and the newer elements of the business community who would most benefit from the city's geographical expansion. Those who chose to build their political careers on these bases—like Tweed—had to pay something for their support. Coin of payment ranged from patronage and more or less honest kinds of graft to public and social services.

All of this cost money. And the city in Tweed's time found it easier to raise that money through debt than through new taxes. In 1860, New York's outstanding debt was $20 million. It rose to $56 million in 1869 and $87 million by 1871. Parts of the financial community demanded a political leadership that would give better protection to their city-related investments, and they found allies in good-government reformers more than willing to open a frontal attack on existing officials' corruption and fraud.

Tweed became the chief target of this attack. Since the beginning of his career, the city's press had been accusing him of various kinds of malfeasance: by 1852 the *Tribune* had already charged him with election bribery. But it was in 1871 that the investigators finally got what they wanted. They said they had found the records of gross padding of bills by city contractors—and that the kickback money had gone to enrich Tweed and his ring. On the basis of such evidence, over a score of indictments were handed down against Tweed. He was finally tried—while most of his alleged cronies escaped—on the misdemeanor of failing properly to audit city accounts. He was convicted in 1873 despite the tainted character of the direct evidence against him, and he was sentenced to thirteen years'

Timely Analysis...

To foster ideologically pure Marxist/Leninist models or to build pragmatic alliances—this is the dilemma of Soviet and Chinese policy that Richard Lowenthal analyzes "with lucid, original, informed and often brilliant insights."
—Alexander Dallin, Stanford University.

Richard Lowenthal

MODEL OR ALLY?

The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries

$12.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confinement for crimes that the convicting jury had been led to believe carried only a one-year sentence. He spent almost all the rest of his life in jail, and near the end of it produced a full confession of his sins, as a plea for leniency. The plea was futile, and Tweed died a prisoner in 1878.

IN ALL of this the reformers acted with the vindictive self-righteousness and the unrestrained partisanship that have quite rightly begun to make them an object of some contempt in modern eyes. Hershkowitz is at his best in giving vivid evidence of those qualities. But at times he wants to argue more, and this creates difficulties. Hershkowitz wants to give the impression that Tweed was innocent, that in fact he was something akin to a patron saint of New York; and so we are somehow led to believe that the charges against him were false and that a substantive travesty of justice took place. Yet on the crucial question of the kickbacks themselves, Hershkowitz's only verdict is, "Probably no one will ever know." In the same way we are told with some casualness about Tweed's making money off city business (as a member of the Board of Education's school-furniture committee, he "sold a few chairs to the city"). We are told how he made "many appointments of friends and intimates" to city government because "it was the way things were and indeed are." We are given no assessment of the election-fraud charges that Tweed trailed behind him throughout his career. We are told that Tweed held very little power—each post of his, up to his leadership of Tammany, is described as something "of no consequence," something that "did not mean too much." And in the end we are left wondering how it was that Tweed managed to provide for his and his friends' survival in public life, let alone how he managed to accomplish the many acts of service that this book credits to him.

For we are also told that Tweed had the best of motives toward the city and the best of effects on it. Tweed in the state legislature was notable for the "long series of social legislation" he sponsored. He "moved to meet the needs of an emerging metropolis. His was from the start an active and vital role, an expanding one, one indispensable to New York's well-being. . . ." His plan to aid Catholic schools is to be understood not mainly as a vote-getting scheme but as a "solution to the problems causing concern to the city's poor since existing private institutions no longer kept pace with the rapid urban growth." And if a fitting statue were to be built today to Tweed, "it would be his city alive and well."

And what of the debt that accumulated during those years? According to Hershkowitz it is not to be counted against Tweed—even though he did father all those new programs and construction projects. The debt itself, we are told, "was New York, a quality of life, population growth, industrialism, inflation, a host of factors"—certainly nothing to justify the judgments cast upon it by the "penny-wise, pound-foolish planners."

In one sense, when he says such things, Hershkowitz is simply continuing a line of argument begun as far back as the 1940's with the republication of *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall.* This was the writing that came to debunk the eminently debunkable pretensions of New York's reformers, and to point out that what they set out to destroy—the politics of the machine—had had its benefits as well as its costs. But with works like *Tweed's New York,* we see this challenge to conventional wisdom ripening into a moralism of its own. The defense of the machine has become as pious and partisan as the reformers were. The attackers of the *Times* have come to sound like the *Times* itself.

When one searches for reasons behind this new moralism, one finds them not in the politics of last century's New York but in today's. Over the past hundred years there has been a major change in the etiology of the city's corruption: the upper-class social descendants of those who destroyed the 19th-century machine for its dishonest practices came a century later to favor urban programs and services that led to much the same kind of practice. But beneath this difference Hershkowitz sees a similarity that

PUBLISH YOUR BOOK IN 90 DAYS

Wanted: book manuscripts on all subjects. Expert editing, design, manufacture and marketing—all under one roof. Completed books in 90 days. Low break-even. Two FREE books and literature give details, costs, success stories. Write or phone Dept. 371

EXPOSITION PRESS, INC.
900 So. Oyster Bay Rd., Hicksville, N.Y. 11801
(516) 822-5700 (212) 895-0081

Le Moal

942 Third Avenue
(Between 56 & 57 St.)
New York, N.Y. 10022/MU 8-8860

W.J. WEATHERBY
SQUARING OFF

MAILER vs. BALDWIN
"Fascinating...grand reading."
—Publishers Weekly

Portraits of both men: as emerging artists, as spokesmen of an era, as friendly enemies, as deadly friends, as losers and winners-take-all. $9.95

MASON / CHARTER
641 LEXINGTON AVE./NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An attractive, inexpensive family edition of—

THE PASSOVER HAGGADAH

With English translation, introduction, explanations, and commentaries, based on the Haggadah studies of E. D. Goldschmidt. Edited by Nahum Glatzer.

Illustrated with woodcuts from the famous Prague Haggadah of 1526 • 126 pages • available as a sturdy softcover edition • stain and grease resistant

Now everyone can be on the same page of the Haggadah at the same time! Unique among the many editions of the Haggadah that are available, this volume—edited by the distinguished scholar Nahum Glatzer—is a veritable encyclopedia in miniature, a source-book of fascinating lore pertaining to every aspect—from the simplest to the most abstruse—of the ancient festival of Passover. Commentaries and essays by such distinguished scholars and thinkers as Solomon Zeitlin, Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, buttress a text thoroughly annotated to provide guidance and illumination from the first Kiddush through the final singing of Had Gadya. With the help of this Haggadah—beautifully clear, legible, and compact—even a relative newcomer to the patriarchal role can guide his family through the wonderful intricacies of the Passover ritual—whether he chooses to preside over an elaborate traditional Seder, or a simpler, more improvised contemporary celebration.

Softcover Haggadahs	Prices
10 or more copies	$1.95 each
1 to 9 copies	$2.25 each

THE JEWISH BOOK CLUB *165 East 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022*

Please send me: ___Soft cover Haggadahs @ $_____ each. Total $_____

☐ Payment enclosed. (The Jewish Book Club pays all packing and shipping charges.)

NAME_____

ADDRESS_____

CITY_____ STATE_____ ZIP_____

he finds even more important and morally significant. To him, the free-spending fiscal policies of the Lindsayite 60's are the functional equivalent of the free-spending practices of Boss Tweed, and the bankers who want to call New York to account today are the functional equivalent of the anti-urban, anti-cosmopolitan reformers of yesteryear. If the fiscal conservatives can be shown to have been in the wrong then, we can learn a proper mistrust for their motives now.

Yet though Hershkowitz is right to note similarities where they exist, surely it is no service either to New York's present condition or to our understanding of its history simply to exonerate from wrongdoing those whose political style one happens to admire or whose intentions one happens to approve. There are limits; New York's leadership has transgressed them recently—and, most probably, so did Tweed. They are the limits and complications that this book chooses not to call attention to. So we find here that Tweed has once again been pressed into the service of partisan and factional polemics, and it comes as no surprise that his reputation has been somewhat distorted in the process, just as it was the last time around.

Transfigured Dread

ROBERT FROST: THE LATER YEARS, 1938-1963. By LAWRANCE THOMPSON and R. H. WINNICK. *Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 468 pp. $17.95.*

Reviewed by EDWARD HIRSCH

THIS volume concludes a venture begun "officially" in 1939 when Robert Frost asked Lawrance Thompson to become his official biographer, and unofficially in 1926 when Thompson, a young undergraduate at Wesleyan, sat in the audience listening to "The Freedom of the Moon." This was the

EDWARD HIRSCH, *a new contributor, has published poems and reviews in the* Nation, *the* New Republic, *and the New York* Times Book Review.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first Frost poem that Thompson had ever heard and we may assume that Frost "said" it, as he usually "said" his poems, with playfulness and a spirited sense of his own performance. The poem concludes, as it begins, with a mischievous placing of the moon.

I put it shining anywhere I please.
By walking slowly on some evening later.
I've pulled it from a crate of crooked trees,
And brought it over glossy water, greater,
And dropped it in, and seen the image wallow,
The color run, all sorts of wonder follow.

All sorts of wonder did indeed follow, including the wonder of a friendship that seemed to cement itself over three and a half decades. In 1938 Thompson served as an honorary bearer at Elinor Frost's funeral service, in 1939 he agreed to do the authorized biography, and in 1942 he published a full-length study of the poems. Thompson had full access to Frost's manuscripts and correspondence, he had ample time to track down the living relatives and friends, and he spent thousands of hours, in public and private, with the man himself. (Even before beginning the biography Thompson had played Boswell to Frost's Johnsonian monologues by planting stenographers in the audience during Frost's appearances on college campuses.)

In 1964, as a supposed curtain-raiser to the biography, Thompson edited Frost's *Selected Letters,* and suddenly the impenetrable Yankee mask showed signs of cracking. Then in 1966, three years after Frost's death, Thompson published the first book of his projected trilogy, *The Early Years, 1847-1915;* in 1970 he followed with *The Years of Triumph, 1915-1938.* Together, these two volumes—at times penetrating, at times moralistic, and oddly scolding—served as a kind of scalpel to cut through the sugary layers of the Frost legend. To nearly everyone's surprise, the maple-stained face of the New England farmer-poet, a face that had animated dozens of tactful memoirs, showed dark ridges under the eyes and warts on the cheek that were deep as bruises. In two massive, scholarly swipes Thompson had carved an irrevocable gash in the legendary persona, and finally the Frost story, which had aspirations to myth, returned to its just human proportions.

But Thompson did not live to complete his long journey (cutting tool in hand) through the misleading bramble of Robert Frost's life. In 1971, after receiving a Pultizer Prize for *The Years of Triumph,* he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. From June 1972 until August 1973 Thompson worked courageously (and courage was the virtue that his subject most prized) with his student R.H. Winnick on the final volume. After Thompson's death Winnick went on to complete the book himself; it is to his lasting credit that *The Later Years* reads

FOR A PASSOVER GIFT, GIVE



Hardcover, 8¼"x10¾",
208 photographs
$14.95

SCHOCKEN
200 Madison Avenue, New York 10016

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIMITED EDITION ETCHING, SIGNED AND NUMBERED BY

Jules Maidoff

King David

"Maidoff's work reveals the human condition in a highly personal way, yet it is universal in its impact because of his sensitive and poetic approach."
—Oriole Farb, Director, Riverside Museum, New York

This graphic adventure blends the richly textured and fascinating interplay of an ancient subject in a modern treatment. In soft tones of sepia, it measures 16" x 17¾" on an ivory-colored sheet 21" x 29½". This edition was limited to 200.

Jules Maidoff's rare gifts have not gone unnoticed. He is represented in museums and private collections both in this country and in Europe, and his many exhibitions have been warmly and enthusiastically received. (His work in galleries starts at $75.00.)

$60.00 including special packaging, postage, and insurance.

Commentary Art Treasures
165 East 56 Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10022

I have enclosed my check for $_____ to cover the cost of *King David* @ $60.00 apiece. This includes postage and insurance. If I am not completely satisfied, I may return this work in good condition, insured, within ten days, and you will send me a prompt refund.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

as a fitting close to Thompson's monumental work. It is readable, moving, conclusive, minutely detailed. And it continues the pattern, so resolutely stitched into the earlier volumes, of presenting the darker side of the New England poet.

From the beginning Thompson's method has been both curious and revealing—curious because, as Dan Jacobson has pointed out,* it continually puts the worst possible construction on its subject's behavior, and revealing because, despite a bias disguised as objectivity, it does give us another, more realistic version of the man. The "other Frost" was more willful and vindictive, more of a careerist and more jealous of competitors than anyone seems to have imagined. He is certainly less likable, but also cagier and more complex, more disturbed and disturbing. This is not quite the implied author of "Birches," though it does help to explain the Yankee editorialist who is always cropping up in the *Collected Poems*. It cruelly undercuts the lovable figure who is always pacing through the pages of *Collecting Maple Syrup* and *Walks and Talks Through the Forests with Frost*. And, finally, it does give us a deeper explanation of the mind that once guided Frost through those terrifying regions called "Design" and "Desert Places."

THE LAST quarter-century of Robert Frost's life were years of ghosts, glories, and poems. They begin with Frost, at sixty-four, near nervous collapse, paralyzed by despair and guilt over his wife's death, and they conclude with his death in 1963. Only eighteen days before that latter event Frost had written that, if he regained his health, he would go deeper into life. This final letter was dictated to Anne Gentry and her mother Kathleen Morrison, "who devises all my future," and it is entirely likely that without Mrs. Morrison at his side Frost would never have lived as long as he did. In fact, he might never have survived Elinor Frost's death if Kay Morrison had not taken him in tow and thereafter served as a secretary, friend, and companion. Not only did she devise his future, determining schedules and deflecting correspondents, but she also helped to assuage his griefs.

There were plenty of griefs to assuage. In 1940, Frost's only living son, Carol, committed suicide; Frost partially blamed himself. Six years earlier, his favorite daughter, Marjorie, had died of puerperal fever after a series of nervous breakdowns. There was a deep strain of nervous illness in the family: in 1947 another daughter, Irma, showing symptoms that strangely resembled her aunt's (in 1929 Jeannie Frost had died in an institution), succumbed to the dread illness and was committed to a hospital. One need not enter the moral swamp of Frost's guilt in these matters to see that Frost recognized his own part in the breakdowns of his children. Bernard De Voto once said to him, "Robert, you're a good poet, but a bad man," and though at times he paraded that badge proudly, at other times it led him to his own duels with the internal dragon. But it was only his wife's death, and her deathbed silence toward him, that brought Frost to the point of breakdown, and nearly defeated him. So it was Kay Morrison's aid that insured his longevity—that, and the business of collecting glories and writing poems. The unquenchable thirst for honors kept Frost moving to the last. The poems continued to serve as weapons and as watering places where he could "Drink and be whole again beyond confusion." Frost had his immedicable woes, but he remained committed to a playfulness that could transfigure dread. It is the significant, saving part of his homemade Emersonian aesthetic.

FROST'S honors during the last third of his life are nearly too numerous to list. These were the years in which Frost became America's unofficial poet laureate, taking goodwill trips to Brazil and the Mediterranean, meeting Khrushchev in the Soviet Union, accepting honorary degrees at Oxford and Cambridge and at umpteen universities at home, collecting a fourth Pulitzer Prize and a first Bollingen, reading two poems at John F. Kennedy's

* In a review of *The Years of Triumph*, COMMENTARY, July 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inauguration (a poor poem badly, and a marvelous poem marvelously), and on and on. During these years he also became a familiar figure on the lecture circuit, sometimes exhibiting the conservative anti-intellectual strains that ran so dep in his character, sometimes parading a personal philosophy that is a curious blend of Emerson's "Self Reliance" and William James's "The Will To Believe." Usually—because he loved to perform—Frost recited poems from memory, entangling the speaking voice in the words and contributing his part toward enhancing the mythic figure who bestrides the collected works.

FINALLY, it is the poems that matter. Thompson's "Life" darkens the achievement, but it does not diminish it. Frost's last two books, *Steeple Bush* (1947) and *In The Clearing* (1962), show something of a falling off, but *A Witness Tree* (1942) is, in its own way, nearly as perfect a book as *North of Boston*. Certainly it contains some of the finest poems written in this century. "The Gift Outright" is the equal of Emerson's "Concord Hymn" and probably our greatest "patriotic" poem. "The Silken Tent" is a one-sentence sonnet worthy of Petrarch. And few besides Shakespeare and Wordsworth have written sonnets with the grace and beauty of "Never Again Would Birds' Song Be The Same."

He would declare and could himself believe
That the birds there in all the garden round
From having heard the daylong voice of Eve
Had added to their own an oversound,
Her tone of meaning but without the words.
Admittedly an eloquence so soft
Could only have had an influence on birds
When call or laughter carried it aloft.
Be that as may be, she was in their song.
Moreover her voice upon their voices crossed
Had now persisted in the woods so long
That probably it never would be lost.

A BOOK YOU WILL NEVER FORGET!

"A tender and truthful book."
—**Irving Howe**

"Once you have begun this book, you will not be able to put it down."
—**Lucy S. Dawidowicz**

"A book that engulfs us in tragedy and heroism intermingled into a necessarily balanced account."
—**Alfred Kazin**

"An extremely important book."
—**New York Times Book Review**

A profoundly stirring portrait of the men and women who survived the Nazi death camps and came to live in America after the war, *New Lives* tells what it is like to have been through the worst that man can do to man . . . and then to begin again, to embrace life.

New Lives is a series of individual portraits—true stories told to the author by the survivors themselves. Sometimes sad, sometimes valiant, sometimes even funny, these stories are—every one of them—extraordinary personal histories. They tell of the survivors' reactions to liberation, their arrival in America, how they went about finding a job and a place to live, how they felt about raising a new family, and—most of all—their problems in trying to fit into a world that did not understand the nightmare they had emerged from. *New Lives* is a remarkable work—a major contribution. It will be eagerly read by everyone who wants to understand the experience of the Jewish people in the twentieth century. **$8.95**



Jewish Book Club
165 East 56 Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Please send me _____ copy(ies) of *New Lives* at $8.95 each.

My check for $_____ is enclosed

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For Passover

The Passover Haggadah
With English Translation, Introduction, Explanations, and Illustrations
Edited by NAHUM N. GLATZER
"I have surveyed any number of Haggadahs in English and have concluded that the Schocken Haggadah is the best on the market."
—Rabbi Ben-Zion Gold, Harvard-Radcliffe Hillel Society
Paperback $2.25

The Jewish Festivals
History and Observance
HAYYIM SCHAUSS
Explains all of the major and minor Jewish holy days in terms of ritual, prayers, ceremonial objects, special foods and symbolism.
Paperback $3.95

Guide for the Jewish Homemaker
SHONIE B. LEVI and SYLVIA R. KAPLAN
A guidebook for use throughout the year, it is especially use for Pesach.
Paperback $2.75

At your bookstore or from SCHOCKEN
200 Madison Avenue, New York 10016

WHY ARE SO MANY JEWISH NAMES IN INTERPOL FILES?

Read the answer to this and other vital questions in



$8.95

available at bookstores or from

RALSTON-PILOT, INC., Publishers
6565 Sunset Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90028

Never again would birds' song be the same.
And to do that to birds was why she came.

It is not because he was a lovable or a detestable figure that Robert Frost compels the imagination, but because he charged and revealed the American atmosphere, deepening our unique conception of nature. No song about the American garden will ever sound the same after hearing Robert Frost's song of Adam and Eve. And, like Eve's effect on birds' song, to do that to us was why he came.

The Artist & His Ideas

DOSTOEVSKY: THE SEEDS OF REVOLT, 1821-1849. By JOSEPH FRANK. *Princeton University Press. 401 pp. $16.50.*

Reviewed by MAURICE FRIEDBERG

IN RECENT years, Dostoevsky criticism has tended to downgrade the role of ideas in the novelist's work and to concentrate instead on the formal aspects of his prose. This has been true not only in the West but also (to a lesser degree) in the USSR, though for opposite reasons.

In the West, Dostoevsky's ideas have been ignored in the general preoccupation of critics with structure and ambience at the expense of content in a literary work. In the USSR, on the other hand, "formal" approaches to Dostoevsky's work (like Mikhail Bakhtin's now-famous theory of "polyphony") have been tolerated precisely because they have tended to muffle the opinions of the single most dissonant figure in old Russia's literary tradition, opinions that could not be either described as mildly "progressive" or dismissed as irrelevant to Soviet reality. For decades Dostoevsky was relegated to the status of a rather minor novelist in the Soviet Union—this, despite the fact that Lenin's description of Tolstoy as a mirror of the Russian revolution is actually a far more apt label for Dostoevsky, who not only took up the cause of the downtrodden and the humiliated, but also warned against the false panaceas and painful choices that the process of emancipation would inevitably bring.

In short, Dostoevsky's ideas have been ignored in the West because they were considered not to matter, and ignored in the USSR because they were considered to matter too much. Now, thanks to the effort of Joseph Frank, who has undertaken a task that may only be described as herculean, there is a chance that the balance can at last be redressed. In four volumes, of which the present is the first, he proposes to restore Dostoevsky to his place in intellectual history without detracting from his stature as an artist. Frank aims at presenting Dostoevsky's writings

> as a brilliant artistic synthesis of the major issues of his time, a personal utterance, to be sure, but one, more than most, oriented by concerns outside himself. It is not simply—as we too often tend to think in the West—the passionately febrile expression of an unbalanced but extraordinarily gifted temperament. Indeed, one way of defining Dostoevsky's genius is to locate it in his ability to fuse his private dilemmas with those raging in the society of which he was a part.

This opening volume deals with the first twenty-eight years of Dostoevsky's life, up to his sentencing and exile for participation in a socialist study circle. It contains a magnificent portrait of Dostoevsky as a young man, and a number of remarkably lucid and perceptive short essays on several of his early works—notably *Poor Folk, The Double,* and *Netochka Nezvanova.* In addition, there is an unexpected and welcome portrait of Vissarion Belinsky, perhaps the most influential Russian literary critic of all time. These original contributions are the more impressive in that Frank is not, by his own admission, "a professional Slavist"—he teaches comparative literature at Princeton —and is dealing here in a period

MAURICE FRIEDBERG, *professor of Russian literature at the University of Illinois, is the author of, most recently,* A Decade of Euphoria: Western Literature in Post-Stalin Russia *(Indiana University Press).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Noose is Tightening Around Man and Civilization

Western society has abandoned its God and is lost in a void of moral anarchy. The civilization we know is threatened by a new Dark Age.

By the turn of the century we will be confronted with abortions-by-demand-of-the-State and the death-by-decree of the sick and elderly. The planned birth, the planned lifespan, and the planned death will be upon us.

Let us resist this barbarous threat to man's existence, more dangerous than all the nuclear bombs.

The Non Sectarian Committee for Life
Box 1234, Mount Vernon, N.Y. 10551

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE
RAPOPORT
FAMILY TREE

A RECORD OF ITS ORIGIN IN 15TH CENTURY ITALY

From the Hebrew
of Rabbi E. Carmoly 1861

An English Version

BY JOSEPH RAPOPORT
in A Limited Edition Booklet
Printed in Verona

$8.50 Postpaid

Send your cheque with order to
"RAVENS"
P.O. Box 507, Station Youville,
Montréal, Québec, CANADA
H2P 2W1

Take militant liberalism and democratic socialism—shake well—and what do you get?

One answer appears in *Socialism and Liberalism: Articles of Conciliation?* by Irving Howe

Every reflective liberal (and undogmatic socialist) will want to read this comprehensive and provocative essay, featured in the Winter/1977 issue of:

dissent

$2.50 a copy, $10 per year

Dissent, 505 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017
Enclosed find $2.50 (single copy), or $10 (one-year sub). Please send to:

Name .....
(please print)
Street .....
City ..... State .... Zip .....
C-3

which has always been of lesser interest to Western Dostoevsky scholars, preceding, as it did, the major novels. (By the same token, these early years are the ones which have always proven most congenial to Soviet scholars. The Dostoevsky of this period—prior to the writing of *The Idiot, Crime and Punishment, The Possessed,* and *The Brothers Karamazov*—was sufficiently to the Left politically, and sufficiently conventional as an artist, to be ideologically palatable.)

So far as overall literary judgments go, Frank does not diverge too sharply from reigning views. Thus, scholars agree that of Dostoevsky's three early novels, *Poor Folk* was the most strongly influenced by Gogol—much of the novel is in fact a parody of and polemic against Gogol's "The Overcoat." Frank concurs in this judgment, but makes the additional point that *Poor Folk*'s emphasis on the motif of human dignity (a concern largely ignored by Gogol)

> . . . shows Dostoevsky's acute awareness that the spiritual is of equal importance with the material in alleviating the lot of the unfortunate—even, perhaps, of greater importance, since poverty only heightens the need for self-esteem and self-respect to the point of morbidity. Indeed, the prominence of this motif in *Poor Folk* already reveals a tension in Dostoevsky's work that will have extremely important consequences later.

Where Frank does diverge from prevailing scholarship is on a biographical point. Ever since Freud's 1928 essay, "Dostoevsky and Parricide," scholars have traced many features of the novelist's writings and personality to the alleged murder of Dostoevsky's father, a physician of modest means and a stern disciplinarian, by enraged peasants in 1839. This incident is supposed to have been the hidden cause of Dostoevsky's epileptic seizures and also to have brought about his obsession with the subject of parricide (as in *The Brothers Karamazov*). Yet, as Frank demonstrates, recent research has shown that Dostoevsky's father was not in fact murdered, and that there is no evidence of Dostoevsky's epilepsy until nearly a decade after the event.

The second "revisionist" element in Frank's book is the strong emphasis on the importance of religious atmosphere in Dostoevsky's formative years. We are told of the intensely religious atmosphere in the Dostoevsky household, which contrasted with the fashionable agnosticism of Tolstoy's family, or Turgenev's or Herzen's, and many pages are devoted to Dostoevsky's friendship with the strongly religious I. N. Shidlovsky. Indeed, Frank emphasizes Dostoevsky's continued religiosity even during his brief socialist interlude:

> Far from being a political innocent, abruptly baptized into socialism, atheism, and materialism all at once by the great intellectual agitator Belinsky, Dostoevsky was a committed moral-religious progressive who stoutly maintained his convictions in the face of Belinsky's attacks and then allied himself with others of the same persuasion.

But though he himself raises this issue, Frank does not go into it deeply enough, especially when one recalls that, like Shatov in *The Possessed,* Dostoevsky broke with the revolutionary idea largely because he refused to shed his God for a secular cause. Dostoevsky's God, moreover, was not the abstract ethical deity of the left-wing intelligentsia or even the formal God of Russian Orthodox theology. Before encountering these, the young Dostoevsky had first absorbed the personal God emerging from the pages of *One Hundred and Four Stories from the Holy Writ*; this work, which was read to Russian children early in the 19th century, was, to put it mildly, somewhat lacking in the ecumenical spirit, and its influence may partly explain Dostoevsky's later embittered hatred of Roman Catholicism. That Frank does not dwell on such childhood influences or give them their proper due may be attributable to his limited background in Russian literature and history.

There are a few other slips of the same kind. Thus, not all of the Slavophiles were reactionary, as they are made to seem in Frank's account, and not all Westernizers were liberal progressives. It was the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

Commentary neither reports nor summarizes but regularly makes news in the world of ideas.

SEND ME 12 MONTHS OF COMMENTARY FOR $20

Commentary, 165 East 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

☐ I prefer 6 months for $10.50 ☐ Check enclosed ☐ Bill me

(Note: Outside U.S.A. add $4/yr.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An affirmation of the human spirit!

$1.95/80854

An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps

"Stunning"
—The New Republic

"Terrifying"
—Alfred Kazin

"Brilliant"
—E.O. Wilson

"Tormenting"
—Elie Wiesel

NOW IN PAPERBACK FROM
POCKET BOOKS



FASCISM:
A Reader's Guide
Analysis, Interpretation and Bibliography
Edited by **Walter Laqueur**

Here, in what is undoubtedly the definitive treatment of fascism, thirteen authorities provide both a much-needed reference handbook and an original work of synthesis and new interpretation.

A Selection of the Library of Political Affairs Book Club

488 pages, $20.00

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY 94720

Slavophile N. S. Leskov, for example, who wrote the most impassioned defense of Russian Jewry—incidentally, though surely not accidentally, omitted from a recent Soviet edition of his work. Again, the critic Belinsky's letter to Gogol may indeed be "the most powerful indictment against serfdom ever penned in Russian"—but the most important one of all, Alexander Radishchev's novel, *A Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow*, is not even mentioned in Frank's book. Nor is there any mention of Y. E. Golosovker's magnificent study of Dostoevsky and Kant—one of the best works of Soviet literary scholarship on any theme to appear in post-Stalin Russia. Finally, an imperfect command of Russian probably accounts for Frank's failure to discern a number of linguistic allusions in the novels and for the scores of undetected typographical errors in this book.

But though errors of this kind may prove slightly annoying to a narrow circle of specialists, the first of these projected four volumes must be welcomed even by them as a major contribution. We can only look forward eagerly to the completion of this important scholarly undertaking.

Skeptical Socialist

CROOKED PATHS: REFLECTIONS ON SOCIALISM, CONSERVATISM, AND THE WELFARE STATE. By PETER CLECAK. *Harper & Row. 206 pp. $10.95.*

Reviewed by STEPHEN MILLER

PETER CLECAK is a chastened socialist. In his previous book, *Radical Paradoxes*, Clecak was critical of some influential American left-wing thinkers, arguing that they were insufficiently committed to democracy. In *Crooked Paths* he is critical of the democratic-socialist tradition itself. He comes to the camp of his conservative, neoconservative, and liberal enemies with white flag in hand—not exactly surrendering but at least willing to admit that he is "more skeptical than ever about the theoretical coherence and moral aptness—not to mention the political utility—of democratic socialism."

He comes, moreover, with a bill of particulars: democratic socialists have been self-righteous, presuming their notions to be morally superior to all others; they have been simplistic, grouping all opponents of an extended welfare state with the reactionary forces of the Right; and they have been evasive, not facing up to the difficulties inherent in governmental responses to social and economic problems.

Clecak also shrewdly acknowledges that a growing number of persons have a vested interest in an expanding public sector: media people, administrators, social scientists, consultants, educators, public-advocacy lawyers, urban planners, and mental-health professionals. As Clecak knows, many people—including many poor people—are sick of the government's continual meddling in their lives. Governmental intervention, he insists, is not necessarily the best medicine for all our social ills, but one would not know that if one only read liberal and Left commentators who, Clecak says, "have brushed aside far too cavalierly" legitimate questions about the proper nature and degree of state activity.

A democratic socialist's "confession"—for Clecak still thinks of himself as a socialist—is unexpected, useful, even appealing. Many people, I suspect, will praise this book for its absence of ideological passion as well as its ecumenical piety, since Clecak asks "liberals . . . to reconsider becoming democratic socialists, and democratic socialists . . . to adopt elements of a conservative vision, [and] conservatives . . . to entertain socialist ideas. . . ." Who can resist this truism dressed up as political wisdom?

Yet at the risk of appearing to shoot a man when he is humbly offering a peace pipe, I should like to argue that Clecak's book is not only slipshod, it is also much less critical of socialism than it at first

---

STEPHEN MILLER *works for the National Endowment for the Humanities in Washington and has published in* Dissent, Encounter, *the* New Leader, *and elsewhere. His article, "The Poverty of Socialist Thought," appeared in our August 1976 issue*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appears to be. (In addition, the prose is dreary—the book often reads like a committee report.)

Taking a cue from Robert L. Heilbroner, Clecak argues that the notion of relative scarcity has forced socialists to change their long-range strategies and short-run tactics. Because the future promises to be one of diminishing resources, it will be impossible to realize a society where, as Marx would have it, each will be rewarded according to his needs. Yet Clecak never clearly says what, precisely, is required of socialist theory now that it cannot lure mankind on with dreams of an abundant future. In fact, it is hard to know *where* Clecak stands theoretically, since his book exists in that dim zone where politics, economics, and culture intersect—a zone that befuddles all but the most rigorous of thinkers. And Clecak is not rigorous.

As a political theorist, in fact, Clecak fails badly. Though generous to liberals and conservatives, he does not seem to have grappled with the best liberal and conservative thought. It is not true, for example, that those who question socialist assumptions are those who "stress moral visions above all," for the most sophisticated defenders of limited constitutional government and the mixed economies of the West—men like Raymond Aron and F.A. Hayek—are suspicious of moral approaches to politics and political economy. And Michael Oakeshott, the English conservative, explicitly eschews any connection between politics and morality. It is not enough to pay one's respects to one's enemies; one must know the precise nature of their argument against socialism.

In any case, Clecak's theoretical generosity is somewhat misleading, for when he gets down to making practical proposals we discover the old socialist animus against the marketplace. Clecak wants to find a mechanism of allocation that can provide a "just distribution of goods and services"—one that displaces the "supremacy of the economic marketplace" as the final arbiter of a person's intelligence and ability. According to Clecak, once a basic portion of income and wealth is distributed equally, the state should

PHILOSOPHY

Holistic Thought in Social Science

D.C. Phillips. Examines the character and history of holism ("a part cannot be understood in isolation from the whole") and how it has influenced recent social and scientific thought, notably general systems theory, functionalism, structuralism, and Gestalt psychology. $8.50

Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis

Edited by John D. Goheen & John L. Mothershead, Jr. "What we see in these pages is a first-rate philosophical mind rigorously and relentlessly at work over a span of more than fifty years."—*Philosophy and Rhetoric.* $15.00

Lao Tzu and Taoism

Max Kaltenmark. "Presents an impressive breadth of controlled synthesis and rich suggestiveness. . . . Recommended as the best available popular introduction to Taoism."—*History of Religions.* Paper, $1.95; cloth, $6.75

Buddhism in Chinese History

Arthur F. Wright. "A masterly and readable book. . . . Will furnish both specialists and lay inquirers with their clearest frame of reference."—*Journal of the American Oriental Society.* Paper, $2.25; cloth, $6.00

Shapes of Philosophical History

Frank E. Manuel. "An extraordinary intellectual tour de force. . . . An amazing guide through the pages of philosophical history, packed with scholarly details and insightful asides."—*The Nation.* Paper, $2.45; cloth, $7.00

Who is Man?

Abraham J. Heschel. "Learned, lucid, so condensed that many of the thoughts appear as aphorisms. . . . Well defines a number of Judeo-Christian concepts."—*The New York Times Book Review.* Paper, $1.65; cloth, $5.95

Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance

Paul Oskar Kristeller. "Brings out admirably the complexity of the Renaissance with its many different strands. . . . A very useful and lucid book."—*The New York Review of Books.* Paper, $2.45; cloth, $7.50

Law, Liberty, and Morality

H.L.A. Hart. "[Professor Hart's] qualities of mind and style put to shame the prevailing standards of jurisprudential writing in this country."—*The New York Review of Books.* Paper, $1.45; cloth, $4.75

STANFORD

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"develop genuinely meritocratic criteria for allocating the rest."

Clecak assures us that these criteria should be arrived at by democratic means, yet the implementation of such criteria would enormously increase the *ressentiment* of the country's citizens, placing constitutional democracy under a wellnigh intolerable burden. People are inclined to accept their economic fate when it is the result of their luck in the "neutral" world of the marketplace—and when they know it is not directly related to their intrinsic worth. They would be less inclined, I think, to accept their share if it were seen as a judgment on their social and personal worth. And it would not matter if that share were to be assigned to them by democratically-elected politicians, since Americans tend to distrust even those whom they vote for.

Such *ressentiment*, moreover, would probably exist even if there were no question of relative scarcity, for even in a cornucopian society people would be envious of someone else's bigger portion if they thought it came by way of political connections or deals. It is doubtful, then, that the state could maintain its authority and legitimacy if it ventured so extensively into distribution. Does not the experience of the past twenty years in the United States support the following "iron law": the more the government tampers with the daily lives of its citizens, the less authority it ends up having?

Clecak not only thinks the government should assign people their income, he also thinks that it should at times tell them how to spend their money. The state, he says, should get rid of "tasteless opulence," and it should also make sure that there are "fewer plastic goods." Finally, like many socialists, Clecak conjures up "rights" that are ill-defined and virtually meaningless—e.g., "the equal right to a secure life and the equal right to live well."

If Clecak is less than satisfactory in his reflections upon domestic questions, he is even weaker when he comments upon foreign affairs—something, I should add, that he does only in passing, perhaps because he is convinced that this area is much easier for a socialist to deal with. For Clecak socialism means supporting a reduced defense budget and fighting militant anti-Communism—which is, he says, the stock-in-trade of "ambitious political figures." Clecak sees anti-Communism as a tedious American pathology that has been used to bolster defense spending and that has resulted in "protecting a host of tottering, often corrupt regimes. . . ." One hates to bore him with historical details, but he seems to have forgotten about the Marshall Plan.

Like an instant breakfast food, Clecak's recipe for American foreign policy has a few simple directions. Most of the world, it seems, is rapidly turning socialist; therefore, if we want to get on with them, we too must turn socialist. American socialists, unlike American conservatives, can negotiate these rapids because, *qua* socialists, they have a better understanding of global currents. They also have a better rapport with their fellow socialists throughout the world.

Clecak's sketch of a socialist foreign policy is simply inadequate—less a sketch than a few random jottings. The carelessness with which he treats the subject is puzzling, since one assumes that a socialist would be especially concerned about the global problem of an unequal distribution of income and resources. Some socialists, in fact, see this as the main item on the socialist agenda; Richard Lowenthal, the German social democrat, has recently argued that socialism must concern itself with negotiating "a fairer deal for the poor, underdeveloped countries. . . ." Yet, preoccupied with devising strategies of absolute fairness, Clecak scants this question and others—détente and international trade, for example—that have a direct bearing upon domestic socioeconomic arrangements. Perhaps it is not fair to ask Clecak to have written a different book, but one can say that Clecak's brand of "conservative democratic socialism" is not adequate to the task at hand. The paths to the future are crooked indeed—more crooked and more various than Clecak cares to consider.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"I was wondering if I could possibly borrow a cup of Johnnie Walker Black Label."

12 YEAR OLD BLENDED SCOTCH WHISKY. 86.8 PROOF. BOTTLED IN SCOTLAND. IMPORTED BY SOMERSET IMPORTERS, LTD., N.Y., N.Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, Vantage Longs.

The first long cigarette to bring good taste to low-tar smoking.

Like a lot of smokers you may like the idea of a longer cigarette. You may also want low tar.

But longer cigarettes usually have more tar.

Well, Vantage just wouldn't go along with that.

So we worked. Until we could perfect a longer cigarette with the famous Vantage combination of full flavor and low tar.

Not the lowest long cigarette you can find. But very possibly the lowest that you will enjoy.

New Vantage Longs. A blend of flavor-rich tobaccos with tar levels held down to the point where good taste still comes through.

That's the Vantage point. And that's the point of Vantage Longs. Never before has there been a long cigarette quite like it.

Try a pack today and see if you go along with us.

© 1977—R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO.

Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.

11 mg. "tar", 0.9 mg. nicotine av. per cigarette, by FTC method.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED